# Citizens, Mutineers, and Aggressors

The Representation of Soldiers in Three Roman Historians

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I, Timothy Brady, declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been clearly indicated.

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**Abstract**

This thesis examines the portrayal of common citizen-soldiers in the work of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. In doing so, it reveals each historian's perception of the rôle of the citizen-soldier and the social, moral, and political place of military service within the framework of the Roman State. The three historians allow for an exploration of this perception from the Republican period, the reign of Augustus, and the beginning of the 2nd century AD. This allows the reader to follow the development of the ideology of military service in the transition from the Republic to the High Empire. The general scholarly consensus remains that Roman historians did not think about the soldiery in a complicated or nuanced way, and rather that they dismissed and disdained them as an armed mob. This thesis argues against this consensus in support of more recent scholarship that has began to examine how the Roman historians portrayed soldiers in their narrative. Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus each represent soldiers as engaged social and political individuals and military service as being fundamental to their conception of how the common Roman citizen interacted with the Roman state. Sallust presents military service as a unifying, democratic, and – if done correctly – reforming activity that all Roman citizens took part in. For Sallust, military service was so

fundamental to the maintenance of Roman society that the corruption of military *mores* led directly to the corruption of the larger *res publica*. Livy also presents military service as a unifying and reforming activity, but one that was restricted to plebeian soldiers. In his reconstruction of the Early and Middle Republic, military service provided the plebeian citizen with social capital as well as an organised route for political engagement. The army became the vehicle for organised resistance to the Republican élite. The thesis concludes with chapters on Tacitus' *Annales* and *Historiae*. In the *Annales* Tacitus uses the mutiny of AD 14 to demonstrate that organised military resistance was no longer acceptable in the new context of the principate. In the *Historiae* Tacitus establishes that the new dynamics of loyalty in the Imperial Army, where the vital connexion was now between the emperor and the individual soldier, had profoundly altered the relationship that citizen soldiers had with the Roman state.

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# INTRODUCTION

The objective of this thesis is to examine the portrayal of the social and political position of soldiers in the works of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. In so doing, I analyse the ideologies and models of military service presented by these three historians. Their accounts provide insight into each historian's understanding of how the Roman citizens who made up the common soldiery of the legions interacted with each other, with the state, and with other parts of the *res publica*.[1] Given the fundamental rôle that the army played both in the Roman state and in the historical accounts of the three chosen historians, these models contribute to our understanding of how the authors understood Roman citizenship as it applied to non-élite Romans.

It is a commonplace in scholarship about Roman society that the ancient sources, being comprised all but exclusively of élite individuals, had an unsophisticated and negative perception of the common Roman *miles*. To the Roman aristocracy, this narrative has it, the soldier was 'a mercenary', 'an idler', and 'a barbarian.'[2] This supposedly unsophisticated and negative perception is present in Carrié's survey of the presentation of Roman soldiers in the ancient sources, one of the few to attempt such a survey.[3] Nor is this

[1] Throughout this thesis the terms *miles*, soldier, and soldiery will be used to refer to Roman citizens serving in ranks of the Roman legions. These terms will not encompass centurions or officers.

[2] Carrié (1993: 102).

[3] 'In a more Roman, more traditionalist, analysis that describes the evolution of Roman society and institution in terms of corruption, the soldier occupies a place abandoned by the citizen, in moral decline. This intransigent ideology could not even consider the soldier a citizen...'

restricted to scholars writing about other aspects of Roman society, important and influential works on Roman military service also present this perception unchallenged.[4]

To the degree to which the presentation of the soldier has been analysed in the works of Sallust, Livy, or Tacitus, the situation is not much better. Sallust, in particular, has been underserved. In comparison to his political and moral discourse, little attention has been paid to Sallust's presentation of the Roman soldier. A recent work on the Roman army as a social institution does not even include his work in a discussion of the sources for the Roman army.[5] Better work has been done by Milne, but even she is too quick to assume a largely negative conception of the Roman soldier and misses the potential for reform.[6] Other scholars are too quick to read in Sallust a tendency to associate Roman soldiers with barbarians.[7] Limited readings of soldiers and military service in Sallust's work pose problems beyond the confines of military history. Traditional military service was fundamental to Sallust's conception of the idealised, uncorrupted early Republic and to his understanding of the process of decline. Attempting to trace the dynamic of

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Carrié (1993: 105). On the general perception of soldiers in ancient sources, see also e.g. Cloud (1993), Sidebottom (2002).

[4] To remain focussed on the issue as it pertains to the historians considered in my thesis, I shall limit myself to quoting two: in his – still essential – *The Emperor and the Roman Army*, Campbell projects Dio's distaste for Roman soldiers (which he extrapolates from two references within his work) across the entire Roman political class: 'Dio despised these soldiers as uneducated, low-class fellows with whom he could have no affinity or contact and who should not be allowed to rise above their true station in life. It seems likely that in this Dio is representative of his class.' (1985: 10); Phang: 'the upper classes depicted these soldiers as a mercenary rabble...' (2008: 3).

[5] Southern (2007: 18-31).

[6] Milne (2009: 94-121).

[7] E.g. Wiedemann (1993: 54).

moral decline without properly placing military service at the centre of Sallust's understanding of the republic both muddles the process of corruption and risks developing a simplistic understanding of the moral state of the early republic.

For Livy, two aspects of Livian scholarship have led to a tendency to ignore the complex and consistent presentation of soldiers in his history. First is the traditional perception of Livy as somewhat incompetent or disinterested in the details of military matters.[8] Even recent work that pushes back against this perception has been more preoccupied with establishing Livy's *bona fides* as a military historian by analysing the details of various aspects of warfare than with engaging with the presentation of the Livian soldier in any detail.[9] The other issue is a tendency to separate military and political issues, rather than to consider the constant political engagement that Livian soldiers demonstrate.[10] There are individual exceptions, most noticeably the 2nd century centurion Spurius Ligustinus, who has been the subject of excellent analysis.[11] In Livian scholarship, too, there is often the assumption of a dismissive and negative presentation of both the Roman people and the soldiery.[12]

[8] Incompetence: McDonald (1957: 161); Walsh (1961: 158); Kraus (1994: 1 n.1). Disinterest: Luce (1977: 41); Sage (1991: 926).
[9] Roth (2006); Koon (2010).
[10] Vasaly's statement that 'Livy is thus at pains to demonstrate the leaderless and, therefore, inarticulate condition of the masses prior to the establishment of the tribunate' (2015: 102) is only possible if the behaviour of the army is excluded; See also Campbell: 'During their conquest of Italy and the Mediterranean, Roman citizen-soldiers seem not to have used their military muscle significantly to change the political structure of the Republic' (2002: 105).
[11] DuToit (1964), Cadiou (2002), Pina Polo (1989: 272-273).
[12] E.g. Mineo: 'The general attitude of the masses is characterised by the absence of rational self-control, as illustrated by the fierce attitude (*ferocia*) of the soldiers inappropriately clamouring for battle...' (2015: 127); Bernard reads in Livy a conception of *romanitas*

It is in the works of Tacitus that the presentation of soldiers has been most misunderstood. The idea that Tacitus is lazy or dismissive in his portrayal of soldiers and military matters is an old one.[13] But this old idea has retained currency and is asserted even in works that examine Tacitus' portrayal of soldier and war.[14] Better work has been done in recent decades; Saddington is right to bring out the excellent insight that Tacitus brings to his account of the psychology of the Roman soldier.[15] Two recent works on the *Historiae* by Ash and Master have closely examined the portrayal of soldiers, but even these have been too quick to present the Tacitean soldier as mercenary and emotional or semi-barbarian, respectively.[16]

This thesis challenges such an understanding of the soldiers depicted in the works of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. Instead, I argue that the ancient sources present Roman soldiers in a much more complex and ambiguous way. Though these three historians had differing perceptions of the place and purpose of the soldier and military service, each portrayed it as a fundamental – and fundamentally Roman – part of their conception of the *res publica*. Vitally, to none of them is the portrait of the soldier or the experience of military service simplistic or inherently negative.

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inherently aristocratic that makes non-élite Romans (amongst whom plebeian soldiers) inherently less Roman than their aristocratic fellow citizens (2015: 41-42).

[13] After all, Mommsen called him 'dieser unmilitärischsten aller Schriftsteller' (1885: 165).

[14] Kajanto: 'he disliked the *vulgus*, and this expression comprised the soldiers, too.' Although he allows that disciplined soldiery rated slightly higher in Tacitus' esteem than civilian plebs (1970: 718); Späth: 'a very stereotypical portrait of armies as *vulgus*.' (2012: 453n8); Similar sentiments are expressed by Flaig (1992: 26); Carrié cites Tacitus as his prime example of the general dismissive attitude towards soldiers quoted above (1993: 105).

[15] Saddington (1991: 3503).

[16] Ash (1999); Master (2016).

Nor can the issues of soldier and military service in the works of these historians be dismissed as simple *topoi*.[17] The soldiers depicted in Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus are not static commonplaces, but complicated individuals whose relationship with each other and with the larger state is directly related to the historian's conception of their context. To examine the presentation of the soldier and the ideologies of military service in the works of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus is to examine how these historians understood the way that Roman citizens related to their state. These historians' portrayal of the army and soldiers during the transition from republic to empire shows a transformation in the political and social engagement of the soldiery with the larger Roman society. This transformation was one of increasing dislocation and disassociation from the *res publica*. As Sallust presented it, the Roman soldier was the fundamental manifestation of the Roman citizen; to Livy military service was the organising structure of the Roman *plebs* and the means by which plebeian Romans engaged with the republic and how they asserted their legitimacy; Tacitus focusses on the individual soldier's overriding loyalty to, and dependence on, the emperor in order to show how this new hierarchy undermined and even negated earlier dynamics of power and loyalty within the army.

Under the republic, military service was configured as a communal activity that reinforced the bonds between individual soldiers and their fellows, their officers, and the *res publica*. To both Sallust and Livy, though in

[17] For the soldier as *topos*, see e.g. Späth (2012: 444); Carrié (1991: 102-105).

different ways, Roman soldiers interacted with their government not only as soldiers but as citizens who were keenly aware of their rights and status. In different ways, each portrays the army as playing an important part in the political functioning of the Roman state. As both Livy and Sallust conceived of the soldiery as plebeian, this demonstrates that, in their conception of the republic, the Roman people remained engaged and politically active throughout the republican period, using their leverage as part of the army to assert their will.

Writing under and about the empire, the model of military service presented by Tacitus is very different. If republican military service reinforced the bonds between soldiers, the internal military hierarchy, and the Roman state, the imperial soldier's experience of army life was one of disassociation and dislocation. Imperial soldiers interacted with their officers, the soldiers of other legions, and Roman civilians with suspicion and, in extreme periods, open hostility. For Tacitus, the only significant bond of loyalty was now the connexion between the individual *miles* and his *princeps*. While Sallust and Livy describe an army of citizen-soldiers, Tacitus presents an army of subject-soldiers. However, even in this new context Tacitus never truly challenges the 'Roman-ness' of the soldiers. Roman soldiers are not dangerous because they are foreign or barbarians, but because they reflect the dangerous tensions present in the imperial system. Nor, I argue, are their interactions with the state, their generals, or their emperor dominated by irrational emotionality – though certainly they demonstrate isolated moments of panic or anger – but rather are carefully negotiated with an eye to their interests and values.

There has been substantial scholarship on military service both in the republic and the principate, and on Roman cultural perceptions of the purpose and effects of military service.[18] Mostly, these have aimed at either a larger understanding of republican or imperial attitudes or at developing an understanding of the historical realities of Roman military service. My work, however, focusses on issues of ideology as expressed within a Latin historiographic tradition. As a result, it is much more about how the historians reconstructed and envisaged the Roman state in recent or distant pasts than the historical reality of those pasts and the rôle of the soldiers within them.

While the amount of military material present in each of the historians is considerable, I focus narrowly on the sociological ideologies of military service that each historian presents. Following Cynthia Damon's argument that what seemed plausible to the Roman historian provides better understanding of his world view that whether or not the facts were accurate, this thesis is not concerned with the historicity of the events presented in the historical narratives of each author.[19] Thus I will not be concerning myself with the likelihood that the ringleaders of 206 BC really were called, as Livy tells the reader, Atrius and Albius – Mr. Black and Mr. White – or whether an unnamed Ligurian discovered the route into Jugurtha's stronghold while he was

[18] Generally see Lendon (2005) and Phang (2008); For the republic, see Rosenstein (2004) and (2007), Rawlings (2007); For the transition between republic and empire, see Keaveny (2007), De Blois (2007), Rankov (2017); For the empire see Le Bohec (1989: 36-67) and Campbell (2002).
[19] Damon (2007: 440).

gathering snails.[20] Such realities for this thesis are of less importance than the fact that they were seen as believable when written.

To avoid over complication and incoherence, this thesis does not engage thoroughly with other accounts of events in the narrative, unless differences between ancient writers illuminate important aspects of the accounts of my three main historians. The focus on social and political models of the individual historians has two salutary effects. Firstly, it keeps the arguments grounded in the narratives of the chosen historians, and secondly it means that the analysis remains focussed on the unique aspects of each account, and engages less with the identification of commonplaces.

Perhaps rather heretically for a work on Roman soldiers, this thesis is also not overly concerned with the organisation, equipment, tactics, or battles of the Roman army. The exception to this, as with the other points above, remains when the historians differ either from other ancient accounts or from our current understanding of the workings of the Roman army. Such concerns are, by and large, unnecessary in an examination, of, for example Sallust's statement that service in a military camp was the foundation of early republican *virtus*. The relevant point to be taken from that is that military service was a standardised and organised process – the width of the *via praetoriana*, the location of the horse-lines, or the material of the tents would offer nothing of relevance.

[20] Livy 28.24.3; Sal. *Jug*. 93.2-3.

Fundamentally, this thesis is interested in the historians' reconstruction of the past. Each of my chosen authors is writing about military service in periods and contexts different than his own. Sallust's work concerns the turn of the 1st century and the 70s BC, and was written in the changed context of the triumvirate. Livy wrote of the early and middle republic from the last decades of the 1st century BC and in the fundamentally changed context of the reign of Augustus. Tacitus' *Annales* began in the differing context of the first imperial transition. Only Tacitus' *Historiae* was written about a period that likely reflected his own time, but even then in the changed context of civil war.

The process of writing history is in part the process of reconstruction. Each of my chosen authors was involved in the reconstruction of a period and context that was different from his own. When, for example, Livy wrote of the mutinous armies of the decemvirate, he was forced to contextualise and ground it in his understanding of the early republic, a different context and period. Early in their works, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus each make the point themselves that they are writing about Romes that were different from their own.[21] Yet to conceive of the past as different also requires thinking carefully about the present. An examination of the rôle played by military service in a historian's reconstruction of the past can provide insight into their understanding of military service in their own context.

[21] E.g. Sall. *Cat*. 7, Liv. 1.pr.4, Tac. *Ann*. 1.1.1

This thesis is organised around separate sections on each historian. Latin historiography was its own genre, influenced by yet distinct from both Greek historiography and the other genres of Latin literature.[22] The Latin historians worked with their own conventions and were interested in questions of self identity and the functioning of the *res publica.* This thesis does not examine in any detail discussions in other genres of military service or the position of the soldier within the state. Such an examination would involve the analysis of, among other things, poetry, philosophy, theatre, and letters. While the methodology used in this thesis could be applied to a similar project, its focus and result would be substantially different.

Warfare was fundamental both to the narratives of these three historians and to their understanding of the Roman state. As soldiers are essential for warfare, soldiers play an integral part not only in the historical narratives of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, but in the social and political framework of the historical Rome that they depict. Each historian's understanding of soldiers touches on the relationship between military service and citizenship, how citizen soldiers related to the *res publica*, the place of these soldiers in the social hierarchy, and how they interacted with each other and with the state.

All of the chosen historians were writing about periods of change, and as a result their work touched on the part played by the soldiers in those periods of change and the effect that they had on the development of the Roman state. Further, as writing about the past involves thinking about how it

[22] On this, see e.g. Kraus and Woodman (1997: 1-9), and Mehl (2014: 1-26).

was either similar or dissimilar from the present, reflections on the rôle that soldiers played in the past involved some reflection of the part that they played in the present. Engaging with these historians' presentations of the past raises methodological problems concerning the past invoked by the historians – Livy's account of early Rome and Sallust's simplified and idealised presentation of a prelapsarian republic in particular. However, this thesis remains carefully focussed on identifying consistent patterns in their portrayal of soldiers. This allows me to dodge issues of historicity by focussing on the conceptual models that the historians are using rather than the realities of the social relations of Roman soldiers.

Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus have been chosen to the exclusion of others for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Greek historians of the republic or Augustan age have been omitted because my focus is on Romans' understanding of their own past, not an outsiders view. Polybius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diodorus Siculus, and Appian all write of the Romans from a Greek perspective, using Greek social and political models as their framework, and their understanding of Rome and the Romans is affected by their theoretical approach.[23] Cassius Dio and Ammianus Marcellinus have been excluded due to the late period of their composition. Velleius Paterculus and Suetonius lack sufficient detail about soldiers for a successful understanding of any model they may be using.

[23] On Appian as an essentially Greek thinker, see Kalyvas (2007); Lowrie (2010: 178)

## Previous scholarship

This thesis is supported by extensive previous scholarship. Besides the historiography of each author, I also have access to scholarship on how Romans related to and reconstructed their past. Scholarship on the Roman army is also fundamental to the project, both on its general organisation and development and on the emperor's relationship with his soldiers. However, my approach differs as I focus carefully on individual historians' understanding of these issues. This thesis does not attempt to provide analysis of general cultural conceptions. My goal is to define how, for example, Tacitus understood the social and political position of the Roman soldier, not to provide a thorough understanding of how early Imperial élites conceived of soldiers.

Until relatively recently there have been two approaches to reading Roman historians. Earlier scholarship attempted to evaluate the historicity of the ancient historians by attempting to identify their methodology and historical sources.[24] This older tradition is problematic because it judges Roman historians against a model of objective historical truth, approaching ancient writers as if they followed the methodologies of modern scientific historians.[25]

[24] In this tradition e.g. Syme (1964) and La Penna (1968) on Sallust; Walsh (1961) and Luce (1977) on Livy; Syme (1958), Benario (1975), and Martin (1981) on Tacitus.
[25] Dench (2009: 399).

In the later decades of the 20th century, historiography began to focus more heavily on the rhetorical and literary analyses of the texts, less concerned with historical realities than the narratives and literary models employed by the historians.[26] The literary approach often presents the work of ancient historians not as 'history' but as 'literature.' Such framing turns the details of an historical narrative into rhetorical fictions rather than the facts that the historians themselves claimed to be presenting. This, I see, as an inappropriate approach to my project. By reading ancient history from the position that the accuracy of the accounts is either suspect or irrelevant, the literary approach ignores the fact that the ancient historian considered himself to be, as Lendon puts it, 'a teller of true tales about the past.'[27] My own work attempts to detect and analyse consistent portrayals of the soldier and military service in the work of each historian. To illustrate the conceptual model that Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus each used to understand the Roman soldier, not as a narrative force or a literary trope, but as a member of Roman society.

Further, much of what interests the literary approach to ancient history has little relation to my efforts. As I am primarily interested in the conceptual models that each Roman historian used to understand the historic Rome he was describing, issues of allusion and intertext offer little unless the historians engagement with earlier writers helps us illuminate these conceptual models. But even here this only works if we establish that the historians were engaging

[26] In this tradition Wisemann (1979) and Woodman (1988) are particularly influential, but see also e.g. Henderson (1989), Jaeger (1997), Feldherr (1998), O'Gorman (2000.
[27] Lendon (2009: 41).

with the works of their predecessors as works of history which attempted to present past events more or less as the writer had understood them.[28] In this way, similarities and differences between historians can be used to illustrate where the historians agreed, and where they differed, in their understanding of the past.

Instead, this thesis follows a more recent strain of scholarship which uses the ancient sources to gain insight into the political thought of ancient writers. Scholars working in this field have used close readings of the sources to develop understandings of how Romans thought about issues such as republicanism, *libertas*, and imperialism.[29] My own work is influenced by this scholarship, though it attempts to understand how each historian reconstructed their past rather than to identify wider cultural political ideas. This thesis also aims to further the project of reading the ancient historians alongside prominent thinkers of the 20th century.[30] I engage with Bourdieu in the context of Sallust and re-examine Auerbach and Rancière's readings of the opening chapters of the *Annales*.

On the organising structures of the Roman army, Phang has provided an overview of the theory, organisation, and maintenance of the discipline of the Roman army.[31] It is grounded in an excellent command of the sources,

[28] Lendon (2009: 42-43).
[29] For Roman political thought generally, see Hammer (2008) and (2014), Connolly (2007) and (2015); on *libertas* see Arena (2012); on republicanism see Kapust (2011); on imperialism see Alston (2013) and Lavan (2013).
[30] On this see e.g. Lowrie (2010) on Agamben; Hammer (2002) on Arendt; Bhatt (2016) on Auerbach and Rancière; and Alston (2017), Bhatt (2017), and Hammer (2017) on Foucault.
[31] Phang (2008).

though her theoretical approach sometimes leads her to downplay the practical function of much of the Roman army's practices. Certainly, for example, castrametation served the purpose of reinforcing discipline and representing Roman power, but fortified camps also protected armies from ambushes and raids. Other overviews grounded more in practicalities than theory are provided by Gilliver and Goldsworthy.[32] On the republic and principate specifically, Keppie's account of the development of the Roman army during the republic and Webster's on the Imperial army also provide necessary historical context for the thesis.[33] On the culture of the Roman army, most relevant to this project is the work of Lendon on the Roman cultural approach to war – particularly his chapters on Livy and Caesar – and MacMullen's analysis of the internal society of the Roman legion.[34] Chrissanthos' work on the relationship between Roman *milites* and their commanders has done much to challenge the cultural perception – dating back to Polybius – of the Roman soldier as a disciplined automaton, following orders unquestioningly.[35]

On the relationship between the army and Imperial power, the most comprehensive work remains that of Campbell.[36] Similar ground was covered more recently by Stäcker, though unfortunately his work on the personal relationship between emperor and individual soldiers is not his strength, and

[32] Gilliver (2001); Goldsworthy (1996).
[33] Keppie (1984); Webster (1984); On the early Republic in particular, discussed at length in chapter 2, see Rich (2007) and Potter (2014).
[34] Lendon (2005); MacMullen (1984).
[35] Chrissanthos (2001) and (2004).
[36] Campbell (1985).

that area is the most relevant to this project.[37] On more specific aspects of the Roman military experience relevant to this paper – the army camp and centurions, the works of Lenoir and Richier respectively, though focussed on narrow geographical areas, provide a wealth of information.[38]

For Sallust, most relevant to my project is the work done to define his political and moral reconstruction of early Rome and his understanding of its decline. Much of the earlier scholarship is hampered by a tendency to read Sallust as a Caesarean propagandist.[39] Despite its age and faults, the most comprehensive survey of Sallust's political thought remains that of Earl.[40] Later scholarship has offered corrections and refinements to some of Earl's weaknesses.[41] Parker has written convincingly on the way that Sallust is willing to undermine or contradict his own narrative in service of his larger argument.[42] Levene's work emphasising the centrality that the narrative of moral decline plays in Sallust's monographs is particularly relevant to my work.[43]

Much of the recent scholarship on military matters in Livy's history has worked to rehabilitate his reputation as a military historian from its nadir in the 1960s. Two vital works by Koon and Roth have argued convincingly that Livy's portrayal of military matters is consistent and more thoughtful that

[37] Stäcker (2003); on the relationship between the army and imperial power see also Birley (2007), Hekster (2007), and Millar (1977). For the republic see Keaveny (2007).
[38] Lenoir (2011); Richier (2004).
[39] E.g. Syme (1964); La Penna (1968).
[40] Earl (1961).
[41] Particularly Kapust (2011); but also e.g. Conley (1981); De Blois (1988).
[42] Parker (2004).
[43] Levene (1992) and (2000).

earlier scholars have seen it.[44] As the thesis largely concerns the way that Livy reconstructed culture and institutions of the early and middle republic – and particularly in the ways he understood them to be different from his own period – the works by Miles and Chaplin are particularly relevant.[45] Important historical context for Livy's reconstruction is provided by Forsyth and Cornell, although separately Cornell is perhaps too trusting of the sources and Forsythe too pessimistic.[46]

There is a wealth of scholarship on the mutinies at the beginning of the *Annales*, although the tendency there is to read it less as a military event than as a venue for Tacitus to make a larger social or political point. Thus to Williams it is an exploration of stoicism, to Woodman it is an account of madness, and to O'Gorman Tacitus is making a point about reading.[47] It is in the scholarship on the *Historiae* where projects similar to my own have taken place. Ash's work on the relationship between generals and armies covers some of the same ground as my own work, but her focus remains the narrative that Tacitus is constructing rather than the ideological models that he is applying to the Roman army.[48] Master's recent work on provincial soldiers engages with the relationship between the army and the imperial state, but he grounds his argument in the experience of provincial soldiers and as a result is too keen to

[44] Koon (2010); Roth (2006).
[45] Miles (1995); Chaplin (2000).
[46] Forsythe (2005); Cornell (1995)
[47] Williams (1997); Woodman (2006); O'Gorman (2000).
[48] Ash (1999).

reclassify the Rhine and Syrian legions as foreign troops to a degree that is not fully supported in the sources.[49]

## The structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of four chapters, with Sallust and Livy each receiving one. Due to the episodic nature of his history, Tacitus has been given two chapters, with one each dedicated to the *Annales* and the *Historiae*. Each chapter involves close and comprehensive readings of each of the historian's works to construct a model of the soldier and of military service. These models are formed by the identification of consistent patterns of behaviour in the ways that the soldiers relate to the larger Roman state. These relations are developed from the individual and group interactions that soldiers have with each other, with their officers, and with the Roman government and larger Roman populace. As the thesis concerns their place within Roman society, the thesis is not concerned with the way that soldiers interact with enemies, foreigners, or slaves. With these models defined, the ideology of military service – that is the purpose and effect that military service had on Roman soldiers and the ramifications of that effect on the larger Roman state – for each historian can be analysed.

The chapter on Sallust examines the fundamental rôle that military service played in the historian's reconstruction of an idealised early republic.

[49] Master (2016).

Influenced by the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, it shows how, through service in the camp, the Roman people developed a *habitus* that was responsible for Rome's rise to greatness. This *habitus* was shared throughout the Roman state by all citizens regardless of social class. The markers of that *habitus* – communal competition for *gloria*, a willingness to bear hardship, and frugality at home – were the foundations of Rome's moral excellence and its power. Once the primacy of military experience had been undermined by safety and wealth, however, the Roman people became fractured. This new Rome was driven by greed and ambition and the new corrupted and fractured Roman people could not present the virtues of old. However, given the fundamental nature of military service in the creation of the early Roman *habitus*, by conducting war in the traditional way and – vitally – by maintaining the discipline of the camp, a general could cultivate within his army a reflection of the excellence of the old Romans. This is shown by examinations of three Roman campaigns, that of Metellus and Marius in the Numidian war, that of Sulla in the east, and of Catiline in Italy.

The second chapter, and by far the longest, concerns the depiction of military service by Livy. It shows that plebeian soldiers are portrayed remarkably consistently in Livy's history from the foundation of the republic until the narrative breaks off in 166 BC. The chapter argues that military service is presented as the foundation of a distinctly plebeian military identity which provided the social capital and status that plebeians used to legitimise themselves when interacting with each other and with the state. Further, as the primary focus for this identity, the Roman army acted as the location of

organised resistance to the *patres* during the struggle of the orders. Though its central place in domestic politics faded as Livy's narrative shifted from internal to external matters following the first pentad, the Roman army continued to be a politically engaged part of the Roman state, and continued to agitate for its interests and rights when on campaign. Due to the lack of the detailed accounts of soldiers and campaigns necessary for my project, this chapter does not engage with the *periochae*.

The third chapter analyses Tacitus' portrayal of the mutinies of AD 14 and argues that the historian represents the mutinies not as akin to the imperial revolts of AD 69 that he describes in the *Historiae*, but rather as a final representation of mutiny common to the republican period. This chapter largely discusses the events of AD 14 in isolation from the larger narrative of the first book of the *Annales*. This is for two reasons, firstly the dynamics of military service that interest me in Tacitus' work are only evident when the military hierarchy is under stress – hence why my final chapter examines the civil war of AD 69. Secondly, though there are common themes weaved through book one, the account of the mutiny is episodic and clearly separated from the rest of the book.[50] In AD 14 the soldiers did not revolt to force a change of emperor, but rather over practical matters concerning the conditions of their service. By doing so they were continuing a traditional method of resistance commonly employed by dissatisfied soldiers of the republic. The chapter argues that Tacitus uses the suppression of the mutiny

[50] O'Gorman (2000: 25). On the episodic nature of Tacitus' work more generally, see Gingras (1992: 241); Walker (1952: 16);

to make a larger point about military service under the principate, showing that the changed context meant that mutiny of the republican style now presented a much greater danger to the state than it had before and as a result was no longer an acceptable recourse for unhappy soldiers.

The fourth and final chapter examines the behaviour of the soldiery of all factions of the civil war of AD 69. It argues that Tacitus represents the fundamental relationship of the individual Roman soldier as no longer his relationship with the state or with his fellow soldiers but his relationship with the emperor. In moments of disorder this bond was capable of overriding all other loyalties or connexions. In a context where there were multiple emperors, soldiers interacted with others – both soldiers and civilians – as either supporters or enemies of their chosen emperor. This was the cause of the intense hostility and violence that the soldiers were capable of inflicting in the course of the war.

Finally, I bring together all four models of military service to demonstrate the fundamental shift in the way that Roman soldiers engaged with each other and with the state. While military service during the republic – as presented by Sallust and Livy – had a strong reforming and communal aspect, under the empire – as described by Tacitus – soldiering had become a process that involved the degradation of earlier political and social relations. This process that involved those same soldiers losing their essential status and citizen-soldiers and becoming the subject-soldiers of the imperial state. Yet this does not involve any simplification in the portrayal of the soldier or a shift

to a stereotypical and negative presentation, throughout the accounts Roman soldiers are presented as having agency and a willingness and a desire to engage with and to influence the state. The difference between the soldiers that Tacitus describes in AD 69 and those described by Sallust and Livy was not one of political will – both were determined and willing to use their political power to force political change. What was different was the way that change was attempted. In the republic, Roman soldiers worked to influence the state by asserting their status as citizens and their essential place in the social order. Under the principate, the only method available to the soldiers was to ensure that their emperor was supreme.

# CHAPTER ONE

## Sallust and the Military *Habitus* of Moral and Immoral Republics

Sallust's pessimism about the state of the republic shines through in the preambles to both the *Bellum Catilinae* and the *Bellum Jugurthinum*. In a state once noted for its modesty, honesty, and incorruptibility the cardinal virtues now appeared to be *audacia* 'shamelessness', *largitio* 'bribery', and *avaritia* 'rapacity'.[51] This perception of Rome in which the early republic was the polar opposite of the late republic is a theme of both his surviving monographs. In the *Catilinae*, Sallust provides vivid descriptions of Rome, both the ideal early republic and the city after its moral collapse. He outlines the formative influences and patterns of behaviour of the republic in both its excellence and its corruption. Using these descriptions, supported by the references to the ideal Rome found in Sallust's other writings, and alongside the work of Bourdieu, I will outline the Roman *habitus*, that is to say the unifying structures of society that form and legitimize the individual practices of citizens.[52]

Outlining the *habitus* of Sallust's Rome in its ideal and fallen states will demonstrate that, beyond the neat phrasing of the proem, Sallust perceived of the Romans of the late republic not simply as decayed versions of their ancestors but as behaving in a way that cast them almost *in opposition* to their ancestors. In Sallust's view the decayed state of the Roman people had a catastrophic effect on the republic and seriously undermined the military

[51] Sal. *Cat*. 3.3
[52] Bourdieu (1977: 79)

efficacy of the armies. Whereas the historian offers no solution to the general moral decay of his times, he does describe the process through which a committed general could manage the corruption of his soldiers and restore a semblance of the old excellence to his men. This involved keeping them in a military environment in the *mos maiorum* and allowing the old social pressures to cultivate some of the *virtus* of the early Romans.[53]

This chapter will first examine the *habitus* of the idealised early republic to establish that the excellence of Rome was fundamentally based in its structure as a military society. Further, this early Roman society was unified, with aristocrats and the people alike serving together and sharing the same set of values and motivations. Following this, the decayed state of the late republic will be shown to have fractured and corrupted the earlier *habitus* of the early republic.

Having established Sallust's conception of the early and late republic, the chapter will then examine the effect that military service – both in the correct, traditional way, and in the new corrupted fashion – had on the citizens serving in Rome's armies. After a general discussion, three specific case studies – Metellus' army in Africa, Sulla's army in Asia, and Catiline's army in Italy – will show both the corrupting effect of leading armies against the traditions of the republic and the reforming nature of military service performed following the *mos maiorum*. This will show that Sallust model of the fallen citizen of his day

[53] Sallust's understanding of the *mos maiorum* is distinct, as this chapter will show. For the *mos maiorum* more generally, see Arena (2012), North (2006), and Lintott (2003: 4-7).

was capable of reform, at least temporary, when he was serving in a military camp.

## The Ideal Republic

In the opening of the *Catilinae*, after describing Rome's transition from kingdom to republic, Sallust provides an account of how and why early Rome flourished:

> Sed ea tempestate coepere se quisque magis extollere magisque ingenium in promptu habere. nam regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt, semperque iis aliena virtus formidulosa est. sed civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate quantum brevi creverit: tanta cupido gloriae incesserat. iam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat, magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant. igitur talibus viris non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduos erat, non armatus hostis formidulosus: virtus omnia domuerat. sed gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos erat: se quisque hostem ferire, murum ascendere, conspici, dum tale facinus faceret, properabat. eas divitias, eam bonam famam magnamque nobilitatem putabant. laudis avidi, pecuniae liberales erant; gloriam ingentem, divitias honestas volebant.[54]
>
> But that was the period at which each man began to advance himself more and to keep his intellect more at the ready. For to kings, the good are more suspect than the wicked, and prowess in another is always a source of fear to them. It is incredible to recall how much the community grew in a short time after its acquisition of freedom, so great was the desire for glory which had arisen. From the very first, as soon as its young men could tolerate warfare, they learned military practice through labour in the camp, and they took pleasure in excellent armour and military horses rather than in whores and parties. To such men no hard work was unusual, no place rugged or steep, no armed enemy a source of fear: *virtus* had tamed everything. But the greatest competition for glory was amongst themselves: each hurried to be the one to strike an enemy, to scale a wall and to be observed while doing such deeds; they considered this to be their riches, this to be a good reputation and great

[54] Sal. *Cat*. 7.1-6

> nobility. They were hungry for praise, generous with money; they wanted mighty glory, honourable riches.[55]

At first this reconstruction of early Rome as virtuous and harmonious, idealised as it is, may seem commonplace.[56] But Sallust's almost entirely military framing of the early republic differs significantly from other reconstructions of early Rome.[57] This Rome is an armed camp. Indeed, unlike other accounts, there is no mention of the importance of farming anywhere in the early Rome described in the *Catilinae* and the virtues and behaviours that are given pride of place are predominantly war-like. The only education offered to young Romans is practical experience *in castris*.[58]

One of the more striking aspects of Sallust's perception of the early republic is how deeply militarized the society seems. Military experience, and in particular a practical education in the camp, is the foundation of Sallust's understanding of Roman virtue: '*Iam primum iuventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat...*'[59] This, it should be stressed, to Sallust was a situation that led to Roman citizens developing practical experience of military matters, not theoretical military knowledge.[60] Sallust has Marius echo this sentiment: in his speech to the people, when he describes his own military training: '*Ita ad hoc aetatis a pueritia fui, uti omnis*

[55] For the convenience of the reader translations have been provided, but the thesis will engage exclusively with the original text. A list of translations used and adapted is provided in the bibliography.
[56] Paul (1984: 125)
[57] In particular that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (2.28), discussed below.
[58] Sal. *Cat*. 7.4
[59] Sal. *Cat*. 7.4
[60] Ramsey (2007: 78)

*labores et pericula consueta habeam.*'[61] 'From boyhood to this point in my life my existence has been such that I regard all toil and danger as normal.' That Marius is referring to the sort of practical conditioning that Sallust describes in *Catilinae* 7 is clear from a later section of his speech when he compares his own practical military education with the theoretical preferred by aristocrats with little experience: '*Comparate nunc, Quirites, cum illorum superbia me hominem nouum. Quae illi audire aut legere solent, eorum partem vidi, alia egomet gessi; quae illi litteris, ea ego militando didici.*'[62] 'Now compare their haughtiness, Citizens, with myself as a new man: the things which they are accustomed to hear or read, I have either seen or done personally; their leadership comes from literature, mine from soldiering.' Marius stresses that his education was practical and military, in a way that echoes the wording of Sallust's own description of the early republic. Marius also presents his form of education as traditional: '*quod si iure me despiciunt, faciant item maioribus suis, quibus, uti mihi, ex virtute nobilitas coepit*.'[63] 'If they are right to despise me, let them do the same for their own ancestors, in whose case, as in mine, nobility derived from *virtus*.'

These passages from Marius' speech, alongside the opening of the *Catilinae* allow the formation of a Sallustian *habitus* that he presents as the universal practical education of the Roman people and the cause of their glory. By considering Sallust's account of the early republic and Marius' account of

[61] Sal. *Jug*. 85.7 I am hardly the first to notice the connexion between these two passages, see Halbband (1976: 172) and Mariotti (2007: 255).
[62] Sal. *Jug*. 85.13
[63] Sal. *Jug*. 85.17

his education, we can begin to develop an understanding of the generation and results of the early Roman *habitus*. It was fundamentally military and achieved through practical education. Its context was military service, and its environment was the military camp. In this separate and separated environment, Roman men learned the habits of soldiers through the labour of military service. This *habitus* prioritized military life – Romans learned to prize war gear over civilian comfort – instilled in the Romans a capacity for enduring hardship, and, above all, taught them to desire recognition for their military excellence: '*optumus quisque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis bene facta laudari*...'[64] 'the best men preferred to do rather than to speak, and that their own good deeds should be praised by others...' This was the framework through which Roman men interacted with each other and how they related to the state.[65] Sallust's presentation of the results of this military *habitus* is clear:

> Igitur domi militiaeque boni mores colebantur; concordia maxuma, minuma avaritia erat; ius bonumque apud eos non legibus magis quam natura valebat. iurgia discordias simultates cum hostibus exercebant, cives cum civibus de virtute certabant. in suppliciis deorum magnifici, domi parci, in amicos fideles erant. duabus his artibus, audacia in bello, ubi pax evenerat aequitate, seque remque publicam curabant.[66]
>
> Hence at home and on campaign good behaviour was cultivated. There was the greatest *concordia*, very little avarice; justice and goodness

[64] Sal. *Cat*. 8.5

[65] Bourdieu: 'The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable *dispositions*, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.' (1977: 72)

[66] Sal. *Cat*. 9.1-3

> thrived amongst them not because of laws but by nature. Quarrels, disharmony and conflict were what they conducted with the enemy; citizens competed with citizens in the area of *virtus*. They were lavish in supplicating the gods, sparing in the home, faithful to their friends. By two qualities – daring in war and, when peace came, fairness – they took care of themselves and of their commonwealth.

This is the result of the *habitus* cultivated in the camp. To Sallust, the martial successes of the republic, the moral perfection of the populace, and the civil concord all stemmed from the militarisation of the citizenry. The fundamentally military aspect of early Rome is emphasised when Sallust provides a general account of the military excellence of early Rome, concluding: '*memorare possum, quibus in locis maxumas hostium copias populus Romanus parva manu fuderit, quas urbis natura munitas pugnando ceperit*...'[67] 'I can recall the places where the Roman people, with only a small unit, routed the greatest of enemy forces; the cities which, though protected by nature, they took by storm...' In the same passage, the historian devotes several sentences to discussing the excellence of early Rome's armies. He even expresses a sense of regret that his chosen topic precludes a more detailed account.[68] This suggests that to Sallust a history of Early Rome would be a history of her military exploits. As a consequence, civil excellence, such as the *concordia* and justice of the early republic, is discussed only alongside early Rome's military affairs: '*igitur domi militiaeque boni mores colebantur*.'[69]

[67] Sal. *Cat*. 7.7
[68] Sal. *Cat*. 7.6-7
[69] Sal. *Cat*. 9.1

Particularly relevant in this passage is Sallust's remark that the excellent state of Rome was maintained '*non legibus magis quam natura*.' This is an important part of his understanding, as the qualities and structure of early Rome are presented as arising from the Roman people themselves and are not directed from above.[70] Sallust's perception of early Rome has no Romulus to assign professions to the Romans, the men of the republic are not given their military traditions by Servius Tullius, instead the process is altogether republican. To him, Rome was incapable of excellence as a kingdom. Under the kings, the good were suspect and those with merit were in danger from the state: '*Nam regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt semperque eis aliena virtus formidulosa est.*'[71] 'For, to kings, the good are more suspect than the wicked, and *virtus* in another is always a source of fear to them.'

The *habitus* of the early republic would be impossible under the kings, as the very qualities that republican Romans prized would have made them enemies to their rulers. It was the circumstances of the republic that allowed the Romans to develop moral excellence themselves. Indeed, Sallust states that, once freed from the kings, the transformation and success of the state happened quickly: '*sed civitas incredibile memoratu est adepta libertate*

[70] Bourdieu: 'It is because subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that what they do has more meaning than they know. The habitus is the universalizing mediation which causes an individual agent's practices, without either explicit reason or signifying intent, to be none the less "sensible" and "reasonable".' (1977: 79)

[71] Sal. *Cat.* 7.2; The model of monarchy presented here is counter to other narratives that emphasised the meritorious contributions of the kings to the development of Roman society: cf. Liv. 2.1.4-6, Dion. 2.28.1; Monarchs' suspicion of excellence is reflected in Greek thought – e.g. Hdt. 5.92.3, Eur. *Suppl*. 444-446 – and remains present in other Roman thought – e.g. Tac. *Agr*. 41, Val. Fl. 1.29-30; Cf. McGuishen, who argues that Sallust's omission of the benefits of Monarchy is a result only of his structure (1977: 67).

*quantum brevi creverit*...'[72] 'It is incredible to recall how much the community grew in a short time after its acquisition of freedom...' Besides this, Sallust stresses the communal, republican nature of this *habitus* by regularly conflating or ignoring class divisions. In the same sentence, Sallust describes a Roman *iuventus* that appears to be composed of both youths from the aristocratic class and the lower orders: '*in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant*.'[73] While '*laborem militiae in castris*' most likely refers to the actions of *milites gregarii*, warhorses and fine armour were surely primarily noble concerns. This unified, seemingly egalitarian sense of Rome as a state of moral perfection is vital to Sallust's perception of the early republic and to its moral collapse.[74] By excising social hierarchy from his account of the early republic, Sallust is, in effect, democratising traditional Roman virtues. Thus *virtus* and *cupido gloriae* are attributes not just of the *nobiles* but of the entire *populus Romanus*. In the chapter preceding the discussion of Rome at its moral height, when talking about the founding of the city and the kingdom, Sallust allows space for both individuals (Aeneas) and social class (by discussing the senate).[75] Individuals and social groups appear again in chapter 11, after the state has fallen into corruption and ruin. But during the idealised period of

[72] Sal. *Cat*. 7.3
[73] Sal. *Cat*. 7.4
[74] Arena has argued convincingly that the Roman people played an important part in the shaping and legitimization of the *mos maiorum*, (2014: 219). In Sallust's construction this is certainly the case.
[75] Sal. *Cat*. 6

early Rome there is only *concordia maxuma*.[76] Emphasising the anonymity and the communal nature of the virtue of the early republic establishes the vital rôle that the innate *cupido gloriae* and the practical military education had in shaping the morality of early Romans.[77]

Sallust further emphasises the communal nature of this transformation by excising any individuals from his account of the early republic. In the three chapters he devotes to this period of excellence, the historian mentions no individual by name. Sallust begins his account by mentioning Aeneas and ends his account of Rome's excellence with Cornelius Sulla, long after Rome has become corrupted.[78] Sallust's Roman republic has no Romulus, no Brutus, no Cinncinatus, or Fabius, or Scipio. Even references to historical events or eminent men are carefully discussed in an anonymous, general way, such as the famous story of Manlius Torquatus: '*in bello saepius vindicatum est in eos qui contra imperium in hostem pugnaverant...*'[79] 'in war, punishment was more often inflicted on those who had fought against the enemy contrary to command...'

[76] Sal. *Cat*. 9.1

[77] Bourdieu: 'The homogeneity of habitus is what - within the limits of the group of agents possessing the schemes (of production and interpretation) implied in their production - causes practices and works to be immediately intelligible and foreseeable, and hence taken for granted.' (1977: 80)

[78] Aeneas at 6.1 and Sulla at 9.4.

[79] Sal. *Cat*. 9.4; Although McGuishin suggests it may be a reference to the son of the dictator Postumius (1977: 85); For identifying this passage with Manlius Torquatus, see Levene (2000: 176 n. 33).

By removing individuals, Sallust is following a tradition established by Cato, who described wars without naming the generals.[80] But this is more than simply an attempt to write history 'in a self-consciously Catonian manner.'[81] While Cato removed generals from his account of wars, in Sallust's idealised Roman republic there are no individuals of any kind, only the Roman people. It was the Romans who drove out their kings, not Brutus: '*post ubi regium imperium...in superbiam dominationemque se convortit, inmutato more annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecere*...'[82] 'After, the command of kings...transformed itself into haughty domineering: so, with a change of convention, they created for themselves annual commands and paired commanders...' This anonymity remains a constant, the third person plural verb form is common, and when the Romans are described, general terms are used: '*quisque*', '*talibus viris*', '*populus Romanus*'. Sallust keeps individuals and classes out of his account of early Rome to emphasise that it was a communal, unified experience and that the *habitus* was shared between the aristocracy and the Roman people.

Sallust refers to two familiar Roman attributes in this section, *cupido gloriae* and *virtus*.[83] Traditionally, *cupido gloriae* was restricted to the ruling class,[84] and Cicero explicitly describes it as an attribute of the nobility.[85] Sallust,

[80] Nep. *Cato* 3.4: '*horum bellorum duces non nominavit, sed sine nominibus res notavit*.'; Plin. *Nat*. 8.5.
[81] Levene (2000: 176)
[82] Sal. *Cat*. 6.7
[83] *Cupido gloriae*: 7.4; *virtus* 7.5
[84] McGushin (1977: 78)
[85] Cic. *Arch.* 26

on the other hand, saw it as applicable to all Roman citizens and the primary motivation of citizens in the early republic.[86] The historian also breaks with the aristocratic tradition by conceiving *virtus* as applicable to all men.[87] He states this explicitly when he lists farmers, sailors, and builders as men who require virtue for success.[88] Indeed, the way that Sallust uses *virtus* throughout his work has caused significant scholarly debate. Syme saw Sallust's perception of *virtus* as 'something solid, distinct, and authentically native.'[89] Santoro l'Hoir argues that Sallust manipulated the traditional aristocratic sense of *vir* and the more neutral sense of *homo* to recast his historical narrative in opposition to the earlier aristocratic usage, and in particular that of Cicero.[90] Thus, as Santoro l'Hoir puts it: 'often a Ciceronian *vir* will be rendered a Sallustian *homo*, and, conversely a Ciceronian *homo* will be converted into a Sallustian *vir*.'[91] However, Santoro l'Hoir's framework is unconvincing for several reasons. Firstly it requires Sallust to be read primarily as a response to Cicero, rather than as an historical text in its own right. Secondly, it is difficult to prove that Sallust attached any of the Ciceronian or aristocratic disparaging sense to *homo*. There is little evidence that the historian expects his reader to attach negative aspects to the Praetor Petreius, for example, when he labels him '*homo militaris*' as he then goes to offer a brief and glowing account of the man's career: '*quod amplius annos triginta tribunus aut praefectus aut legatus*

[86] Sal. *Cat.* 7.3
[87] Earl (1961: 16)
[88] Sal. *Cat*. 2.7
[89] Syme (1964: 242).
[90] Santoro l'Hoir (1992: 47-62).
[91] Santoro l'Hoir (1992: 47).

*aut praetor cum magna gloria in exercitu fuerat.*'[92] 'who had been in the army with great glory for more than thirty years as tribune or prefect or legate or praetor.' Marius is referred to as both *homo* and *vir* in the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, and Santoro l'Hoir explains this by suggesting that Marius is *vir* only when Sallust explicitly approves of his actions.[93] Conversely, that Metellus remains *vir* throughout the monograph is explained away by Sallust's admiration.[94] But this admiration, it should be noted, did not preclude the historian from describing Metellus undermining the efficacy of his army tent when Marius was elected consul.[95] Further, Sallust's perception of *homo* is not incompatible from his concept of *virtus* as, as we have seen, he applies *virtus* explicitly to *homines who 'arant, navigant, aedificant*'; men who certainly would not have fit the traditional élite sense of *vir*.[96]

More convincing is the suggestion by McDonnell that Sallust's perception of *virtus* was more complex than it might seem.[97] McDonnell detects two distinct uses of *virtus* in Sallust. The first is a vague sense of ethical virtue influenced by Greek thinking, the other is a traditional Roman perception of *virtus* that is inextricably linked to military activity.[98] However, by asserting that this military *virtus* is detached from moral concerns, McDonnell has missed the

[92] Sal. *Cat*. 59.6
[93] Santoro l'Hoir (1992: 53)
[94] Santoro l'Hoir (1992: 52)
[95] Sal. *Jug*. 82.2-3
[96] Sal. *Cat.* 2.7; On *vir* as traditionally denoting a man involved in public life, see McDonnell (2006: 2 n. 6), Hamblenne (1984: 376), Santoro l'Hoir (1982: 9-28); Sallust's paring of *homo* and *virtus* has prompted other explanations. Wirz reads *arant, navigant,* and *aedificant* as, in fact, references to the élite activities of landowning, trade by sea, and public endowments (1922: 85); But McGuishin offers the more straightforward reading that Sallust is applying *virtus* to 'all men in all fields of endeavour' (1977: 40).
[97] McDonnell (2006)
[98] McDonnell (2006: 357)

vital rôle that Sallust gave military service in the moral construction of the early republic. Instead, Sallust writes of *virtus* as something that any Roman citizen can attain, through a number of professions, but the route he is most interested in and the one he devotes the most time to, is through the cultivation of military habits in the camp.

Chapters 7-9 of the *Bellum Catilinae* thus allow for the construction of the *habitus* for the early republic. The formative structures of the early republic were the camp education, foreign threat, frugality, and the pre-eminence of *gloria* as cultural capital. Camp education accustomed the citizen to discomfort. As the primary cultural capital was *gloria*, all citizens were conditioned to compete honourably with their fellows in battle and learned to scorn personal danger. Sallust's ideal Roman begins to take shape. Because of his youthful training in the camp, a citizen was by inclination and education above all a soldier and his chief abilities and desires were military. He preferred the trappings of a legionary to those of a civilian, he scorned wealth gained by any method but honourable booty. He was brave in the face of the enemy, undaunted by terrain and unfazed by the toil and deprivations of campaign. He competed with his fellow citizens only to outdo them in battle and at home he was frugal, civic minded, god fearing, and law abiding. This, to Sallust, was the ideal Roman, the breed of men that had led the republic to greatness. It was to these standards that Sallust would judge later Romans.

The fundamentally military nature of the Sallustian account is most clear when it is compared to another version of the social and moral structure of

early Rome. Dionysius of Halicarnassus devotes the early chapters of his work to an account of Romulus' reign and the steps that he took to ensure the moral excellence of his citizens. Both Sallust and Dionysius stress that virtue is something that is better learned than taught:

> ὁρῶν γὰρ ὅτι τὸ σωφρόνως ζῆν ἅπαντας καὶ τὰ δίκαια πρὸ τῶν κερδαλέων αἱρεῖσθαι καρτερίαν τε τὴν παρὰ τοὺς πόνους ἀσκεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ὑπολαμβάνειν χρῆμα τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς οὐ λόγων διδαχῇ παραγίνεσθαι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πλήθεσι πέφυκεν, ἐν οἷς τὸ πλεῖόν ἐστι δυσάγωγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργων ἐθισμοῖς τῶν πρὸς ἑκάστην ἀρετὴν ἀγόντων...[99]
>
> Observing that the means by which the whole body of citizens, the greater part of whom are hard to guide, can be induced to lead a life of moderation, to prefer justice to gain, to cultivate perseverance in hardships, and to look upon nothing as more valuable than virtue, is not oral instruction, but the habitual practice of such employments as lead to each virtue...

Like Sallust's Romans, who learned virtue through service in the camp, Dionysius' Romulus intended to set his citizens in occupations that would train them. The moral effects of both Sallust and Dionysius' early Roman *habitus* are markedly similar. In both cases the Romans learned to exercise restraint and in both cases the Romans learned to prize virtue over anything else. As will be discussed, such moderation was essential to Sallust's concept of the moral perfection of the early republic as he considered the loss of this moderation and the embracing of civilian luxury one of the chief culprits in Rome's moral decline.[100] Besides moderation, both Romulus' reign and the early republic developed a degree of resilience and fortitude. Romulus' laws led the Romans

[99] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.28.1
[100] Sal. *Cat*. 10, Discussed at length below.

to withstand hardship, as in Sallust's vision of early Rome '*non labor insolitus, non locus ullus asper aut arduos erat*.'[101] 'no toil was unusual, no place was difficult or inaccessible.' Both led to a sense of cooperation, and the citizens worked only to damage their enemies. Dionysius' Romans learned to keep disputes over property reserved for the enemy.[102] In Sallust's own words there was '*concordia maxuma*' and the citizens '*iurgia discordias simultates cum hostibus exercebant*.'[103] The social structures of both the reign of Romulus and the early republic, as recorded by the two historians, produce a markedly similar set of morals in the Roman citizenry.[104] Both have raised citizens with a restrained, frugal lifestyle who are capable of withstanding hardship and labour and who cooperated with fellow citizens and saved their ire for the enemy. Yet, if the end result was the same, Dionysius and Sallust saw the process as markedly different.

Vitally, Dionysius' account lacks the fundamental military framing present in Sallust. This is because, unlike Sallust, Dionysius sees this as a twofold process; Romulus would train his Romans not only in the camp, but in the fields. Under instruction from their king, early Romans had to be both soldiers and farmers:

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[101] Sal. *Cat*. 7.5
[102] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.28.2
[103] Sal. *Cat.* 9.1-2
[104] It is for this reason that La Penna's warning about reading 'monarchist' tendencies in Dionysius and 'republican' tendencies in Sallust should be heeded (1968: 117-118). Both narratives lead to morally upstanding republics, and Dionysius' perception of the central place that the kings played in Roman development is hardly unique: similar sentiments are expressed by Livy: '*fovit tranquilla moderatio imperii, eoque nutriendo perduxit ut bonam frugem libertatis maturis iam viribus ferre possent*' (2.1.6). For a 'monarchist' vs 'republican' reading see Skald (1930: 72-75).

> δύο δὲ μόνα τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἐπιτηδεύματα κατέλιπε τά τε κατὰ γεωργίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ πολέμους, ὁρῶν ὅτι γαστρός τε ἄνθρωποι γίνονται διὰ τούτους τοὺς βίους ἐγκρατεῖς ἀφροδισίοις τε ἧττον ἁλίσκονται παρανόμοις πλεονεξίαν τε οὐ τὴν βλάπτουσαν ἀλλήλους διώκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων περιποιουμένην τὰς ὠφελείας. ἀτελῆ δὲ τούτων ἑκάτερον ἡγούμενος εἶναι τῶν βίων χωριζόμενον θατέρου καὶ φιλαίτιον...τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόν τε πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸν γεωργικὸν ἔταξε βίον ζῆν.
>
> The only employments he left to free men were two, agriculture and warfare; for he observed that men so employed become masters of their appetite, are less entangled in illicit love affairs, and follow that kind of covetousness only which leads them, not to injure one another, but to enrich themselves at the expense of the enemy. But, as he regarded each of these occupations, when separate from the other, as incomplete and conducive to fault-finding...he ordered the same persons to exercise the employments both of husbandmen and soldiers.

Dionysius states that by following Romulus' advice men became 'masters of their appetite' and 'less entangled in illicit love affairs.'[105] So too did Sallust's early Romans disdain civilian pleasures. But, while the Romans in Dionysius practise restraint regarding the civilian luxuries of good food and loose women, those described by Sallust judge them less than the martial pleasures of fine armour and trained mounts. '*magisque in decoris armis et militaribus equis quam in scortis atque conviviis lubidinem habebant.*'[106] There is another key difference between the accounts in Dionysius and Sallust. To the Greek historian, these moral benefits come from a social structure imposed strictly upon Rome by her king. Romulus' observation of human nature and his desire to instruct his people leads him to limit their areas of activity to warfare and

[105] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.28.2

[106] Sal. *Cat*. 7.4 This comparison is even stronger if one considers Mariotti's suggestion that *decora arma* here should be read not as decorated but rather as weapons fitted to the task (2007: 254).

agriculture. All of the moral benefits are the intended consequences of the king's actions.[107] This is contrasted clearly with Sallust's conception of early Rome, where their *habitus* is developed communally, and there is no evidence of a guiding force.

Dionysius' version of Early Rome differs significantly from Sallust's also in the importance that agriculture plays in the moral structuring of the city. Romulus is said to have separated all occupations into two camps, on the one hand were agriculture and warfare and on the other everything else. These other trades, which he considered 'ἐπιδιφρίους μὲν καὶ βαναύσους' 'sedentary and mechanical' and not fit for Romans, he assigned to slaves and foreigners.[108] By law, the only occupations open to Roman citizens were to be war and farming. Further, each citizen was to devote his time to both. Either on their own was 'incomplete and prone to fault-finding' (ἀτελῆ… φιλαίτιον), and only through spending peace in the fields and war on the march could Romans reach the moral superiority their king desired.[109]

Indeed, the image of the peasant farmer as a representative of old fashioned virtue – particularly in comparison to the urban poor – appears to have been a common strain of thought in Rome at the time.[110] The connexion between farming and warfare is alluded to by Cato Maior: '*ex agricolis et viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi gignuntur...*' 'from farmers are made both the

[107] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.28
[108] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.28.1
[109] Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.28.2-3
[110] Evans refers to it as 'one of the more hackneyed themes of Roman literature' (1980: 134).

strongest men and the stoutest soldiers.[111] There is also a reference to this dual occupation in the pseudo-Sallustian letter to Caesar: '*humillimus quisque in arvis aut in militia nullius honestae rei egens satis sibi satisque patriae erat*.' [112] 'the humblest citizen lacked nothing for which he could honourably wish either in the fields or in military service, but was sufficient for himself and for his country.' Dionysius appears therefore to be relaying a Roman commonplace that painted the early Roman as a citizen farmer, so much so that some scholars have attempted to prove the presence in Dionysius' work of a late republican political pamphlet.[113] Dionysius' view of the importance of farming in the moral fabric of early Rome clearly matched the common perception of his time.

However, farming plays no part in Sallust's formulation of the early republic. Indeed, Sallust's ambiguous opinion of farming marks him out from the Roman norm. At times he seems unusually dismissive of agriculture, particularly in the opening of the *Bellum Catilinae*: '*non fuit consilium socordia atque desidia bonum otium conterere, neque vero agrum colundo aut venando, servilibus officiis intentum aetatem agere*.' 'it was not my intention to waste the good of my leisure time in lethargy and indolence, nor to spend my life in agriculture or hunting, concentrating on the duties of slaves.'[114] To Sallust

[111] Cato *Agr.*. Pref.4
[112] Ps-Sallust, *Epistulae ad Caesar* 1.5.3.
[113] On this see Pohlenz (1924) and the less certain Gabba (1960). This idea has been convincingly challenged by Balsdon (1971).
[114] Sal. *Cat*. 4.1; this passage has inspired a degree of scholarly debate, particularly due to the way it appears to challenge Cato the Censor. Delz has argued that the meaning is that agriculture is not itself a servile duty, but that landowners spend an inordinate amount of time supervising slaves (1985: 168-73), Woodman – as his translation demonstrates – agrees (2007:

farming appears to have been irrelevant to the effect of service in the camp on the moral quality of Roman citizens. Their status as poor farmers certainly had no improving effect on the rural poor who joined Catiline's cause. It should also be noted that when Sallust records Marius' decrease of the property qualifications, he voices no concerns over the *capite censi*'s suitability for military service, though they would have had no experience as farmers.[115] By excising farming from his account of the ideal state of early Rome, Sallust creates a state that was firmly, even fundamentally military. Sallust has reconstructed early Rome that differs from that of Dionysius in two important ways: there was no guiding force to correspond with the part played by Romulus and the only Roman occupation was warfare. While Dionysius' early Romans were taught their morals by Romulus through the practices of farming and soldiering, Sallust's Romans cultivated *virtus* as a group through service *in castris*.

Sallust's understanding of early Rome is unusual in its fundamentally military nature. Military service was the wellspring for the qualities and motivations of early Rome. Roman youth communally developed a *habitus* through *in castris per laborem*. This *habitus* took as its primary cultural capital *gloria*, which was earned primarily through military excellence. As a result of

165 n. 6); Syme sees the judgement as applying only to the contemporary practice of farming (1964: 45-46); Responding to Syme, Earl suggested that Sallust's judgement applied only to those who practiced agriculture as their primary profession, rather than as a pastime (1965: 234); Levene sees as it as part of a concerted effort to undermine Cato's standing as a moral exemplar (2000: 174); It is probably worth considering alongside this apparently confused account of the corruption Grethlein's point that Sallust uses expressions of uncertainty to highlight his credibility, (2006: 304-313)

[115] Sal. *Jug*. 86.2-4 Indeed, as will be discussed below, such men soon prove to be the equals of those recruited in the old way.

the *habitus*, Romans of the early republic were willing to suffer hardships that led to great military success, while at home their lives were marked by frugality and equanimity. The communal nature – Romans underwent this process regardless of class – meant that government and society was marked by *concordia maxuma* and *aequitas*. It was this culture that allowed Rome to become the powerful and stable state that is described at the beginning of the *Bellum Catilinae*.

However, Rome's excellence could only last as long as the *habitus* was maintained. Levene has argued convincingly that Sallust uses Catonian allusions in a way that demonstrates that the tensions that led to the decline of Roman morality following the destruction of Carthage were present even in the idealised state that he describes in the opening of the *Catilinae*.[116] By alluding to Cato – who lived in the period of moral excellence he described –, Sallust demonstrates that the tendencies towards moral degeneracy that the Censor railed against was present even in his ideal Rome.[117] This has important implications for Sallust's conception of military service. As it was the *habitus* learned in camp that taught early Romans to rise above the tendencies toward immorality, we shall see that the degradation of that *habitus* led to the moral collapse of the last century of the republic.[118] Having described the *habitus* of Sallust's early republic and the patterns of behaviour of its citizens, it falls now to discuss the results of Rome's moral collapse. This will allow for an evaluation

[116] Levene (2000)
[117] Levene (2000: 177)
[118] Kapust, focussing on competition within the republican system, has argued similarly that the Romans of the early Republic described by Sallust had similar drives but they were productively channelled in the idealised period (2011: 27-52)

of a *habitus* for the historian's perception of the corrupted republic, which will enable the comparison between armies composed of corrupted citizens and those restored to the *mos maiorum*.

## The Corruption of the Republic

Turning from Sallust's golden age to the moral collapse that follows requires a brief comment on when exactly he perceived this corruption to have taken place. While the most detailed description of the republic at its moral height occurs in the *Bellum Catilinae*, briefer accounts of this ideal state are also found both in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* and in the fragments of the *Histories*. All three works are clear on the fall of Carthage as being the end of this golden age, but the dates of its beginning are somewhat contradictory. In *Catilinae*, moral perfection is said to have developed soon after the founding of the republic.[119] The *Jugurthinum* makes no mention of any start of this period, but also seems to clearly establish that this moral excellence was an effect of the Roman republic specifically, not of just Rome itself.[120] Thus the period of greatness can start no earlier than the expulsion of the Tarquins.

The *Histories*, however, muddies the water. Unlike the '*concordia maxuma*' described in the *Catilinae*'s account of early Rome, the *Histories* refers to the struggle of the orders and the secession of the plebs both in the

[119] Sal. *Cat*. 7.3
[120] Sal. *Jug*. 41.2

narration and in the speech of the tribune Licinius Macer.[121] Indeed, Macer explicitly dates the period of '*maxima concordia*' to between the Second and Third Punic Wars: '*optimis autem moribus et maxima concordia egit inter secundum atque postremum bellum Carthaginiense*.'[122] ' This more complicated perception of the early republic shows a more developed sense of Roman history and perhaps an 'increased pessimism' on the part of Sallust.[123] This discordance does not, however, affect Sallust's image of the ideal Roman. As we have seen, it is the circumstances – *cupido gloriae*, external threat, frugality at home, and military education – that led to the development of the ideal Roman citizen. Nor, as we will see, does the end result differ. Sallust's corrupted present is as consistent as his idealised past. We are faced with a chronological problem, but not a structural one. The structural problems remain the same. Sallust's thesis can be expressed very simply: Rome is now corrupt; Rome was once not corrupt; a change in the circumstances and habits of the Romans has caused this corruption. Inconsistences in detail and chronology between or even within the work can be maintained since the overall thesis remains consistent.

On one point Sallust is remarkably consistent, the inciting incident for the process by which the republic became corrupt was the destruction of Carthage. The wealth and security that followed the end of the Punic war led to *ambitio*

[121] Sal. *His*. 1.11M; 3.48M.1
[122] Sal. *His*. 1.11M
[123] Earl (1961: 42)

and *avaritia*.[124] The traditional scholarly narrative is that these vices led to a division between the people and the nobles which fractured the *concordia* of the earlier republic. Sallust is thus accused of ignoring social and economic factors and focussing solely on the individual vices and social discord that led to the destruction of the civil order.[125] In this narrative, the *ambitio* of the populace was inflamed by the *avaritia* and *luxuria* of the nobility.[126] In such a way, the traditional narrative has it, by moralising the process, Sallust became 'easy prey' to conventional notions about the virtue of the early Romans.[127] But, as discussed above, Sallust's notions about the morality of the early Romans differed significantly from the more conventional view presented by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

It is my contention that focussing on the individual vices and political struggles obscures a key point in Sallust's perception of the collapse of *concordia*. The destruction of Carthage and the growth of wealth in the city disrupted the collective *habitus* that shaped the development of the ideal Roman citizen. The unifying external threat had vanished. *Otium, luxuriae,* and *divitiae* corrupted the *habitus* and led to the spread through the republic of the vices that would destroy it: *avaritia*, *ambitio, superbia*, and *crudelitas.*[128]

[124] Within the text itself the order of *ambitio* and *avaritia* are at first glance inconsistent. However, as the end results remain the same, this problem does not affect my overall argument. As a result it is unnecessary to spend time on this matter. On various proposed solutions to this issue see Büchner (1960: 320) Conley (1981a & 1981b), Earl (1961: 13-15), McGushin (1977: 90-91), Tiffou (1975: 302).
[125] Earl (1961: 29)
[126] Conley (1981a: 381)
[127] Syme (1964: 17)
[128] Sal. *Cat*. 10.2-4

*Cupido gloriae* was pushed out by *ambitio* and *avaritia*. The increased wealth disrupted the universal frugality of the golden age. At the same time, military service was becoming less fashionable, as men sought advancement through other careers.[129] Sallust has Marius allude to this change when he invites his audience to compare his own career with that of an aristocratic commander given command of an army without ever having earned practical military experience.[130] Sallust's ideal Rome had been a place of universal virtue, a perception he developed by discussing the republic at its height in anonymous and general terms. In the *Catilinae*, he uses the same method to show that Rome's corruption was universal. Once again he carefully avoids discussing either individuals or social classes in order to demonstrate the universal nature of the corrupt state.[131]

In the opening of the *Bellum Jugurthinum*, Sallust justifies writing a history of the Numidian War in part because he considers it the inciting incident that led to the political collapse at the end of the republic. The war marked the beginning of popular resistance to the *superbia* of the nobility and this caused the social struggles that would end with the civil wars.[132] Taken on its own this appears to contradict the narrative of universal corruption offered

[129] De Blois (1987: 17-18); In his exhaustive survey of junior officers in the Republic, Suolahti showed that even by the second century the post of military tribune was largely occupied by men from families without senatorial status (1955: 155-160).
[130] Sal. *Jug*. 85.15; The sentiment is expressed by Marius, but as discussed above, the similarities between Marius' speech and Sallust's own account of early Rome are clear. Certainly, it is easier to find connexions between Sallust's own opinions on the Romanness of practical education than to read it as a reflection of Cynical thought, as Skald does (1941: 100-102).
[131] Sal. *Cat*. 10
[132] Sal. *Jug.* 5.2

in the *Bellum Catilinae*. However, in the context of the later passage in the *Jugurthinum* where Sallust discusses the moral collapse of the republic the causality becomes clearer. Sallust states that '*Ceterum mos partium et factionum ac deinde omnium malarum artium paucis ante annis Romae ortus est otio atque abundantia earum rerum, quae prima mortales ducunt.*'[133] 'The custom of parties and factions and, then, of all evil practices arose at Rome a few years before from inactivity and an abundance of those things which mortals consider to be priorities.' This fractured society was not the fault of either party, but rather the result of the corrupted state of the citizenry. The text is clear on this: '*Namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in lubidinem vortere, sibi quisque ducere, trahere, rapere.*'[134] 'For the nobility began to turn their rank, and the people their liberty, into matters of whim: every man for himself appropriated, looted, and seized.' Sallust spreads the blame throughout the republic; it is not the solely the *nobilitas* or the *populus* that is responsible for the moral collapse but both, the fault lies with *quisque*.

Sallust here allows us to see the *habitus* of this new Rome, a society appears greatly changed from that of its ideal counterpart. The primary cultural capital is no longer *gloria* but money and wealth:

> igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies omnium malorum fuere. namque avaritia fidem probitatem ceterasque artis bonas subvortit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem, deos neglegere, omnia venalia habere edocuit.[135]
>
> At first the love of money, and then that of power, began to prevail, and these became, as it were, the sources of every evil. For avarice subverted

[133] Sal. *Jug*. 41.1
[134] Sal. *Jug*. 41.5
[135] Sal. *Cat*. 10.3-4

> honesty, integrity, and other honourable principles, and, in their stead, inculcated arrogance, inhumanity, contempt of religion, and general venality.

Without the external threat and the military education, the populace are now shaped by *otium* and the erstwhile frugality has been replaced by increased wealth gained from Rome's conquests.[136] As a result, the patterns of behaviour of these new Romans are fundamentally different from their ancestors. A new Roman is not driven by *cupido gloriae*, but rather by *cupido pecuniae* and *cupido imperi*. His ability to bear hardship and danger has been undermined by *otium*. His avarice had made him effeminate: '*Avaritia...corpus animusque virilem effeminat*.'[137] Whereas his ancestors had been diligent in honouring the gods, this new Roman neglects them. Unlike the law abiding citizen of the earlier period, he is false and double-dealing. With all citizens competing against each other for wealth and power the earlier *concordia* has vanished; Sallust makes no mention of it.[138]

Most notably, compared to the overwhelming military aspect of the early Roman *habitus*, Sallust introduces an entire section of the state that has no experience of military service. Sallust has separated the civilian sphere from the military one. An indication of this fractured Roman state is given by the appearance, for the first time in the work, of the noun *miles*.[139] Prior to this

[136] Sal. *Cat*. 10.1-3
[137] Sal. *Cat*. 11.3
[138] In both the *Bellum Catilinae* and the *Bellum Jugurthinum* Sallust reserves *concordia* for his narrative of early Rome. The few later references to it occur only in the speech of the tribune Memmius (*Jug*. 31.23) and Sallust's sly reminder that the Senate's fractious deliberations over Catiline occurred in the temple of *Concordia* (*Cat*. 46.5, 49.4).
[139] Sal. *Cat.* 11.5

first occurrence, even in the explicitly military passages describing the wars of the republic, Romans had only been described as *vir*, *cives*, or indirectly. It was not *exercitum Romanum* that defeated the enemy in the field, but *populus Romanus*.[140] Now, however, Sallust divides the corruption of Rome into two separate fields, the military and the civilian, and the people of Rome into two separate groups, the aristocracy and the people, both equally corrupt.[141] First, he describes the new fallen state of the civilian population. The new desire is not for armour and horses but for houses, land, and, above all, money: '*rapere omnes omnes trahere, domum alius alius agros cupere, neque modum neque modestiam victores habere, foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere*.'[142] 'everyone started to seize and loot; one man desired a house, another land; the victors showed neither restraint nor moderation but did foul and cruel deeds against their fellow citizens.' Further, this wealth was no longer esteemed only if it had been come by honestly. Gone were the *divitatiae honestae* of the idealised period. Both in the *Bellum Jugurthinum* and the *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust uses '*rapere*' to describe the method by which these new Romans attempted to gain their newly desired wealth.[143] This wealth, then, was no longer legitimate military booty but the ill-gotten gains of thieves.

[140] Sal. *Cat*. 7.7
[141] On the way that Sallust presents *populus Romanus* as the unified citizenry in his idealised republic and as a group distinct from the aristocracy in the later period, see Hammer (2014: 175-179)
[142] Sal. *Cat*. 11.4
[143] Sal. *Cat*. 11.4; Sal. Jug. 41.5

Moreover, Sallust uses '*rapere*' in connexion with wealth to exclusively denote the wealth that was gained illicitly by civilians and undisciplined soldiers.[144]

Fragmented as it was, the *populus Romanus* no longer shared the unified *habitus* of the early republic.[145] The men of the corrupt republic could not have been more dissimilar from their ancestors. They lacked the attributes that Sallust saw as leading to the greatness of the republic. They, like their ancestors, were the products of their circumstances, but while their ancestors had been shaped by external threat, frugality, and rigorous military training, these new Romans were shaped by security, leisure, and wealth. Because the uncorrupted Roman *habitus* was thoroughly grounded in military service and the virtues cultivated in the camp, it is now to the camp that we must turn to fully understand the process and nature of this new corrupted state.

## The Corruption of the Armies

The corruption of Rome had a direct effect on the military efficiency of the republic, since the corruption was as widespread on campaign as it was at home. DeBlois has argued argued that Sallust perceived soldiers and veterans as a separate social group within the republic, there is little evidence in the text to support this.[146] Armies in Sallust are still portrayed as temporary collections of citizens enrolled for the purposes of a campaign: In his account of the

[144] Corrupt civilians: *Cat*. 11.4, *Jug*. 41.5; Sulla's soldiers: *Cat*. 11.6
[145] Bourdieu stresses that a habitus requires homogeneity amongst its members to properly provide structure. (1977: 80)
[146] De Blois (1988: 616)

Jugurthine War, each of the armies sent to Africa is raised from the populace, with no suggestion that this is simply a case of reenlisting veterans.[147] Indeed, the only detailed information given about the source of recruits concerns Marius' formation of his army, when the recruitment is expanded to include a new, as yet untapped source of civilians liable for military service.[148] Further, when Sallust describes veterans in his account of the war, he is invariably referring to soldiers who have been serving in a particular campaign and contrasts them with the untried levies brought out as reinforcements by each successive consul.[149] In Sallust's account of the Numidian war, then, *miles* is not a profession, but simply a temporary state that a citizen occupies when enlisted for a campaign.

The tight links between the army and the civilian population are emphasised by Marius. In his speech to the people, the new consul clearly portrays his soldiers in the old style, that is as citizens fighting for the republic.[150] The speaker is, of course, not the historian himself, but nowhere else in the work does the Sallust suggest that there is any significant differentiation between soldiers and citizens. In the *Catilinae*, Sallust associates the motivations and desires of the *Sullani* with the lowest rung of the Roman citizenry. The poor of Rome are enticed to join Catiline because they see the chance to transform their fortunes through civil war just as Sulla's men had done a decade earlier.[151] This is a result of the new order of things,

[147] Sal. *Jug*. 27.5; 43.3
[148] Sal. *Jug*. 86.2
[149] E.g. Sal. *Jug.* 87.2-3
[150] Sal. Jug. 85
[151] Sal. Cat. 37.6

where the primary motivation of a Roman is no longer *cupido gloriae* but *cupido pecuniae*. Not only do men not care about winning the esteem of their fellow citizens in service of the state, they are willing to imperil that state to enrich themselves. Both the *Sullani* and the rural poor also are shown to be disinclined towards the difficult labour of farming. Sallust stresses the unsuitability of the Sullan veterans for farming, twice mentioning that they had squandered their wealth.[152] These men have not become habituated towards *labor*.[153] Later, he describes civilian labourers that were no longer willing to till the soil and wished to join Catiline.[154] The connexion is clear: soldiers are simply members of the citizenry, prey to the same corrupting forces and social pressures of their fellows in the civilian sphere. Here again we see the result of the new *habitus*. Now shaped by *otium* rather than conditioned to *labor*, Roman citizens look askance at the hard graft of agricultural work.

Sallust alludes to the negative effect that the corrupted citizens had on the military efficacy of the armies of the republic. In his discussion of Caesar and Cato, he returns to his earlier assertion that it was the quality of the populace that had led the early Romans to their successes against larger armies and richer states:

> sciebam saepenumero parva manu cum magnis legionibus hostium contendisse; cognoveram parvis copiis bella gesta cum opulentis regibus, ad hoc saepe fortunae violentiam toleravisse, facundia Graecos, gloria belli Gallos ante Romanos fuisse. ac mihi multa agitanti constabat

[152] Sal. Cat. 16.4; 28.4
[153] As is discussed below, Sullan veterans were particularly disinclined towards labour as a result of the circumstances of their military service.
[154] Sal. *Cat*. 37.7

> paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse, eoque factum, uti divitias paupertas, multitudinem paucitas superaret.[155]
>
> I knew that the Romans had frequently, with small bodies of men, encountered vast armies of the enemy; I was aware that they had carried on wars with limited forces against powerful sovereigns; that they had often sustained, too, the violence of adverse fortune; yet that, while the Greeks excelled them in eloquence, the Gauls surpassed them in military glory. After much reflection, I felt convinced that the eminent virtue of a few citizens had been the cause of all these successes; and hence it had happened that poverty had triumphed over riches, and a few over a multitude.

Once the populace had become corrupted, however, it was only the size and power of the republic that protected it from serious military reverses.[156] Rome is no longer dominant due to the inherent excellence of its citizens but merely because of its large population and resources. It has become, in a sense, one of the powerful states that the early Romans so easily overcame.

While the populace and the soldiery remained linked in Sallust's perception of the republic, it is clear that he perceived some differentiation within the officers of the armies. This is signalled by the recurring Sallustian epithet *homo militaris*. In the *Catilinae*, Sallust uses this designation to describe three men commanding Roman troops against the conspirators. The first two of these are the praetors sent to intercept the Allobroges: Valerius Flaccus and Pomptinus.[157] The last is Antonius' legate, Petreius, who commands the state army in the final battle against Catiline.[158] An example of the career of a *homo militaris* is given by Sallust when he introduces Petreius: during his thirty-year

[155] Sal. *Cat*. 53.3-4
[156] Sal. *Cat*. 53.5
[157] Sal. *Cat*. 45.2
[158] Sal. *Cat*. 59.6

career he had held the positions of legate, prefect, tribune, and praetor.[159] The other two men Sallust repeatedly describes as having a military career, though does not explicitly label either *homo militaris*, were Marius and the renegade Sertorius.

It is important not to take this categorisation too far. Sallust did not perceive these military men as 'all but professional officers' as DeBlois has claimed.[160] Sallust seems to have regarded the *homo militaris* as neither an exclusively military career nor a new phenomenon. Most of the men described have held magistracies that did not have direct military connexions. Valerius Flaccus and Pomptinus are serving praetors, while Petreius had previously held the same magistracy, as had Marius and Sertorius. That they had all served as praetors is instructive. By the late republic, praetors were rarely expected to command soldiers in the field and the praetorship had ceased to be an exclusively military appointment.[161] Further, while most of the men Sallust says had held military tribuneships, Pomptinus is not recorded as having been a tribune.[162] It is therefore more convincing to consider Sallust's conception of *homo militaris* as simply describing a man who had military experience, rather than someone who was pursuing a military focused career.[163]

The pedigree of the five men is also worth considering. While Pomptinus, Petreius, Sertorius, and, of course, Marius were of modest family, the praetor

[159] Sal. *Cat.* 59.6
[160] De Blois (1988: 613)
[161] Ramsey (1984: 232)
[162] Garbugino (1998: 214)
[163] Ramsey (2007: 225)

Valerius Flaccus was the son of a consul and from a family of impeccable breeding with roots stretching to the foundation of the republic.[164] Indeed, in the late republic the aristocratic class, though losing ground since the Hannibalic war, still occupied a substantial portion of the recorded military tribunes.[165] This *homo militaris*, then, was not a *novus* attempting to find a place from himself in the system dominated by the *nobiles*, rather Sallust seems to have perceived him as simply one of several varieties of politician. Of course, a general could fight a war without relying on military men. Calpurnius Bestia seems to have formed his staff exclusively from noble politicians, and Sulla, though arriving in Numidia without any experience, would become an effective officer under Marius' command.[166]

With the quality of the armies tied to the quality of the citizen soldiers, and their officers, Sallust had his explanation for the military reverses that Rome suffered in the late republic. In the *Bellum Jugurthinum* and the *Histories* he uses his account of the revolt at Vaga and the disastrous campaign of Albinus to demonstrate the ineffectiveness and unreliability of armies composed of the citizens of the late republic.[167] However, Sallust demonstrates how the circumstances of campaign provide an opportunity for a Roman army to recapture something of the old Roman *habitus*.

[164] McGushin (1977: 78)
[165] Suolahti (1955: 162)
[166] Sal. Jug. 28.4; 96.1
[167] Vaga: Jug. 66-67; Albinus *Jug*. 38. Both passages are discussed at length below.

## Reforming the *Habitus* of a Roman Army

While Sallust appears to see the corruption of the republic as irreversible, he does demonstrate that citizens serving in an army can be restored to something approaching the standards of their ancestors. This involves a two-pronged process that requires changing a soldier's behaviour and his circumstances. By restoring the *mos maiorum* and training an army through castrametation, a general could restore the mettle and moral superiority of his troops. However, this process was both temporary and elusive, requiring the constant attention of the general and the cooperation of his officers. In Sallust's understanding of the development of the early Roman *habitus*, the camp played a fundamental rôle, both for common soldier and the élite officers, as under the republic the Roman youth '*in castris per laborem usum militiae discebat*...'[168] 'learned through labour in the camp military practice...' Further, the fact that labour in the camp dated from the beginning of the republic suggests that Sallust saw castrametation as something innately Roman.[169]

Castrametation is the process of building marching camps, and it served as a form of training for the Roman armies throughout the republic and into the empire; similar to modern close order drill, it gave the Roman soldier a

[168] Sal. *Cat*. 7

[169] The origin of the Roman practice of castrametation was by no means a settled point to the ancients. Some believed that the Romans had learned the art of building camps from Pyrrhus (e.g. Liv. 35.14.8; Front. *Strat*. 4.1.14), others that Pyrrhus had been impressed by the orderly camps of the Romans when he arrived in Italy (Plut. *Pyrr*. 16.6-7). For a detailed survey on the ancient sources on castrametation see Lenoir (2011: 14-29).

standardized and controlled activity.[170] Polybius provides a systematic description of the camp as it was theoretically constructed in the middle republic. There are, of course, several reasons why we should be cautions of Polybius' account.[171] However, the details of the account are less relevant here than the fact that castrametation was a formalised and regulated practice: every aspect of the building of camps in the republic was organised and dictated by tradition. That Sallust understood this is reflected in his judgement of certain commanders conducting campaigns contrary to those traditions.[172] The placement of each tent in the legion and the spaces between them were carefully organised and regimented, as was the length and layout of the paths between them.[173] The physical defences, sentries and military duties were all carefully and uniformly organised.[174] Importantly, the camp was meant to be an almost exclusively military environment. With the exception of the officers' slaves, everyone inside the camp was a soldier.[175] The ordered environment of the camp represented hierarchies and order and gave each person within the camp their specific place in that hierarchy and order. It was also replicated and recreated on a daily basis, as generals moved their armies. Soldiers, therefore,

[170] Phang (2008: 67)
[171] Erskine's warning that the level of detail of his account of the Roman camp not be taken as evidence of an empirical rather than theoretical approach is to be heeded (2013: 237-240). On Polybius' presentation of the Roman Army more generally, Goldberg (2016) has demonstrated that Polybius' account of decimation is not adequately supported in our sources for the middle republic, though Goldberg is too quick to blame that on the paucity of the sources than on Polybius himself.
[172] E.g. Sallust's remark that Sulla led his army in Asia '*contra morem maiorum*', *Cat.* 11.5; Metellus restored traditional discipline in the African army (with the implication that Albinus had not required it of his men), *Iug* 44.3.
[173] Plb. 6.27-32
[174] Plb. 6.34-36
[175] Plb. 6.33

had to be conscious of the built environment and its ordered hierarchies, that they continuously – and communally – recreated. By separating soldiers from the civilian world and establishing a restricted, ordered environment, a general removed corrupting civilian influences and forced his soldiers into an exclusively military environment. In this environment, Roman citizen-soldiers would develop a military *habitus* that was distinct from the corrupt civilian habitus of the contemporary republic, but echoed the moral excellence of the early republic.

As will be discussed at greater length below, it is this method that Metellus uses to restore and strengthen his army while on campaign in Numidia. His actions take a lazy and corrupt army and rebuild it as a disciplined force that, like the ancients, is brave in the face of the enemy, undaunted by terrain and unfazed by the toil and deprivations of campaign. Accounts of discipline restored in this manner also occur in several fragments from the *Historiae*. One fragment, most likely related to Lucullus' own struggles with maintaining discipline, refers to directing an army towards the *mos maiorum*.[176] '*Exercitum maiorum more verteret*.' 'he returned the army to the traditional practice.'[177] In his discussion of Varinius' reforming his army in the 3rd Servile War Sallust's portrayal of the army is similar to his comments concerning Albinus' army in Numidia; here again, the correct course of action

[176] On locating this fragment in the narrative of Lucullus' efforts to reform the legions of Valerius Flaccus, see Maurenbrecher (1899: 117-118) and McGuishin (1994: 74).
[177] Sal. *His*. 3.19M On the similarities between the language used here and Metellus' actions in Africa see Funari (1996: 500).

is to restore the old practices. '*Et tamen interim cum volentibus numero quattuor <milium iuxta illos castra poni>t. va<llo, fossa, permag>nis operibus commun<ita>*.'[178] 'In the meantime, with four thousand willing troops, Varinius pitched camp near the enemy, fortifying it with rampart, ditch, and extensive earthworks.' Following McGuishin's suggestion that the detail given by Sallust suggests that previous commanders had not bothered with proper castrametation, it is likely that Varinius was the first of the commanders sent against Spartacus to conduct his campaign in the traditional way.[179] Unfortunately for Varinius, his overconfidence leads him to move against Spartacus before the process is complete.[180] His defeat reinforces Sallust's point that military success is directly tied to restoring the *mos maiorum*.

As we have seen, Sallust perceived the development of the Roman *habitus* as a communal practice, not imposed on the people from above. This view influences his understanding of how the *habitus* was to be cultivated in later armies. While the military hierarchy had to be respected, as an essentially republican process the appropriate *habitus* could not be enforced by harsh or domineering leadership. Sallust describes the proper method as a careful balance between indulgence and firmness. For instance, he praises Metellus' prudence in restoring the discipline of his army before moving against the Numidians and by controlling this discipline by moderation rather than cruelty.[181] Nowhere does Sallust speak favourably of excessive severity in

[178] Sal. *His*. 3.96.a-bM
[179] McGuishin (1994: 117).
[180] Sal. *His*. 3.96dM
[181] Sal. *Jug*. 45.3

restoring or maintaining the *habitus* of Roman soldiers, though such practices were generally considered not just laudatory but necessary to maintain order in an army. For instance, Valerius Maximus provides an approving list of particularly brutal punishments meted out to soldiers by the great generals of the republic.[182] He ends his account thus: '*aspero enim et absciso castigationis genere militaris disciplina indiget, quia vires armis constant; quae ubi a recto tenore desciverint, oppressura sunt nisi opprimantur.*'[183] 'For military discipline requires a harsh, brutish sort of punishment because strength consists in arms, and when these stray from the right path they will crush unless they be crushed.' Indeed, Sallust seems to be explicitly addressing this tradition when he describes moderate command of as much a benefit to the republic as the greatest strictness.[184] Moderate command, then, was necessary if the ancient *habitus* was to be cultivated, rather than enforced from above. The general needed to provide the circumstances for the communal development described in the *Bellum Catilinae*, something he could not do by playing the martinet.

Besides moderation, another method of maintaining the *mos maiorum* was by openly sharing the danger and hardships of the men. Marius makes much of his willingness to share the experiences of the soldiers in his speech to the people.[185] He proves his words no empty boast; as throughout the war

[182] E.g. Val. Max. 2.7.10-14
[183] Val. Max. 2.7.14
[184] Sal. *Jug.* 100.5
[185] Sal. *Jug.* 85.33

he labours alongside his men and is personally present at the major military events of his campaign.[186] Metellus also goes to pains to show himself to the men, disturbing his sleep to inspect the night sentries and visiting all parts of the column when on the march.[187] Similarly, the *Historiae* shows Lucullus, faced with imminent defeat, riding alone to join his retreating men and encourage them to fight as Romans should.[188] By sharing the labour, hardships, and dangers of his men, a general could reinforce the sense of social homogeneity necessary for the development of a reformed *habitus*. When the early Romans assaulted enemy armies or citadels in Sallust's account of the early republic, they did so as a unified *populus Romanus*, not as soldiers directed from the rear by aristocratic generals.

There was a perception amongst the Romans that military discipline came as a 'package' and if any part of it was eroded, the rest would follow.[189] Sallust seems to have followed this thinking. In his work this is most clear in the immediate and damaging effect that a breakdown in co-operation between officers has on the effectiveness on the troops under their command. Sallust does not use the term '*concordia*' in his narrative outside his account of the early republic, cooperation between the general and his subordinates fulfils the same rôle in this reformed military *habitus* that *concordia* held in early Rome. However, this cooperation also appears to have been one of the most fragile aspects of *the habitus*. In the early stages of the Metellus'

[186] Sal. *Jug*. 100.3-4
[187] Sal. *Jug*. 46.5
[188] Sal. *His.* 4.7M
[189] Phang (2008: 171)

campaigns, when he and his legate Marius are cooperating, the Roman army operates at peak efficiency. Yet, when Marius falls out with his commander following his desire to seek the consulship, the first thing to go is the discipline of Marius' troops.[190] This same breakdown is alluded to in Sallust's account of the notoriously troubled campaign against Numantia, where Aemilianus is saddled with an officer staff that Sallust describes disparagingly as *'factiosi*.'[191] To Sallust, the maintenance of this military co-operation – a sort of ersatz *concordia* – was essential in restoring the *mos maiorum* and increasing the effectiveness of the troops.[192] While he does not term it *concordia*, this social and military unity – which grew out of moderate leadership and the discipline of a traditional camp – was vital to the maintenance of the reformed *habitus* of the Sallustian soldier. When cooperation broke down due to rivalry within the command tent, the *habitus* was in danger of breaking down.

Having described in general terms this process, an examination of the Numidian War will allow an understanding of its details. In the *Jugurthinum* Sallust provides detailed descriptions of two varieties of army. In the early part of the campaign the reader is given a scathing description of an army composed of and led by corrupt men. When Metellus takes command, the situation improves greatly. Sallust first describes the method by which the

[190] Sal. *Jug.* 64.5
[191] Sal. *Jug*. 8.1
[192] Wiedemann gets close to the point here, but focuses too much on concord simply between élites: 'the best noble commander cannot succeed if he ignores the talent of a *novus homo*; but a talented *novus homo* can only succeed in co-operation with a talented aristocrat.' (1993: 50) That co-operation is the key to success is fundamental to Sallust's understanding, but is co-operation within the whole army, formed by they appropriate military *habitus*, that gives a general victory, not simply a good working relationship with his lieutenants.

general restored the *habitus* of his soldiers and then provides evidence that, even though the republic was not capable of the virtue and vigour of the *mores maiorum,* an army properly led could capture something of the old quality of Rome.

## The Armies in Africa, Asia, and Italy.

Sallust provides a portrait of an army formed of the newly corrupted citizens in the early chapters of the *Bellum Jugurthinum*. Under the command of the incompetent Spurius Albinus and his brother, the army and its officers exhibit all the behaviours resulting from this new Roman *habitus*, they are unwilling to bear hardship or danger, they are motivated by *avaritia* and *ambitio*, and they are disunited even in the face of danger.

*Avaritia* is perhaps the most obvious motivation. The army is unwilling to run the risks of attacking the enemy and earn honest booty, but is perfectly willing to steal cattle and slaves from the provincials in order to barter with traders for foreign wine and luxuries. [193] Even worse, their greed puts the entire army at risk when Jugurtha attempts to subvert the army. So bad are conditions in the camp that the king is able to send envoys to spread sedition not only under cover of night but in broad daylight.[194] Sallust gives an indication of how widespread this corruption is when he reports that the

[193] Sal. *Jug.* 44.5
[194] Sal. *Jug*. 38.3

*primipilus* of one of Albinus' legions was amongst those induced to betray the army.[195]

Their unwillingness to bear hardship is most clear in the description of the winter camp. The soldiers are static, only moving their camp when forced to by an accumulation of sewage or a shortage of food.[196] The camp is neither fortified nor guarded and camp followers and soldiers mix freely day and night, and the soldiers are supplementing their military fare with foreign wine and purchased bread.[197] This is not merely an indication of sloth on the part of the soldiers; baking bread was a regulated and formalised aspect of camp labour, and thus formed part of a proper Roman's *habitus*.[198] Sallust's judgement is damning; the army is '*iners'*, *'imbellis'*, and *'neque periculi neque laboris patiens'*.[199]

When Metellus arrives in Africa to take command, he sets about immediately rectifying the situation. As the passage provides the most complete and detailed account of Sallust's understanding of good leadership, it is worth quoting in full:

> Namque edicto primum adiumenta ignaviae sustulisse: ne quisquam in castris panem aut quem alium cibum coctum venderet, ne lixae exercitum insequerentur, ne miles hastatus aut gregarius in castris neue in agmine seruum aut iumentum haberet; ceteris arte modum statuisse. Praeterea transuersis itineribus cottidie castra movere, iuxta ac si hostes adessent vallo atque fossa munire, vigilias crebras ponere et eas ipse cum legatis circumire; item in agmine in primis modo, modo in postremis,

[195] Sal. *Jug*. 38.6
[196] Sal. *Jug*. 44.4
[197] Sal. *Jug*. 44.5
[198] Roth provides a detailed survey of the sources demonstrating that preparing bread was part of the daily routine of a Roman soldier, particularly when on campaign (1999: 44-51).
[199] Sal. *Jug*. 44.1

> saepe in medio adesse, ne quispiam ordine egrederetur, ut cum signis frequentes incederent, miles cibum et arma portaret. Ita prohibendo a delictis magis quam vindicando exercitum brevi confirmauit.[200]
>
> And that in an edict he removed first the props of their apathy: no one should sell bread or any other cooked food in the camp; no camp followers should accompany the army; no spearman or troop soldier should keep a slave or baggage animal in camp or in the column; and that he set a narrow limit on other things. Besides this, he moved camp daily on sideways routes, he fortified it with a rampart and ditch just as if the enemy were in the vicinity, he set frequent watches and went round them personally with his legates; likewise in the column he was sometimes in the front, sometimes at the rear, and often in the centre, to ensure that no one broke rank, that when advancing they were massed around the standards, and that the soldiery carried food and arms. In this way, by the prevention of offences rather than by punishment, he soon toughened his army.

Sallust spares little praise for Metellus' actions when faced with the state of Albinus' army. Rather than attacking Jugurtha, he remains within Roman territory and enforces the old disciplines. With daily marches and regularly building fortified camps, the consul accustoms his army to the military *labor* of the ancients. By moving his camps and setting sentries, he separates his army from the corrupting civilian world around them. Having denied his soldiers *otium*, he moved to cut them off from the *luxuriae* that they had enjoyed under Albinus. He drove out the suttlers that had supplied them with foreign wine and the bakers that had allowed them access to anything other than simple military fare. By daily marches and castrametation, Metellus was, in effect, teaching his army *usus militiae*. It should be stressed, that despite Sallust's remark that the process occurred *brevi*, it is clear that the process took some time. While Metellus was reforming his army, Jugurtha had time to send and

[200] Sal. *Jug*. 45.2-3

receive messages to Rome, and arrange an embassy to Metellus.[201] Further, it shall become evident that the reformed *habitus* is a very fragile thing, and vulnerable to backsliding if the proper camp discipline is not maintained.

Throughout Sallust stresses Metellus' hands on and constant approach to maintaining the *habitus* of his army: the consul seemed to be everywhere at once, inspecting sentries, observing the marches from the front, middle and rear of the line.[202] Metellus' practice has the desired effect, and when he marches on Numidia, his army, once composed of fresh levies and the demoralized remnants of his predecessor's campaign, is now the most formidable force in Africa.[203] Excepting a few brief calamities and the breakdown of co-operation between Marius and Metellus, the army in Africa appears to be exhibiting the ideal *habitus* through the remainder of the campaign. Like the early Romans, they are able to withstand the attacks of their enemies, as the battle of the Muthul River and the siege of Vaga.[204] They are also able to bear the toil and hardship of campaign, including a forced march through the desert.[205] Once again, therefore, the army fits the description of the early Romans given in the *Bellum Catilinae*.[206]

It is also illustrative that the largest reverse under Metellus occurs when the garrison at Vaga is ambushed and destroyed. On the day of their destruction, Sallust paints a picture of soldiers who have abandoned the

[201] Sal. *Jug*. 46.1-2
[202] Sal. *Jug*. 46.5
[203] Sal. *Jug.* 51.1
[204] Sal. *Jug*. 48-53; 69
[205] Sal. *Jug*. 75
[206] Sal. *Cat*. 7

*habitus* of their ancestors. The officers have been lured away from their troops with the promise of feasting. The men themselves are mingling with the civilian population of the town and, like the civilians around them, they are unarmed.[207] Softened by contact with the civilians and being separated from their standards, the soldiers are quickly massacred by the Vagenses.[208] Removed from the reformative *habitus* of the camp, then, the modern corruptions have reasserted themselves and reduced the martial vigour of the soldiers in Vaga. As a result, such men cannot withstand the attack even of a foreign mob.

The disaster at Vaga can be contrasted with an earlier battle near Zama when Jugurtha with a large force managed to overrun the badly defended Roman camp. While many are killed in the opening of the engagement, the survivors, numbering only forty, manage to hold off the Numidians until they are relieved.[209] Unlike the men at Vaga, these men, remaining in the camp and subject to its discipline, retain something of their ancestors' excellence, like them they are able to resist a large foreign force '*parva manu*'.[210] Here the importance of the camp and its reformative aspect is shown in dreadful simplicity. The reformed Romans at Zama are capable of fighting of an attack by a large enemy force, the relapsed men at Vaga are not.

[207] Sal. *Jug*. 66.2-3
[208] Sal. *Jug.* 67.1-2
[209] Sal. *Jug.* 58.1-3
[210] Sal. *Cat.* 6.7

Levene has suggested that the *Bellum Jugurthinum* can be read as an 'historical fragment' that prompts the reader to consider the events of the Jugurthine War within the larger narrative of the political decline of the republic.[211] In the context of this chapter, while the *Jugurthinum* ends with a successful Roman army, restored to the earlier *habitus* and with Marius and Sulla cooperating, we must consider this alongside Sallust's narrative of decline, where he singles out Sulla especially for undermining Roman excellence.[212] While Vaga and Zama provide examples of the practical importance of maintaining the military *habitus*, in his brief description of Sulla's campaign against Mithridates Sallust provides an example of the catastrophic moral results of allowing soldiers to serve outside the *mores maiorum*. In the East, the historian records, '*Sulla exercitum quem in Asia ductaverat, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat.*'[213] 'Sulla, in order to secure the loyalty of the army which he led into Asia, had allowed it a luxury and license foreign to the manners of our forefathers.' As Sulla was successful, Sallust cannot attribute a defeat to the abandoning of the *mores maiorum*. Instead the historian describes the appalling effect the campaign had on the morality of the soldiers. Like their civilian counterparts these men show no respect for the gods, but rather '*delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere*.'[214] 'to pillage shrines, and to desecrate everything, both sacred and profane..' In the long list of wealth

[211] Levene (1992); On this, see also Djikstra and Parker (2007).
[212] Sal. *Cat*. 11
[213] Sal. *Cat*. 11.5
[214] Sal. *Cat*. 11.6

and fine goods the Sullani acquired, Sallust does not once mention *praeda* – the usual term for legitmate military spoils – but again uses the verb *rapere*.[215] As discussed above, this appears to be language that Sallust uses to delegitimise wealth he considered gained dishonestly.

Sallust also suggests that the circumstances of the campaign made them less like proper soldiers: '*Loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliverant.*'[216] 'in the intervals of leisure those charming and voluptuous lands had easily demoralized the warlike spirit of his soldiers.' Indeed the depiction of the men could barely be worse, and Sallust finishes by dismissing them as soldiers '*corruptis moribus*.'[217] This strongly negative portrayal matches that of the soldiers under Albinus' command in Numidia, though the primary focus there was their ineffectiveness as troops, not their immorality. In the brief account offered of Sulla's command, Sallust provides an example and a warning of the result of allowing men to campaign '*contra morem maiorum*.' This is what armies of corrupt citizens look like when they campaign outside the traditional military *habitus*. They more resemble bandits than soldiers and represent a dangerous group to introduce to the already unstable republic.

By contrast the reforming effects of a properly cultivated military camp are demonstrated to a remarkable degree in the closing pages of the *Catilinae*. Once he settles on open military action, Catiline immediately begins taking

[215] Sal. *Cat.* 11.6
[216] Sal. *Cat.* 11.5
[217] Sal. *Cat.* 11.7

similar steps to Metellus to increase the fighting ability of his army. From the moment he arrives in his camp, he cultivates the appearance of a republican general: '*cum fascibus atque aliis imperi insignibus in castra ad Manlium contendit*.'[218] 'he marched quickly with fasces and the other *insignia* of command to Manlius' camp.' Catiline's efforts to portray himself as a legitimate magistrate have received much attention.[219] Less attention has been paid to Catiline's efforts to present his own forces as a proper Roman army.[220] This attempt appears to have begun the moment he joined his forces with those of Manlius:

> Catilina ex omni copia, quam et ipse adduxerat et Manlius habuerat, duas legiones instituit, cohortis pro numero militum conplet. deinde, ut quisque voluntarius aut ex sociis in castra venerat, aequaliter distribuerat, ac brevi spatio legiones numero hominum expleverat, quom initio non amplius duobus milibus habuisset.[221]
>
> Catiline formed two legions from the entire force which he himself had brought and which Manlius had had, the complement of the cohorts being in proportion to the number of soldiers; but then, as volunteers of various of his allies came to the camp, he distributed them equally and in a short while had filled up the legions with the number of men, although initially he had had no more than two thousand.

Catiline's efforts to present his army as a traditional republican force involved several steps. First, he had organised them into cohorts and legions, not on an *ad hoc* basis, but from the beginning as a two-legion army, with the constituent parts under strength at first. Secondly, Sallust reports that the conspirators had

[218] Sal. *Cat*. 36.1
[219] Mariotti (2007: 662); Kurfess (1976: 649); McGuishin (1977: 200)
[220] Although Summers correctly identified Catiline's assumption of magisterial authority being derived from his army (1900: 82).
[221] Sal. *Cat*. 56.1-2

managed to acquire an *aquila*, supposedly from Marius' campaigns against the Cimbri.[222] Most importantly, however, Catiline situated his forces *in castris*. Sallust's Catiline, therefore, appears to understand something of the significance of education in a camp. He himself alludes to this in his speech before the battle at the end of the monograph, when he downplays the efficacy of his own words:

> Compertum ego habeo, milites, verba virtutem non addere, neque ex ignavo strenuum neque fortem ex timido exercitum oratione imperatoris fieri. quanta cuiusque animo audacia natura aut moribus inest, tanta in bello patere solet. quem neque gloria neque pericula excitant, nequiquam hortere... [223]
>
> I have found, soldiers, that words do not supply prowess and that neither is an apathetic army made committed, nor a cowardly one courageous, by a speech from its commander. Whatever daring resides in the heart of each man by nature or by habit, it is usually visible to the same degree in war. It would be pointless to exhort the man who is roused by neither glory nor danger...

Sallust has Catiline speak in a manner that echoes the language of his depiction of early Rome. Once again we have the dismissal of the individual and the lauding of the collective quality of soldiers. Here too, moreover, we have the sense that *virtus* is something that must be cultivated, not simply imparted. Catiline also makes reference to the idea that true Roman soldiers are those '*gloria...excitant*.'[224] Particularly evident, in the speech, is the focus on *mores* and *natura*, both things that Sallust sees as part of Early Rome's success.[225] Yet, Catiline focuses on the *audacia* of his men; indeed, *audacia* plays an important

[222] Sall. *Cat*. 59.3
[223] Sal. *Cat*. 58.1-2
[224] Sal. *Cat*. 58.2
[225] *Natura* and *mores* both at 9.1

part in his address to the troops, as he uses it three times.[226] This is a corrupted understanding of Sallust's early Rome, as, despite the detail given to Rome's martial excellence, Sallust mentions *audacia* in that context only once.[227] Indeed, Sallust reminds his readers that the early republic punished excessive *audacia* in battle.[228] Further, though Catiline made appeals to the cultural capital of the early republic, he also talks in terms of the new corrupted republic: '*memineritis vos divitias, decus, gloriam, praeterea libertatem atque patriam in dextris vostris portare*.'[229] 'remember that you carry in your own right hands riches, honour, glory; even freedom and your native land.' Catiline's speech represents a commander and an army that is between the two moralities. Their time as traditional military formations in the camp have begun the process of reform, but they have not fully abandoned the *habitus* of the new republic. The conspirators thus occupy a place between the idealised Sallust's idealised Romans, who value *decus* and *gloria*, and the army of Sulla, preoccupied with *divitiae*.

Nor are Catiline's efforts reduced simply to rhetoric. Sallust provides evidence of his efforts to cultivate the *habitus* of a Roman army by continually stressing that even when avoiding battle Catiline is maintaining a military camp: '*Catilina per montis iter facere, modo ad urbem modo Galliam vorsus*

[226] Also at 58.15, 58.17
[227] Sal. *Cat*. 9.3. Bruggisser argues convincingly that this example of *audacia* is the only place where it is presented as an unambiguously positive attribute, and only when paired with *aequitas* (2002: 269-270).
[228] Sal. *Cat*. 9.4
[229] Sal. *Cat*. 58.8

*castra movere, hostibus occasionem pugnandi non dare*...'[230] 'Catiline marched through the mountains, moved his camp now towards the city and now in the direction of Gaul, and gave the enemy no opportunity for battle...' In all, of the nine uses of *castra* in the *Bellum Catinlinae*, six refer to Catiline's forces, one to the idealised early republic and two to the forces of the Roman state.[231] Catiline's regular movement of his camp may have been driven by a desire to avoid battle with the government forces, but this would have had a similar effect as Metellus' exercises in Africa. Intentionally or not, Catiline had banished *otium* from his army and it was developing the *habitus* of the soldier. To use Sallust's own language from the *archaeologia*, Catiline's army '*per laborem usum militiae discebat*.'[232]

There is evidence, too, that cultivation of the military *habitus* was having an effect on the quality of his soldiers, as Sallust reports that in the early stages of the conspiracy there were no defections from Catiline's camp: '*neque ex castris Catilinae quisquam omnium discesserat*.' [233] 'and not a single one deserted Catiline's camp.' However, as we have seen in the cases of Metellus and the Servile War, the process of reformation was a continuous one, and one that did not have a full effect on all of his soldiers, as Catiline did suffer desertions when the executions of Lentulus and Cathegus became known. That the reforming nature of military service had yet to effect these men is made

[230] Sal. *Cat*. 56.4
[231] Catiline's camp 32.1, 36.1, 36.5, 56.1, 56.4, 57.1; Early Rome 7.1; Roman camps 57.3, 61.8
[232] Sal. *Cat*. 7.1
[233] Sal. *Cat*. 36.5

evident from Sallust's comment that the deserters were from '*quos ad bellum spes rapinarum aut novarum rerum studium illexerat...*'[234] 'those whom the hope of plunder, or the love of change, had led to join in the war...' These men reflect the corrupted soldiers of the new *habitus*, resembling the army of Sulla veterans of which, Sallust has told us, were with Catiline's army.[235] These are not men who have yet undergone the reformative process of military service and thus retain the *habitus* of the corrupted republic. This, however, is to be expected, as we have seen, because the process of reform was an extended one, requiring time to properly cultivate the correct behaviour and motivations in the soldiery.

Catiline's determination to direct his forces according to tradition continued when he finally committed his forces to battle: '*signa canere iubet atque instructos ordines in locum aequom deducit*.' 'he ordered the trumpets to sound and led his army in order of battle down into the plain.' The appropriateness of Catiline's approach to leading men in battle is also stressed by Sallust: '*strenui militis et boni imperatoris officia simul exequebatur*.'[236] 'performing at once the duties of a valiant soldier and of a skilful leader.' Interestingly, in his account of Catiline's early life, Sallust made no mention of Catiline's military experience or ability, something that is mentioned by Cicero.[237] Instead, Sallust allows the military effectiveness and high morale of

[234] Sal. *Cat*. 57.1
[235] Sal. *Cat*.
[236] Sal. *Cat*. 60.4
[237] Cic. *Pro Cael.* 12

both Catiline and his army to manifest itself at the end of the *Bellum Catilinae*. Such effectiveness is presented as surprising to the commander of the state forces.[238] Indeed, it should be. Catiline's forces are formed of a number of Sullan veterans, disaffected noblemen and landless peasants, all manifestations of the corrupted state of the late republic. They joined the conspiracy out of a desire for the wealth that would allow them a life of *otium*.[239] However, the time they have spent on manoeuvre and building camps has begun to cultivate in them some of the *habitus* of the early republic and turned them into effective soldiers. As we have seen, another result of the *habitus* learned *in castris* during the early republic was a strong degree of *concordia*. There is evidence of, if not *concordia*, then some unified sense of purpose amongst the Catilinarians at their final battle. Catiline's legates, Manilius and an unnamed Faesulan, appeared to take Catiline's orders without question and both died at the posts he had assigned them.[240] Amongst the army, too, there is a sense of a kind of ersatz *concordia*: '*Sed confecto proelio tum vero cerneres quanta audacia quantaque animi vis fuisset in exercitu Catilinae*.'[241] 'When the battle was ended it became evident what boldness and resolution had pervaded Catiline's army.' Further, in his description of the battle's aftermath, Sallust provides us with evidence of this unified sense of

[238] Sal. *Cat*. 60.5
[239] Sal. *Cat*. 37.6
[240] Sal. *Cat*. 60.6
[241] Sal. *Cat*. 61.1

purpose in the army by depicting the dead Catilinarians lying where they took up battle and with wounds to the front.[242]

Sallust uses the actions of Petreius, Antonius' legate, to show that the army of the Roman state has also been kept in proper order, though Antonius himself is ill.[243] Petreius' extensive military experience has been discussed above, but it is his relationship with his soldiers and his understanding of their motivations that interest us here. Sallust makes it clear that he knows many of the men in his army by name: '*ipse equo circumiens unum quemque nominans appellat*'[244] 'riding up and down upon his horse, he addressed each of his men by name' and later '*plerosque ipsos factaque eorum fortia noverat*.'[245] 'he knew most of the soldiers and their honourable actions.' Such familiarity with so many men would suggest that they had served with him before, and thus experienced some of the reforming nature of military service. Petreius' speech to the troops also suggests this, as he reminds them of their past military achievements.[246] There are differences, however. Petreius' army did not demonstrate the same degree of unified purpose as that of the conspirators: '*strenuissumus quisque aut occiderat in proelio aut graviter volneratus discesserat.*' 'all the most valiant had either fallen in the fight or come off with severe wounds.' Yet some variation in the quality of soldiers is to be expected. As we have seen, the reforming nature of camp service was a process, and

[242] Sal. *Cat*. 61.2-3
[243] Sall. *Cat.* 59.4. Sallust presents Antonius' illness as genuine, avoiding an alternative tradition – presented by Dio (37.39) – that he feigned illness to avoid fighting Catiline.
[244] Sal. *Cat*. 59.5
[245] Sal. *Cat*. 59.6
[246] Sal. *Cat*. 59.6

many of the soldiers in Petreius' army had been *in castris* for even less time than the conspirators, as they were recruited in response to the outbreak.[247]

The battle at the end of the *Bellum Catilinae* is a battle between two forces that have both been, to some degree, reformed through military service. Reading Sallust's account of the battle in the context of the reformative nature of the Sallustian military *habitus* provides an answer to the problem of Sallust's presentation of the Roman Government and Catilinarian forces as remarkably similar at the close of the *Bellum Catilinae*.[248] Levene has shown that Sallust problematises his own presentation of the ideal republic by implying that the Romans of that period had the same inclinations towards immorality, but did not indulge them.[249] Other scholars have outlined the morally complex nature of Sallust's Catiline, where he seems to embody some of the virtues of early Rome, while epitomising the drives of the new corrupted republic.[250] Therefore, both Catiline's men and the soldiers of Petreius are representatives of the new Roman state, but both armies have undergone a degree of reform through their service in the camp. Both, though formed of men from the corrupted republic, exhibit some of the characteristics and qualities of their forbears that Sallust praises extensively at the beginning of the monograph. Sallust's closing sentences emphasise this, as he describes the

[247] Sal. *Cat*. 59.5.
[248] Wilkins comes close to the point, here, but focuses too much on similarities between aristocratic commanders, but misses the communal nature of the conflation (1994: 71).
[249] Levene (2000).
[250] Wilkins (1994); Kraus and Woodman (1997: 19-21); Vasaly (2009: 251-255).

victorious state troops finding *amici, hospites*, and *inimicos* amongst the dead.[251]

## Conclusion

In the early chapters of the *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust provides the reader with an account of the early republic. According to him, the early Romans' successes were due to the moral superiority and hardiness that their education and lifestyle had developed in each citizen. By nature and education such men were frugal, brave, and hardy. To Sallust, the excellence of early Rome was grounded in the *concordia* and shared values of its citizens. This concord was strong and durable enough that the Romans of old acted with a shared sense of purpose and commitment that was strong enough to even override social class. This idealised situation was due to the shared experiences of military service that all citizens gained from time spent in the military camp and on campaign, which cultivated a moral and unified *habitus*.

However, the success of the republic was its undoing. With the destruction of Carthage and the increase of wealth and leisure within the city, the traditional pillars of Roman virtue were worn away and the moral edifice of the republic collapsed. Once the republic had become corrupted through *otium* and wealth, Roman society became too fractured to maintain this *habitus*. Due to the nature of Roman war making, this moral collapse effected

[251] Sal. *Cat*. 61.8-9

not only the civilian life of the city but also Rome's armies. On campaign, Roman armies began to mirror the corrupted state they served, and were driven more by comfort and loot than by the *cupido gloriae* that had motivated their ancestors. The new patterns of behaviour were ill suited to the rigours and dangers of campaigning and the effectiveness of Rome's armies suffered as a result.

However, on campaign and in the camp a good general could recreate the conditions of the early republic. Life inside the camp was frugal and rigorous, while the organising and building of the camp provided something approaching the practical military experience of the ancients. Further, while the republic itself had little to fear from an external threat, the external threat to soldiers on campaign was all too real. Even *cupido gloriae* could be simulated through the public praising of brave individuals and the giving of military awards for valour.

Not only could the structures of the old Roman *habitus* be recreated, the structures of the new corrupt *habitus* could be suppressed. In a properly built camp, which was fortified and guarded, moved and reconstructed on a regular schedule, the Roman soldiers would have little chance to indulge in the *otium* and *divitiae* that had led to the development of *audacia, avaritia,* and *largitio* in the larger republic. An army kept to this military *habitus* would rediscover the patterns of behaviour of its predecessors, and Sallust provides accounts in his work of armies which, though raised in the late republic and consisting of the corrupt populace, reflect his description of the idealised earlier armies.

A proper understanding of this reformative model of military service contributes to our understanding of Sallust's work in several ways. Firstly and simply, it allows us to push against a tendency to dismiss Sallust as a source for military affairs.[252] More than this, however, a full understanding of the rôle that military service played in the development of Sallust's ideal early republic contributes vital detail to scholarship that aims to systematise and analyse the process of moral decline that pervades Sallust's work. Primarily, it offers clarification to the debate over the exact sequence of *ambitio* and *avaritia*.[253]

By properly understanding of the educational nature of military service we can see that the important issue is not really whether *ambitio* or *avaritia* began the process, but that the decline of military service had made the Roman people vulnerable to such temptations. My analysis of military service in Sallust also offers important nuance to Milne's argument that it was the absence of war that began the process of decline.[254] My analysis argues that it was not a lack of war – for wars were certainly not lacking in the 2nd century BC – but the erosion of the camp education that weakened the morality of the Romans. Finally this chapter builds on the work done by Levene, as the potential for reform within the army lends support to his argument that the tensions that resulted in the decline of Rome were present at its beginning.[255] The fact that citizens of the corrupted republic can experience reform by returning to the

[252] As represented by e.g. Southern (2007: 18-31).
[253] On this debate see Bücher (1960); Earl (1961: 13-15); Tiffou (1975: 302); McGushin (1977: 90-91); Conley (1981a & 1981b).
[254] Milne (2009: 94)
[255] Levene (2000)

*mos maiorum* shows that to Sallust it was the circumstances of the late Republic that led to its corruption, not any innate moral difference.

Unfortunately for a republican like Sallust, as this method involved exercising control not only over the behaviour but the circumstances of their soldiers, it could only be maintained while an army was on campaign. Once soldiers were demobilised, they were once again absorbed into the corrupted republic they had served. As a result, the reformative nature of military service offered little help in addressing the structural problems of the larger republic.

# CHAPTER TWO

## *Imperium* Requires Consent

### Tension Between Commanders and Men in Livy's History

In book Two and book Forty-Five of his history – near the beginning and the end of the surviving portions of his narrative – Livy provides accounts of two severe, aristocratic generals who, in the conduct of their campaigns, managed to alienate the troops under their command. Both faced determined resistance from the men below them, who were committed to frustrating their commander's plans.

The circumstances were very different, in 471 BC Appius Claudius was skirmishing against a tribe on the borders of Latium while three centuries later Aemilius Paullus was subduing the Macedonian king, Perseus. However, the cause of the trouble in each case was the same: the generals were conducting their wars and exercising their *imperium* without concern for the status, rights, and interests of the men under their command. Appius Claudius, in particular, was given a remarkable warning by his officers: '*concurrunt ad eum legati tribunique monentes ne utique experiri vellet imperium cuius vis omnis in consensu oboedientium esset*.' 'the legates and tribunes gathered hurriedly around him and warned him upon no account to test his *imperium*, when its effectiveness depended on the consent of those obeying it.'[256] In Livy's conception of the republic this was a dangerous way to lead men. Roman soldiers in his history were, from the foundation of the republic, aware of their

[256] Livy 2.59.4

interests, engaged politically, and jealous of their rights and status. When they felt those rights were being ignored or trampled upon, they were willing to resist or defy the authority of their commanders.

As discussed in the preceding chapter, to Sallust the wellspring of republican Roman virtue was military service. On campaign and in the camp young Romans of all classes learned through military service and labour to be ideal citizens.[257] In Livy's understanding of the early republic, the foundation of republican virtue is a rather less martial process. In his discussion of the overthrow of the Tarquins and the early days of the republic, the historian explains that the Regal period was a necessary part of the development of Roman civic identity.

The monarchy allowed for a slow growth of common Roman identity that served as a form of vaccine that protected the fledgling republic from what Livy saw as the dangers of liberty: interclass strife and demagoguery. What might have happened, he asks, if the kings had not kept the Roman people from liberty '*priusquam pignera coniugum ac liberorum caritasque ipsius soli, cui longo tempore adsuescitur animos eorum consociasset?*' 'before ever the pledges of wife and children and love of the very soil (an affection of slow growth) had firmly united their aspirations?'[258] This concept of Roman political identity developing under the kings and tempered by family and farming is unique among Roman historians.[259] Indeed, although Rome's military

[257] Sal. *Cat.* 7.4
[258] Livy 2.1.5
[259] Luce (1977: 244)

successes make up a large part of his history, in Livy's list of the republic's achievements war is part of a larger whole, sandwiched between their peaceful successes and the quality of their magistracies.[260]

To Livy, military service appears to have had a different effect on the social cohesion of the republican citizenry. In Sallust's account it was a grand, unifying process that brought citizens together and led to Rome's greatness. He even democratizes the process by conflating noble officers and common soldiers and by excluding individuals from his account of the republic's early accomplishments.[261] In Sallust's framing, military service unified and reformed the morals of the citizenry. In Livy's account of the republic, rather than being a fundamental part of the republic military service was somewhat less of an unalloyed good. To Livy, the plebeian soldier was marked by a distinct and separate identity, with its own measurement of status, its own interests and motivations. This identity was different from, and occasionally at odds with, the élite culture of the Livian republic. Further, when plebeians speak publicly in Livy's narrative, they assert their status as soldiers, they never make any reference to their civilian occupation or make reference to a social status that is not related to their military service. The Plebeians in Livy's narrative are overwhelmingly represented as soldiers, even when craftsmen appear, they

[260] Livy 2.1.1
[261] Sal. *Cat.* 7.4-7.

appear in military service.[262] In Livy's narrative, plebeians present themselves as a military class and as the only counterpart to the élite.[263]

Plebeian military identity in Livy is marked by four essential aspects. The first was a strong political identity and continual political engagement. Soldiers were fully aware that they were citizens and remained politically connected to the situation in the city. They also were prone to a degree of politicking within the camp; this is most present when they resist command or when the army reacts to a vacuum in the higher echelons of the army.

Plebeian soldiers in Livy's narrative were also united by a strong sense of self identity. That was the foundation of how they related to each other both on campaign and during peace. Those in the camp were brought together by a common sense of humour, a ribald and occasionally grim way of joking that Livy identifies as particular to the Roman soldier.[264] There was an emphasis on the shared dangers and toils of military life and soldiers often made appeals to the service they have given the state and speak to their peers as *commilites*.[265] The cultural currency of the camp was measured in the amount of time men

[262] Roman citizens are only explicitly referred to as craftsmen when serving in Mamercinus' army against the Gauls (Liv. 8.20.3-4).
[263] Livy's conception here runs against our historical understanding, which generally perceives the *plebs* as a group – particularly in the early republic – as to some degree or another exempt from military service. On the plebs as for the most part not eligible for military service, see e.g. Momigliano (1966) and (1986), Ogilvie (1965: 294); for the plebs as a more varied group, see e.g. Cornell (1983: 118) and (1995: 256-258); Raaflaub argues that they played a greater part in the Roman military (1993: 148-151).
[264] The so-called *iocus militaris*. E.g. Livy 3.29.5; 5.49.7; 7.10.13; 7.38.3; 28.9.18.
[265] E.g. Livy 2.55.7, 3.50, 42.34.15. Though Livy uses the term '*commiles*' but rarely – twelve times, in fact – both plebeian soldiers and generals often reference shared military experiences indirectly by speaking of their long service or referencing specific campaigns. Ogilvie suggests that by largely restricting *commilites* to speeches, Livy lends the word pathos (1965:375).

have spent on campaign and the recognition that soldiers had won from their commanders. Their status was often symbolised by the scars their bodies carried, which attest to the shared experiences of their time under the standards, or by decorations they had earned in battle.[266]

Soldiers were also determined to ensure that their service served a purpose that they themselves found appropriate. In the early years of the republic this meant that they tended to welcome campaigns that served to protect the republic or benefit the Roman people as a whole, while they were more resistant to fighting to extend or preserve the power of the Senate over the surrounding peoples. When wars became more profitable in the 4th century, this benefit was often measured in the share of profit that individual soldiers would make from their military service.

Livian soldiers also had a strong understanding of their own interests, and were willing to pressure or even break with their commanders to promote those interests. These interests were either related to the political situation in Rome or arose from tactical considerations, as the soldiers made efforts to ensure that their commanders were making military decisions that the men saw as correct. As plunder came to play a larger part in Rome's war making, the men began to also exert pressure to ensure that they received what they saw as a fair share of the proceeds of the war they were fighting. But even

[266] Focussing on aristocrats, Jaeger has classified military decorations and scars as forms of *monumenta* that serve manifestations of an individual's deeds (1997: 17). When presented by plebeians, however, scars and decorations represent not individual deeds put a narrative of service. On republican military decorations e.g. Polybius (6.39); Val. Max. (8.14.5). See also Gilliver (2007: 17-21); Maxfield (1981: 55-66).

here, when Livy highlights moments of trouble surrounding the division of spoils, the issue is usually framed more as concern over soldiers having their status and contribution recognised, rather than merely a matter of greed. These aspects of the republican soldier remain constant in the extant books of Livy's history. Further, this military identity represents the primary plebeian identity in Livy's narrative. When plebeians speak in public, they exclusively do so as soldiers, and assert their status as such to legitimise themselves.

Canny generals throughout Livy's history understood this culture and on occasion made appeals to it themselves, casting themselves as *commilites*. Beyond that, they made attempts to appear to honour and protect the status of the men they commanded. Such generals often secured the support and respect of their men. In contrast, those who commanded in an aloof and heavy-handed manner, or took steps that were seen to undermine the status of their *milites* often found themselves at odds with their own armies.

Also constant throughout Livy's account of the republic is the remarkable degree to which the soldiers remain organised and politically motivated. The men would react with hostility to bad generals, unpopular wars, and decisions made by command that the soldiers perceived to be either unfair or against their own interest. Such reactions largely manifested themselves within the structure of the army, as the men used their centurions as a conduit to express their desires to their commanders. This happens so often – and without any pushback from the centurions – that Livy appears to have seen this as part of the normal working of the republican Roman army.

Indeed, with very few exceptions, whenever problems arose between command and the soldiery, centurions sided with the soldiery. When negotiation between the army and command reached an impasse, the army communicated its desires and acts to influence command through more drastic measures. These included refusal of service, the deliberate sabotage of their effectiveness as soldiers, and even mutiny.

The Roman army as described by Livy appears to operate in a state of tension and negotiation between the soldiery, composed of the *milites gregarii* and the centurions, and command, composed of the senatorial generals and the military tribunes. This tension appears whenever the interests of the commanders and their men are at odds. The inciting issue in almost all instances of trouble within the army seems to have been threats to the distinct plebeian military identity. All Livian soldiers shared a strong understanding of their own identity or interests. When the decisions of command challenged that identity or threatened the interests of the men, the army acted to influence or countermand their generals. This shared identity and clear perception of their interests is common to all soldiers in Livy's account, from the men who joined Brutus to drive out the Tarquins in Book One all the way through to the soldiers attempting to block the triumph of Aemilius Paullus in Book Forty-Five.

More importantly, if the only legitimate plebeian identity in Livy's republic is the military one so prominent in his narrative, then Roman soldiers can be read as stand-ins for the plebeian class as a whole. If the rôle of the

army in Livy's republic as the organising and directing force in plebeian resistance is overlooked, the interaction between the *plebs* and the larger state is in danger of being misunderstood.[267] This means that when Livy's narrative shifts at the end of book five from a focus on the struggle of the order to Rome's increasing foreign wars, the plebs – as a politically active section of the *res publica*, concerned about their status, and aware of their rights – do not vanish from the narrative. Rather, the Roman plebs remain politically active and engaged in their rôle as soldiers, who continue to guard their status and their rights from encroachment from their aristocratic officers.

To demonstrate the relatively unchanging nature of plebeian military identity, the communal sense of shared interest and the tension this creates with command I shall look at the entirety of Livy's surviving work divided into four sections: Books One to Five, Six to Ten, Twenty-One to Thirty, and Thirty-One to Forty-Five. For each section the presence of this military identity will be established and then the various ways the army communicated its wishes or displeasure to command will be analysed to demonstrate that the tension between the soldiery and command in Livy's account is not merely an occasional breakdown of discipline but rather a permanent aspect of the republican army that flares into serious political conflict whenever the soldiers' interests or identity is challenged by the actions of command. Further, as the soldiers represent the plebs on campaign, much as their officers represent the

[267] E. g. Vasaly, in an otherwise excellent examination of the plebs in Livy's first pentad: 'Livy is thus at pains to demonstrate the leaderless and, therefore, inarticulate condition of the masses prior to the establishment of the tribunate' (2015: 102).

aristocracy, the tension between command and soldiery is the tension between plebs and *patres*.

## Livy as a source for military affairs.

The degree to which Livy's work is a useful source for Roman military systems and affairs is hardly a settled subject. Though his reputation has recovered from its nadir in the 1960s, Walsh's dismissive judgment of the historian's 'crippling ignorance' of military affairs still colours the discussion of warfare in Livy's history.[268] Also, modern scholars are prone to view Livy's military accounts as largely literary rather than historical efforts.[269] Arguments against Livy's usefulness as a source for the military, despite the huge proportion of his history dedicated to matters of war, largely turn on two issues. Firstly, his supposed tendency to follow his sources so closely means that his reliability is directly tied to the reliability of his source, something, with the exception of Polybius, it is difficult for modern scholars to qualify.[270] Secondly, Livy's lack of a military career has undermined belief in the accuracy of his accounts, a problem compounded by a perceived tendency to obscure or elide details of military engagements and a few relatively insignificant, but

[268] Walsh (1961: 158); Cf. McDonald (1957: 161); Kraus (1994: 1 n.1). A decade or so later, Luce was only slightly less damning when he blamed defects in Livy's accounts of war to disinterest, rather than ignorance. Luce (1977: 41); Such a judgement remained commonplace enough for it to be repeated unchallenged by Sage (1991: 926).

[269] Lendon (1999: 276); this view has a long pedigree, see Syme's dismissal of Livy's account of early Rome: 'In the first Decade the author takes leave of legend only to plunge into fiction' (1959: 27).

[270] On the traditional view of Livy's reliance on his sources see Syme (1958: 148); Walsh (1970: 144).

famous, cases where he has misunderstood the tactical details reported by Polybius.[271]

There has been considerable pushback on the traditionally dim view of Livy's quality and reliability both of his history in general and specifically of his military sections. There is no need for this work to enter that argument to any great degree, but I will touch on several aspects of the debate to demonstrate that arguments against Livy's military experience and reliability do not pose a threat to his usefulness to the purpose of this chapter.

On the issue of Livy's use of sources, two recent works have addressed two aspects of Livy's writing on war to demonstrate that regardless of Livy's sources, there are two models of military activity that are applied consistently throughout his work. Koon argues convincingly that Livy's detailed battle scenes consistently represent his 'literary vision of combat' and his understanding of the 'mechanics of infantry fighting'.[272] His argument for the historian's military experience in the Perusine war is less convincing, grounded as it is in an assumption that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.[273] Koon maintains that battles in Livy maintain a consistent structure and vocabulary that is not merely a result of his sources, arguing that the battle

[271] For both the traditionally damning view on Livy's famous mistranslations, see Walsh (1958). Barnes (2005) and Briscoe (2013) are more moderate in their assessment.
[272] Koon (2010: 23-35)
[273] Koon (2010: 23). Though I fear Koon also over estimates the degree to which provincial aristocracy took part in the civil wars and, indeed the experience of the Augustan literary class. (2010:27).

narratives are too detailed to be derived from the annalists, differ from Polybius' account, and are also distinct from, though influenced by Caesar.[274]

Approaching Livy's siege narratives rather than his pitched battles, Roth argues that Livy, while closely following his sources, exerts enough control over them to standardise his siege narratives, once again creating a consistent depiction of Roman sieges regardless of the time period and his particular source.[275] Most importantly for this chapter, Roth shows that, with a few exceptions, Livy generally does not include anachronistic siege technologies in his accounts of early sieges.[276] This demonstrates that Livy understood that certain military technologies were inappropriate for earlier periods of Roman history and excised them from his account in order to maintain the plausibility of his depiction of the early republic.[277]

Certainly, there are other occasions where Livy is willing to adapt his sources to fit his literary understanding of the republic. During the first Macedonian war, when Titus Flamininus and Phillip V met at the beach near Nicaea, Philip behaved with his characteristic irreverence. In Polybius' account Flaminius was receptive to Philips jests as the Roman was repeatedly described as '*γελάσαντος*' 'laughing'.[278] Later, the Roman grandee joined in:

> ὁ δὲ Τίτος οὐκ ἀηδῶς μὲν ἤκουε τοῦ Φιλίππου χλευάζοντος: μὴ βουλόμενος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις [μὴ] δοκεῖν ἀντεπέσκωψε τὸν Φίλιππον

[274] Koon (2010: 31-33)
[275] Roth (2006: 52)
[276] Roth (2006: 50-52); The exceptions: Livy's account of the siege of Pometia (2.17) contains anachronistic reference to '*vineis aliisque operibus*', while the siege of Veii depicts extensive use of earthworks probably beyond the capabilities of early 4th century Rome.
[277] Roth (2006: 52)
[278] Polybius 18.6.1

> εἰπὼν οὕτως: ‘εἰκότως’ ἔφη ‘Φίλιππε, μόνος εἶ νῦν: τοὺς γὰρ φίλους τοὺς τὰ κράτιστά σοι συμβουλεύσοντας ἀπώλεσας ἅπαντας’. ὁ δὲ Μακεδὼν ὑπομειδιάσας σαρδάνιον ἀπεσιώπησε.[279]
>
> Titus was by no means displeased by Philip's jests, and not wishing the others to think he was so, rallied Philip in turn by saying, ’Naturally you are alone now, Philip, for you have killed all those of your friends who would give you the best advice.’ The Macedonian monarch smiled sardonically and made no reply.

Livy’s account is starkly different, while Philip retains his famous jocundity, Flamininus limited himself to a few brief opening remarks – and even these are given in indirect speech – that laid out the demands of the Roman people and then spent the rest of the meeting in dignified, austere silence. Gone are his receptive, even encouraging, responses to Philip’s jokes; a representative of the senate should not indulge in banter with a foreign king. The private conference the following day, once again given only as indirect speech, was also business-like and dignified.[280] Livy adapted his source to fit his greater narrative; in his reconstruction of the republic, great Romans do not make jokes.

That Livy was willing to control the information coming from his sources to create consistent models of pitched battles, sieges, and Roman behaviour is an important point for this chapter. In the following sections I will lay out the identity of the Livian soldier, his motivations, and his social capital. This will be shown to be a fundamentally plebeian identity, distinct from and often in opposition to the élite identity of the senate and the generals and officers

[279] Polybius 18.7.5-6
[280] Livy 32.32-35

above them. Further, aspects of this identity create a dynamic within the Roman army that makes this construction different from those presented in other historians. The simmering tension with command and the fact that, when order breaks down, centurions invariably side with the soldiery against command show that Livy conceived of Roman soldiers as different from the rigorously disciplined soldiers described by Polybius. Further, they do not fit Caesar's account, where legionaries are shown with 'a uniformity of behaviour and simplified motivations.'[281]

Which brings me neatly to the question of Livy's military career or lack thereof. To the subject of this chapter, whether Livy spent time on campaign or not, and absent any evidence I am content to assume he did not, becomes less relevant. Compared to accounts of the army in the civil wars and the Augustan age, the soldiers depicted in Livy are unlikely to reflect the army of his time. Rather they, like his siege narratives and his battle scenes, are rhetorical creations, designed to reflect his understanding of the position of citizen-soldiers in the republic that he has reconstructed.

## Plebeian Military Identity in Livy's History

Before beginning my analysis of the part played by soldiers in Livy's narrative, I define what is meant here by the 'Roman soldier'. Historically, in the early and middle republic – the period covered by the extant books of Livy's

[281] Koon (2010:33)

history – the Roman army was composed of citizens performing temporary military service.[282] Military service in the form that concerns us here: plebeian infantrymen – *milites gregarii* and centurions – was the responsibility of those who met the property qualifications of the plebeian military class, the *adsidui*. Those men spent varying amount of time on campaign, often short periods in the early republic and far longer in the wars of the middle republic, and often spent intervals between campaigns in civilian life.[283]

Livy's picture is different from that of the modern consensus. Certainly, Livy is aware of the Servian classes and the property qualification for military service. He devotes several sections of book one to Servius Tullius' new census qualifications.[284] In that he gives the minimum property qualification for military service as a minimum worth of 11000 asses, any citizen worth less was not liable for military service.[285] On occasion the presence of the Servian classes appear in the narrative, such as following Cannae when the senate recruits soldiers '*ex omni aetate et fortuna.*' 'of every age and condition.' This is perhaps also the case during the panics surrounding the *tumultus gallici* that happen occasionally in the first decade.[286]

[282] Who fought alongside large numbers of allied troops, but since this chapter is concerned with Roman citizens, and since Livy himself rarely acknowledges their presence in his narrative, they need not concern us.
[283] As I focus on Livy's narrative, there is neither space nor need to dive into the historicity of military service in the early and middle Republic. On the Roman property classes see e.g. Gabba (1973), Rathbone (1993); For the proportion of Romans serving in the armies of the Republic see e.g. Brunt (1971), Rosenstein (2004); For the intermittent nature of military service see e.g. Cadiou (2002), DuToit (1964).
[284] Livy 1.42-44
[285] Livy 1.43.7
[286] Livy 7.9.6, 8.17.6, 8.20.2, 10.10.12 Though even here it is possible Livy is not thinking of the property qualifications, and his comment that the troops raised by such measures were

More commonly, however, Livy appears to conceive of a republican army that was open to, and recruited from, all levels of plebeian society, even the very poor. At the dawn of the republic the men serving in Tarquinius Superbus' armies are the same sort that he has digging ditches and sewers.[287] Decades later, all of the victims of *nexum* debt-bondage – those most economically insecure in the city – have served or go on to serve in the army.[288] Much later in the work, if we are to take his own statements about his patrimony at face value, the most successful soldier in Livy's account, Spurius Ligustinus, would not have met the minimum qualification for service.[289]

Just as there is little internal evidence for the various military classes within Livy's narrative, there is no sense either of separate military and civilian identities. Amongst the plebeian class, Rome is not divided into soldiers and citizens, but rather those citizens who have served in the army and those who have not. Perhaps even more specifically those who are currently on campaign and those who remain in the city.

The debate over the spoils of Veii is illustrative. Appius Claudius warned that an equal division of the loot threatens to strip soldiers of their just reward. The senate must act to ensure that: '*non avidas in direptiones manus otiosorum urbanorum praerepturas fortium bellatorum praemia esse*,'[290] 'the hands of urban layabouts, grasping for plunder, would not snatch away the

'*mimime militiae idoneum genus*' 'the sort least suitable for military service' means only that the recruiters were less discerning about the quality of recruits than was normal.
[287] Livy 1.58.
[288] Livy 2.23-24
[289] Livy 42.34.1-2
[290] Livy 5.20.6

prizes due to brave warriors.' Claudius did not distinguish between soldiers and civilians, but rather between those spending their time in *otium* in the city and those on campaign. This framing at first may seem unfair, since only exaggerated rhetoric could describe the daily labour of a craftsman or farmer as *otium*, especially since the army at Veii has been on extended campaign and someone must have been supplying them with food and equipment. If, however, military service is the way that Roman plebeians demonstrate their worth, then such dismissive words make sense. Within the narrative, Roman antipathy to non-military labour or, more correctly, to being perceived as someone who does non-military labour predates the republic.

In 509, when Brutus was raising the populace against the Tarquins, his speech turned from the personal crimes against Lucretia[291] to the more general tyranny of the Tarquins, he claims '*miseriaeque et labores plebis in fossas cloacasque exhauriendas demersae; Romanos homines, victores omnium circa populorum, opifices ac lapicidas pro bellatoribus factos*.'[292] 'and the misery and the labours of the plebs, who were plunged into ditches and sewers and made to clear them out. The men of Rome, he said, the conquerors of all the surrounding peoples, had been turned from warriors into artisans and stone-cutters.' Two aspects of Brutus' speech are important, firstly, that he frames such labours as a threat to the Roman peoples' status as soldiers.

[291] In order to remain focussed on the rôle that soldiers played in the ouster of the Tarquins, I will pass over the central part that Lucretia plays in Livy's narrative. On the political aspects of the rape of Lucretia, see Matthes (2000: 23-50), Joshel (1992), and Joplin (1990).
[292] Livy 1.59.9

Secondly, Brutus makes this appeal not to the soldiers in the fields, but to the plebeians remaining in the city.

During the debt crisis and the decemvirate those suffering under the system who make appeals to the people, either themselves or as tools for demagogues, tend to be soldiers. The debtor exploited by Manlius Capitolinus is a veteran with extensive experience – and a respectable number of scars. Verginius is, obviously, a respected centurion.[293] When we are given any details about plebeian tribunes, beyond their rabid opposition to the *patres*, it is invariably their military record. In Livy's history no plebeian asserts his status by mentioning his wealth, and when men assert themselves as citizens, they almost always do so alongside assertions of their status as soldiers.[294]

The universal image of military service is reinforced in the speech of the prisoners of Cannae, who stress their worth to the state as soldiers and citizens not as an absolute difference with other Romans, but as a qualitative one. They are better soldiers because they are more experienced than new recruits, not because they are fit to be soldiers and the others are not. When they list the measures the senate is taking to reinforce the army after the losses against Hannibal – rearming those who escaped, arming the poor and the aged, and freeing slaves – it is only the last that provokes protest, as they argue that money would be better spent on their ransom than manumission.[295] Their comments concerning the prospect of arming freed slaves are also illustrative.

[293] Livy 6.14.6
[294] Cf. Verginius (3.44); the prisoners from Cannae (22.59); the survivors of Cannae (25.6)
[295] Livy 22.59.9-13

While they have argued for their own worth as soldiers over those of the newly recruited Romans, they refuse to do so with the slaves: '*nam si conferam nos cum illis, iniuriam nomini Romano faciam*.'[296] 'for to compare us with them would be to degrade the Roman name.' Romans – even the adolescent, aged or poor – can be appropriately measured as soldiers, but slaves cannot.

In Livy's account of the republic, every Roman had the potential to be, as the prisoners of Cannae put it, '*civis et commilito*'. The status of a plebeian was measured by the degree to which he had fulfilled that potential. The distinctly military aspects of this plebeian identity are made starker by the almost complete lack of individual Roman civilians in Livy's account. As mentioned above, when Roman citizens are described in any detail, the details given are almost invariably military. The pious M. Albinius who donates the use of his cart to Vestal virgins fleeing Rome before the Gallic sack is an example of the rare plebeian citizen introduced without any evidence of his military status.[297] Yet even here while we are given no details about his military experience we are given little information about his civilian life either, beyond that he is a plebeian and has a wife and children.[298] We are told that he was among the part of the citizenry considered '*inutilis bello*,' which on the face of it suggests that Livy considers a large part of the plebeian class to be unsuitable as soldiers. However, the situation in 390 was unusual. There were concerns

[296] Livy 22.59.12
[297] Livy 5.40
[298] Livy 5.40.10; However, that he, unusually for the refugees, is able to move his family in a wagon might suggest that he is not a pauper. Ogilvie's suggestion that he might be identified as the consular tribune of 379 seems unjustified. Ogilvie (1965: 724).

about supplying large numbers of men on the Capitol and Livy states that many Romans have been ordered out of the city including the majority of plebeians.[299] From the context, then, we can establish that the plebeians that Livy refers to as *inutilis bello* were designated so as a result of specific conditions during the sack, not that they represented a section of the populace seen as unfit for military service.

Livy's conception of the republican plebeian was that of a soldier, regardless of whether they were on campaign at the time. When they spoke to each other or to *patres* they asserted their status with reference to the shared social capital of their common military identity. While Livy gives no explicit description of this military identity in his surviving books, the important aspects of it can be constructed from the work. Further there is little sense of any change in patterns of behaviour in the course of his narrative. The status of the Livian soldier is measured in three ways: experience of the shared hardships of campaigning, the length of time the soldier spent on campaign, and official recognition of his quality by a commanding officer. The identity of the Roman soldier is also separate from that of the Roman élite commanding them. Plebeian soldiers and élite officers had distinct sets of social capital, and measured and asserted their status according to a different rubric.

Feldherr, in his analysis of duels and *devotiones* in Livy's description of the early republic emphasises that the importance that aristocratic feats of

[299] Livy 5.40.5

arms play in his narrative is directly related to the reaction of the audience to such deeds.[300] Livy, however, restricts this to aristocratic officers. There are no moments in Livy's history where an audience – or indeed the reader – witnesses a heroic deed performed by a common soldier. Rather, when a plebeian soldier asserts his status he boasts not of a single proud action, but rather of a career of service, measured by number of campaigns, official recognition and, often the physical scars of his time in the camp.

By removing from his account any descriptions of plebeian soldiers performing deeds of valour and instead referring to them only obliquely through either the recognition they have received distinguishes the plebeian military identity from that of the élite. This emphasis on recognition for deeds rather than the deeds themselves is evident from the early books of Livy's history. While prosecuting the Decemvir Spurius Oppius a tribune presents an unnamed centurion as a witness. The man's worth as a witness, as a soldier and citizen, is framed in the context of official recognition and length of service. '*testis productus, qui septem et uiginti enumeratis stipendiis, octiens extra ordinem donatus donaque ea gerens in conspectu populi*...'[301] 'A witness was brought forward, who, after reckoning up twenty campaigns, after having been particularly honoured eight different times, and wearing these honours in the sight of the Roman people...' The man's actions themselves are not described

[300] Feldherr (1998: 82-111) Duels and *devotiones* are 'actions whose effectiveness depends on their being witnessed by others. Each "performance" puts on display the hierarchies that give structure to Roman civic life and thus offers an image of the distinctive political system that sets Rome apart from her adversaries.' 85.
[301] Livy 3.58.8

in any detail, as the relevant point is that his actions have been recognised and rewarded by command. The victims of the *nexum* debt bondage in the turmoil leading to the first *secessio* do the same.[302]

As discussed above, this focus on length of service and the recognition of authority is in stark contrast to Livy's description of aristocratic officers and cavalrymen. When such men are praised in the narrative it is usually as reference to their *virtus* and the illustrious heritage, the tribune Cornelius Cossus and the consul Agrippa Furius being prime examples of this.[303] In his defence of the unnamed centurion, the tribune is careful to stress the length of time that he has spent in the army. At the trial of Spurius Oppius, it was mentioned that the centurion that he wronged had served in twenty campaigns. It appears that to the Livian soldier demonstrating one's status as an old veteran was an integral part of establishing oneself as a good soldier and a good Roman. Similar sentiments are expressed about veterans during the political wrangling that surrounded the war with Veii.[304]

By making length of service and official recognition the two benchmarks of worthy military service, soldiers in Livy perhaps allow for an understanding of shared experience. Time spent under arms and rewards from commanding officers allow for the individual soldier's record to be presented in a general and objective way. This in turn presents the soldier as a valuable member of a group that extends beyond his immediate comrades on the

[302] Livy 2.23
[303] Livy 3.58.8; 4.19.1
[304] Livy 4.58.13

battlefield and in the tent line. There is evidence in Livy's narrative for this sense of a shared identity across the Roman army that extends even to men that have not spent campaigns together.

Volero, a soldier resisting conscription, appealed to those present in the Forum both as citizens and fellow soldiers when the lictors threatened him with violence.[305] When taking refuge amongst his comrades from the Decemvirs, Verginius is able to rouse his army to march against them with appeals to their shared identity – he addresses them as *commilitiones* twice in a short speech.[306] Those men, however, are his personal comrades. Yet when the tribune Icilius instigates mutiny amongst the army fighting the Sabines, he uses both the murder of their own comrade, Siccius, and the wrong committed against Verginius – a fellow soldier but not a personal comrade – to provoke the men to action.[307] This suggests that Livy saw plebeian identity as extending beyond the personal bonds a soldier might form on campaign with his *contubernales*. Rather, military service cultivated a common sentiment across the army, even if men had served in different campaigns under different generals. Personal knowledge or connexion to an audience of his peers was not essential for a soldier asserting his status.

One aspect of the plebeian military identity in Livy that, though minor, appears to be integral to the shared identity and something that separates plebeians from their aristocratic officers is their sense of humour. The Roman

[305] Livy 2.55.7
[306] Livy 3.50.5-7
[307] Livy 3.51.7

senators and generals described by Livy are a fairly humourless lot. This stands in marked contrast to plebeian soldiers, who Livy frequently depicts as joking amongst themselves. Frequently, though not exclusively, this takes the form of the rude verses sung or chanted by soldiers during a triumph.[308] Though clearly part of the triumphal ritual, this *iocus militaris* is presented by Livy as being something the soldiers create themselves. This is particularly evident in the triumph of the dictator Mamercus Aemilius where Cornelius Cossus' feats of bravery led the legionaries to praise him extensively over their commander.[309] The soldierly nature of this joking is made explicit when Livy refers to the rough joking of the army of 355 BC as *'iocus militaris.*[310]' Joking is a distinctive behaviour that marks soldiers out as different from the larger Roman population. This is indicated by Livy's use of vocabulary: of the thirteen times Livy uses the word '*iocus*' to describe the behaviour of a Roman citizen, nine are in military contexts while the remaining four involve Romans who are influenced by or speaking with foreigners.[311] The *iocus militaris* represents a pattern of behaviour that is common to plebeian soldiers throughout Livy's history and serves to emphasise the difference between their identity and that of the patres.

Three aspects of the plebeian military identity: the importance of official recognition, the emphasis on long campaigns and shared experiences,

[308] Livy 3.29.5; 5.49.7; 7.10.13; 7.38.3; 28.9.18. On this sort of *iocus militaris* see Oakley, who detects a 'curious fascination' with them in Livy's text (1998: 361).
[309] Livy 3.20.3
[310] Livy 7.17.5
[311] Military: Livy 1.4.9, 3.29.5, 5.22.5, 5.49.7, 7.10.13, 7.17.5, 7.38.3, 24.16.14, 28.9.18; foreign influence: 7.2.5, 7.2.11, 39.10.1, 42.39.5

and the joking nature of soldiers all appear in Livy's narrative as unique to the plebeian infantry of Rome's armies. All of them are also present in the narrative almost from the beginning of the republic and certainly within the 5th century. In Livy's formulation of the republic, the plebeian class is the counterpoint to the élite of the Roman republic. This plebeian class self-identifies, organises, and expresses its will primarily through military experience and the plebeian sections of the army. This is particularly prominent during the first pentad, and the next section will deal with the place the army plays in the development of the republic from its founding to the fall of Veii.

## From the Founding of the Republic to the Siege of Veii

### The Political sensibility of the Early Republican Army

To begin this examination Livy's conception of the republican soldier – politically engaged, aware of his interests, and wary to challenges to his status and his rights – I will consider the emergence of this form of Roman citizen in the founding of the republic and the early struggle of the orders. It is at the dawn of the republic that the Roman plebs first appears in Livy's narrative as an organised and engaged force within the Roman state, and throughout the 4th century the army serves as the manifestation of their will. This section will deal with the part the army played in the ousting of the Tarquins, its leading rôle in the first secession, its central place in the second, and the status of the army as the plebeian tribunes' primary source of influence. It has been observed that, historically, even as a temporary militia of citizens serving only for the duration of a campaign, republican soldiers must have brought aspects of their time as soldiers back into their civilian lives.[312] In Livy's account of the early republic – and indeed in all of his surviving work – while citizens brought aspects of their civilian life into their military service, it was only in their status as soldiers that they could effectively resist the senate, since the willingness of plebeian soldiers to go to war was necessary in the near constant border skirmishing that marked the first century of the republic.[313]

Roman soldiers exerted influence in the politics of the republic from the very beginning of Livy's republican account. After Brutus raised the

[312] Cadiou (2009: 158)
[313] Kapust (2004: 390)

populace at Rome against the Tarquins, his next step was to head directly to Ardea in order to co-opt the army.[314] Tarquin, on the other hand, left the army in the field and returned to Rome to restore order. Brutus avoided the king and his retinue on the road and was able to reach the camp and secure the support of the army. At the same time, the king failed to win back the city and, with both army and city against him, entered exile.[315] The rôle played by the army in the founding of the republic is worth brief consideration for two reasons. Firstly, Brutus appears to have understood the central place of the army better than Tarquin did. Throughout Livy's first pentad the army functions as the organised manifestation of popular sovereignty.[316] Brutus understood that his revolution would not succeed without the support of the army, as he avoided contact with the king before he had secured the support of the troops. Nor was his avoidance of direct confrontation with the king necessarily driven by practical concerns, while Livy is not explicit, it is likely that Tarquin returned to Rome with an armed retinue, yet the historian is explicit that Brutus himself did so, too: before departing for Ardea, Brutus organised his own armed retinue.[317] Brutus' intention was to raise the state against the Tarquins, not merely replace him as king. To do so he needed to win the support of the army.

Tarquin, on the other hand, did not seem to grasp that without the support of the army he cannot control Rome. As was the case with Appius

[314] Livy 1.59.12
[315] Livy 1.60
[316] Forsythe (2007: 36)
[317] Livy 1.59.12

Claudius and Aemilius Paullus, Tarquin did not understand that imperium required the consent of those under his command. This is made clear in the speech that Livy gives Brutus, at the end of which Brutus urged the people '*ut imperium regi abrogaret exsulesque esse iuberet L. Tarquinium*...'[318] 'to abrogate the king's authority and to exile Lucius Tarquinius...' The use of the technical republican language '*imperium*...*abrogaret*' is vital here.[319] Ogilvie recognised that the anachronistic language has the effect of connecting the fall of the Tarquins to the development of the republic.[320] This has interesting connotations for how Livy understood Roman sovereignty. Romans generally understood consular *imperium* as deriving from the power of the kings, as Livy himself suggests.[321] Yet if the power of a king could be revoked by the citizenry, then the line between the regal period and the republic becomes blurred. The fact that Roman soldiers and citizens could withdraw the *imperium* of Tarquin also firmly illuminates Livy's model of republican military service dated from the ouster of the Tarquins: like the kings before them, republican generals and magistrates could only wield power if their citizens and soldiers were willing to recognise it.

Tarquin misunderstood this and, in quitting the camp to retake the city, left the army vulnerable to Brutus' politicking. Yet, this misunderstanding manifests not only in his poor last minute decision to abandon the army at the moment of crisis, but in his behaviour as king. Livy is clear that part of the

[318] Livy 1.59.11
[319] Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.2.57; id. Q. Fr. 2.3.1; Vell. Pat. 2.18.6
[320] Ogilvie (1965:228-9)
[321] Livy 2.1.7; On the regal origins of *imperium* see Lowrie (2010: 178); Brennan (2004: 35); Glinister (2006: 24).

reason Rome is ripe for revolt is because the Tarquins had spent much of their reign antagonising Roman soldiers. In his speech to the people Brutus reminded them that the king has been pressing men of the military class into manual labour: '*Romanos homines, victores omnium circa populorum, opifices ac lapicidas pro bellatoribus factos.*' 'Roman men, victors over all the neighbouring peoples, had been turned from warriors into artisans and stone-cutters.'[322] The unhappiness of the citizenry with this situation was recognised even by Tarquin, who decided on war with Ardea partly to fill his own coffers and partly to give the soldiers a break from the labour and the chance for spoils.[323] The situation makes it clear that Roman citizens, while they accepted military service, were less happy about being compelled into corvée – their employment as *lapicidae* in particular would have been problematic as it was an occupation associated with slaves.[324] But the issue at hand was as much the result of forcing Romans into labour as it was the nature of labour itself. Tarquin's labour program effectively turned Roman soldiers into Roman workers. This represented a direct threat to the status of Roman men as soldiers. As will be discussed below, in Livy's republic the Roman plebeian's understanding of himself as a soldier was fundamental to his sense of his own worth as a citizen.

[322] Livy 1.59.9
[323] Livy 1.57.1
[324] Ogilvie (1965:228); For the low status of such work in general see Sallust, whose dismissive remarks about the sort of people that might be persuaded to break a conspirator out of prison – '*opifices atque servitia*' – are illustrative (Cat. 50.1); For *lapicidinae* as a place of punishment see Plautus, Capt. 736, 944-5, 998-1000.

There is further evidence that the royal family had alienated the men in the army. During the siege of Ardea there appears to have been a relaxation of discipline, largely benefiting the aristocratic officers rather than the soldiers.[325] During this period, the princes did little to cultivate the image of themselves as dedicated soldiers: '*regii quidem iuvenes interdum otium conviviis comisationibusque inter se terebant.*' 'the young princes for their part passed their idle hours together at dinners and drinking bouts.'[326] This begins a pattern that is present throughout Livy's work where commanders who hold themselves aloof and separate from the men suffer disorder, while successful generals show themselves to be taking part in the dangers and discomfort of campaign alongside their soldiers. The Tarquins made three mistakes that were to be repeated by republican commanders later in Livy's history. Firstly, they failed to understand the army's rôle as the organised representatives of the plebeians. Secondly, they antagonised the army by treating the soldiers in a way that the men saw as disrespectful. Finally, they made no effort to portray themselves as *commilites* with the men or even to be seen sharing the rigours of campaign. While in 509 this situation the army did not act on its own initiative, the enthusiasm with which it joined Brutus' coup is evident: '*liberatorem urbis laeta castra accepere*...'[327] The fall of the Tarquins was grounded in both Brutus' understanding of the place of the army within the Roman state and in Tarquin's failure to understand that the support of the army was in essence the support of the Roman people. This was the first of

[325] Livy 1.57.4
[326] Livy 1.57.5
[327] Livy 1.60.2

many regular events in the history of Rome where the success of an élite individual depended on his ability to understand and gain the support of the plebeian soldiery.

As a true citizen militia serving only when needed and, according to Livy, without recompense for the first hundred years of the republic, the concerns of republican army for the most part mirrored the concerns of their fellow citizens. In Livy's account, the centrality of the army as a force in republican politics is evident from the beginning of the republic. The lead up to the first *secessio plebis* grew out of the senate's inability or disinterest in resolving the crisis arising out of high levels of debt amongst the plebeians.[328] Livy focusses exclusively on the issue of debt, eliding the larger political or agrarian issues described by other historical sources, though all accounts also mention debt.[329] Focussing on the issue of *nexum* has the effect of making the crux of the issue the systematic loss of status suffered by the plebs forced into servitude by the *patres*. The level of debt-bondage arising from the crisis was intolerable to the plebs, and Livy gives as his only individual example the travails of a decorated old centurion.[330] With this framing the senate's unwillingness to address the issue of debt becomes an unwillingness to protect the status of soldiers. This is particularly clear in the way the plebs framed their complaints:

[328] The details of the debt-bondage of *nexum* remain obscure as it was abolished before any legal commentaries could have illuminated the issue. However, as Livy appears disinterested in – or unclear on – the details, an understanding of them is unnecessary to consider the part that *nexum* plays in Livy's narrative. For *nexum* in Livy see Ogilvie (1965: 296-299) For the issue in general see Jolowics and Nicholas (1972: 164-166).
[329] Raaflaub (2008: 210); Ridley (1968: 537).
[330] Livy 2.23.1-7

> fremebant se foris pro libertate et imperio dimicantes domi a civibus captos et oppressos esse, tutioremque in bello quam in pace et inter hostis quam inter civis libertatem plebis esse.[331]
>
> They complained loudly that while they were abroad fighting for liberty and dominion they had been enslaved and oppressed at home by fellow-citizens, and that the freedom of the plebeians was more secure in war than in peace, amongst enemies than amongst citizens.

This short passage is important for three reasons. Firstly, and most importantly it demonstrates that the Plebs have learned that their political strength lies in their status as Rome's soldiers, and that they are better protected from the senate as part of the army than as individual citizens. This is emphasised by the language used, as the plebs is conflated with the army. Secondly, it makes it clear that the sort of people being enslaved in Livy's narrative are the same sort that are serving in the army. Finally, it once again demonstrates that the Plebs chief protest against such treatment concerns their status as soldiers.

The importance of this status made even more explicit when Livy describes an individual victim of the situation. A ragged old man came into the forum and despite his pitiful condition he was recognised by his fellow citizens as a veteran:

> ordines duxisse aiebant aliaque militia decora volgo miserantes eum iactabant; ipse testes honestarum aliquot locis pugnarum cicatrices adverso pectore ostentabat.[332]
>
> the word went round that he had commanded companies; yet other military honours were openly ascribed to him by the compassionate bystanders, and the man himself displayed the scars on his breast which bore testimony to his honourable service in various battles.

[331] Livy 2.23.2
[332] Livy 2.23.4

To the plebeians gathered around him, all of this man's worth was measured by his military service. The centurion also prioritised his status as a soldier. After showing his scars, he goes on to describe his service against the Sabines. It is only later that he mentions his civilian status as a former small farmer, and even then only as necessary details in the tale of his decline.[333] Once again, the issue was not framed as injustice done simply to Roman citizens, but specifically as injustice done to Roman citizens who had established their status as soldiers. Such degrading of the status of soldiers was, as we have seen, a primary cause of Tarquin's alienation of the army.

Roman soldiers feeling that their status has been challenged was a regular point of contention between the army and command, even a passing comment that compared soldiers to slaves led to the lynching of a Roman general.[334] At this point in the narrative the old centurion's tale of misfortune proves the breaking point and the building discontent boils over into disorder on the streets and threats to senators. When the angry crowd is confronted by the senators, once again the injustice of their situation is contrasted with their status as soldiers. Crowding around the consuls, they show them their fetters and the signs of their deprivation: '*haec se meritos dicere exprobrantes suam quisque alius alibi militiam*.'[335] 'These, they cried, were the rewards they had earned, and their bitterly rehearsed the campaigns they had each served in various places.' That Livy conceives of the victims of *nexum* to be plebeian

[333] Livy 2.23.5
[334] The tribune Postumius Albinus, discussed at length below.
[335] Livy 2.23.11

soldiers is made clear when the senate temporarily agrees to address the issue in order to allow recruitment for a war against the Volsci. When the senate declares a moratorium on the enslavement of those in debt, countless debtors rush to the forum to enlist in the army.[336] The temporary moratorium protected the plebeians' status as soldiers, and they were willing again to serve in the army.

Although the actions of the consul provided temporary relief, the tension between the plebs and the *patres* continued and when it came to a head again, once more resistance came from the army. While the tension was caused by the wider issue of debt, the inciting incident was the intention of the consuls to keep the army in the field longer than the men thought acceptable.[337] This decision was itself spurred by the central part that the army was playing in the politics of the city, the consuls believed that removing the army from the city would halt the disorder, suggesting that they thought that the majority of the troublemakers – or at least their ringleaders – were men liable for military service. With the exception of Sicinius, who proposes the secession, no other individuals are named and Livy frames this as a collective debate. That this action was taken primarily by the army can be inferred from Livy's account. The army begins to plot sedition after it is ordered out of Rome to commence actions against the Aequi.[338] While Livy's wording is not clear as to whether the army rebelled before or after it had moved out of the city, the

[336] Livy 2.24.7
[337] Livy 2.32.1-2
[338] Livy 2.32.1

narrative suggests that the men have already marched, as their first concern is a military one – how to extricate themselves from the *sacramentum* without impiety.[339] Their first plan, to kill the consuls, is dismissed as heinous, although this is not be the last time that Livian soldiers consider lynching their commanders. [340] Instead the plebeian army decided to remove itself from the command of its generals.[341]

Having decided on secession, the men still conducted themselves as an army, and their first step was to fortify the sacred mount as if it were an army camp: '*ibi sine ullo duce uallo fossaque communitis castris*...' 'there, without any commander, they fortified their camp with ditch and palisade.'[342] That the decision was made separately by the army is also supported by Livy's comment about the mood in the city following the occupation of the Sacred Mount: those plebs left behind worried about their ability to defend themselves from the aristocrats: '*pauor ingens in urbe, metuque mutuo suspensa erant omnia. timere relicta ab suis plebis uiolentiam patrum*.' 'A great panic seized the City, mutual distrust led to a state of universal suspense. Those plebeians who had been left by their comrades in the City feared violence from the patricians.'[343] As the army functioned as the engine of organised plebeian resistance, with it

[339] Ogilvie suggests that the soldiers preoccupation with the *sacramentum* represented a 3rd century concern projected back by the annalists, however, concerns over the *sacramentum* are a consistent issue for Roman soldiers in Livy's narrative (1965:431).
[340] Livy 2.32.2
[341] My focus here remains Livy's narrative, and in particular the part that the soldiers play in it. I will not be engaging with the historicity or other accounts. For other narratives see Ogilvie (1695: 309-311). For its historicity see Forsythe (2005: 170-176) and Cornell (1995: 242-271).
[342] Livy 2.32.4
[343] Livy 2.32.5

out of the city the remaining plebeians were at the mercy of the aristocrats. Even the choice of the Sacred Mount as a camp may suggest that the secession originated among the army after it had left the city, a location that Livy himself says caused some confusion in the sources.[344] Though further away from Rome than the Aventine, the Sacred Mount is located between the archaic city and the territory of the Aequi and would have been a logical choice for an army already in the field. Livy's account shows that the while the cause for the secession was not simply a military issue, the decision to secede was made collectively by the army with no obvious or significant conferral with those members of the plebs who remained in the city. Even at this early stage the army is presented as capable of debating and taking political action as a group on the behalf of the larger plebeian order, and their engagement with the political process is evident.

The army also plays a prominent part in the events of the second secession and the fall of the decemvirate. As they began to feel their control slipping, the decemvirs started to worry about the sentiment of the army. The dissatisfaction among the soldiery was already evident, though they had not yet refused service outright, Livy reports that the men were taking the extraordinary action of wilfully courting defeat in order to express their

[344] Livy 2.32.3 Livy tells us that Piso placed the location of the first secession on the Aventine, to match the second. Livy himself appears to get confused, as in his account of the second secession (3.54.9) he remarks that the Aventine was the site of both the first and second secessions. For a detailed discussion of the confused narrative, see Ogilvie (1965: 310-311).

unhappiness.[345] When an individual soldier agitated inside the camp, the decemvirs took quick action:

> L. Siccium in Sabinis, per inuidiam decemuiralem tribunorum creandorum secessionisque mentiones ad uolgus militum sermonibus occultis serentem, prospeculatum ad locum castris capiendum mittunt. datur negotium militibus quos miserant expeditionis eius comites, ut eum opportuno adorti loco interficerent.[346]
>
> L. Siccius was serving in the campaign against the Sabines. Seeing the bitter feeling against the decemvirs, he held secret conversations with the soldiery and threw out hints about the creation of tribunes and resorting to a secession. He was sent to select and survey a site for a camp, and the soldiers who had been sent to accompany him were instructed to choose a favourable opportunity for attacking and killing him.

This passage allows a glimpse of the politicking and plotting present in the army. While Livy rarely explicitly describes such behaviour, he must have conceived of it happening regularly, as the results of such political agitation within camp – denial of service, planned defeats, and outright mutiny – are frequent in his narrative. However, the passage also demonstrates that the political situation had not yet progressed to the stage where resistance to command was universal, as the decemvir Fabius is able to find a number of troops willing to kill their comrade. Livy does not make Dentatus into the prominent character than other sources, who depict him as a great fighter of

[345] Livy 3.42.2-5
[346] Livy 3.43.2-3

duel, however, making him into a prominent figure would undermine the communal nature of the dissatisfaction that leads to the secession.[347]

In the fallout of the pursuit and death of Verginia once again the army played a central rôle.[348] Verginius himself was a serving soldier, who travelled from camp to Rome to plead for his daughter's freedom.[349] After his daughter's death he returned to his army, on campaign against the Aequians, both to protect himself from Appius and to raise the army against the government.[350] The other men involved in the affair, Icilius and Numitorius, fled the city to join the army fighting against the Sabines, again with the express intention of stirring them up against the decemvirs.[351] Both of these attempts were successful and once again Livy portrays the army as the driving force in a *secessio plebis*. The southern army, moved to revolt by Verginius, marched back to Rome and occupied the Aventine.[352] It is at the urging of the returning soldiers that civilians begin to join with the troops:

> eunt agmine ad urbem et Auentinum insidunt, ut quisque occurrerat plebem ad repetendam libertatem creandosque tribunos plebis adhortantes.[353]

[347] Dentatus' status as a duel fighter is discussed below. Ogilvie suggests and alternative interpretation, that Livy downplays Dentatus to avoid distracting from the larger narrative of the devemvirs (1965: 476).
[348] By focussing on the reaction of the soldiers to Verginius' grief, I do a disservice to Verginia, whose receives only a passing reference. On the account, which, as Ogilvie remarks, Livy saw as worthy of 'all the art which L. could bring to bear' (1965: 477) see Claasen (1998: 92-94); Freund (2008); Joshel (1992).
[349] Livy 3.44.11
[350] Livy 3.50
[351] Livy 3.51.7
[352] Livy 3.50.10-13
[353] Livy 3.50.13

> They marched in military order to the City and occupied the Aventine. Every one whom they met was urged to recover the liberties of the plebs and appoint tribunes.

Here again the army is presented as the organising force behind plebeian political action. Once there the men elect from amongst themselves ten military tribunes to represent them with the senate.[354] When news of this reaches the army in Sabine territory, they themselves elect ten tribunes and move to join with those already on the Aventine.[355]

Most interesting about Livy's account of the occupation of the Aventine is the communal nature of the soldier's decisions. At all times the men are shown making decisions collectively, rather than being led by any individual. Verginius and Icilius are able to influence and prompt these decisions, but neither operate as leader of the men. Icilius, indeed, is shown as scrambling to divert the will of the northern army in a direction that will benefit his political career before he loses the chance to exert any influence over their actions.[356] He recognised that the politically active and engaged citizens in the northern army could serve as his base of support in his political career, just as the southern army would for Verginius. As with the ousting of the Tarquins, the winners and losers of the political disorder will be those who recognise that the army is politically engaged and cognisant of its interests and use that fact to influence the political situation. Both Verginius and Icilius recognised that their positions as tribunes depend on winning the support of the army.

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[354] Livy 3.51.3-6
[355] Livy 3.51.8-10
[356] Livy 3.51.8

In Livy's account of the early republic, Roman citizens on military service consistently demonstrated a communal will and willingness to break with their commanders over political matters when they felt their rights at home or on campaign were being infringed. This sense of the army as politically active and engaged was also shown in the struggles between the senate and the tribunes over legislation when the army is abroad.

The presence of the army during political struggles was a recurring issue in the politics of Livy's early republic. Often during pieces of contentious legislation, there was an attempt by the senate to ensure that the army is out on campaign while the tribunes struggled to get the army recalled. Indeed, such senatorial tactics predate the tribunate, as it was an attempt to keep the army away from the city that sparked the first secession.[357] In 459 the tribunes accused the consuls of keeping the army in the field to derail legislation: '*clamant fraude fieri quod foris teneatur exercitus; frustrationem eam legis tollendae esse; se nihilo minus rem susceptam peracturos*.'[358] 'They exclaimed that the army was being detained abroad from dishonest motives; it was intended to frustrate the passing of the Law.' With the return of the army, the tribunes were able to frustrate the consuls by getting themselves re-elected, though a vote on the law in question was postponed. Similar debates over the presence of the army were common in this period, also happening, for example, in 460 and 457.[359]

[357] Livy 2.32
[358] Livy 3.24.1
[359] Livy 3.17; 3.29.8

Tribunican successes in this period were dependent on them having attained both the presence of the army and its support. In 460, during Herdonius' occupation of the Capitol, the senate was alarmed to find that the tribunes had called a political gathering, leading to the soldiers laying down their arms and deserting their positions.[360] Despite the best efforts of the senate, they failed to properly rearm the populace, and it was only the intervention of the Tusculan dictator Mamilius that prompted the Roman people to return to military discipline, and even then despite the protests of the tribunes.[361] In 457 tribunican efforts to pass laws favouring the plebs were unsuccessful, Livy states explicitly that the triumph of the senate was due to the fact that Rome had two armies in the field.[362]

The success of the tribunes in 460 and the senate in 457 show how the deployment of the army could be used to frustrate plebeian efforts. In 460, responding to a uniquely dangerous situation, the army was stationed within the city, while in 457 both armies were abroad. This suggests that it was not respect for the imperium of their senatorial generals or their awe for the *sacramentum* that subdued the political sensibilities of the army.[363] The deployment of the army outside of the city strengthened the power of the senate in a more prosaic way; it separated the soldiers from the tribunes,

[360] Livy 3.16.6-3.17.1
[361] Livy 3.18.4-10
[362] Livy 3.29.
[363] At (3.20.5) Livy stresses that the *sacramentum* was held with far more respect by early republican soldiers than in later periods. However, his own narrative challenges this as from the beginning of the Republic soldiers appear to feel able to act against it when they feel the circumstances warrant such action.

isolating the plebeian magistrates from the most organised and engaged part of their constituency.

Within Livy's narratives the plebeian tribunes also appear to understand that their power – and by extension the political power of the plebs – is severely weakened when the army is on campaign. The primary weapon of the tribunate against the senate in this period was the veto of a *dilectus*, and they deployed it with regularity. In the middle decades of the 5th century. Livy records six occasions when the tribunes blocked, or threatened to block, the *dilectus*: 460, 459, 458, 457, 445, and 441.[364] Blocking the *dilectus* had a double effect. Most importantly, it allowed the tribunes to keep the base of their support – the army – within the city where it could take part in politics. Also, since it was only effective when there was a threat of war, it also put pressure on the senate, who would have to resolve the situation before the enemy could be dealt with.

The political understanding and engagement of the Roman army in Livy's account of the early republic is particularly clear in his preferred version of the mutiny and lynching of the consular tribune Postumius Regilensis, discussed in more detail below. Livy frames the episode firmly within the context of the political struggle between plebs and patres.[365] Livy describes an army that was composed of citizens who brought their political concerns and their understanding of their rights with them from the city. With an option to

[364] Livy 3.20, 3.22, 3.24, 3.30, 4.2, 4.12 respectively
[365] Livy 4.49-50

refuse service, citizens liable for military service exercised considerable leverage over the senate and magistrates. Before the formation of the tribunate this refusal was the only leverage the plebs held. This situation made the army the organising and directing force behind resistance to the senate. When the tribunes were in place that refusal remained the most potent weapon in their political arsenal. As a result, the cooperation of the army became vital to the tribunes' efforts to resist the aristocracy. While the tribunes now had the power to direct plebeian resistance, that resistance remained organised through the army.

The position of the army as the driving political force of the Roman plebs can be accentuated by comparing the two Roman secessions to the civil war that broke out in Ardea in 443. Much like the second secession, the inciting incident revolves around the fate of a young woman, and, having spiralled out of control leads to a separation between the Ardeate aristocrats and commons.[366] Beyond the superficial differences, however, the two accounts are significantly different. Unlike the situation in Rome, where the personal conflict between Verginius and Appius Claudius was merely the spark that prompted a conflict rooted in wider political concerns over Roman government, there is no reported further political issue at stake in Ardea. Further, while both Roman secessions began with the army and were

[366] Livy 4.9.1-10

conducted with discipline and restraint, in Ardea the violence arises in the streets amongst the people as a whole.[367]

Driven from the city, the Ardeate plebs begin raiding and looting the estates of the nobility, actions that Livy explicitly contrasts with the restraint of the Roman plebs: '*nihil Romanae plebi similis*.'[368] The historian also consistently portrays this as a civilian conflict. At no point does he refer to the armed Ardeates as *milites*, reserving that term for the detachments of Volsci and Romans that are drawn into Ardean territory by the conflict. He further emphasises this by telling his readers that the plebs were largely composed of *opifices* – workers – who were motivated by the prospect of plunder.[369] These chaotic and violent scenes stand in marked contrast to the behaviour of the Roman army and people during the secession. In his account of the first *secessio plebis*, Livy describes the people withdrawing to the Sacred Mount: '*modestiam patrum suorum nihil uiolando imitati*.' 'having imitated the good behaviour of their fathers and made no depredations.'[370]

At the dawn of the republic, the Roman plebs were taught of their agency and power, perhaps inadvertently, by Brutus. His behaviour during the coup, both his appeals to the Roman plebeian sense of status as soldiers and his mad scramble to ensure control of the army before confronting Tarquin, demonstrated the central, even indispensable, rôle that the army played in the foundation of the republic. The soldiers' understanding of their own power, as

[367] Livy 4.9.7
[368] Livy 4.9.8
[369] Livy 4.9.9
[370] Livy 3.52.3

well as their perspective on their status as soldiers and their rights as citizens caused the army to be the organised and active political manifestation of the plebeian order in secessions and the establishment of the tribunate.

The origins of the secessions in the army is evident in Livy's narrative and in the military flavour of the camps on the Sacred Mount and the Aventine. As a result of the military aspect of plebeian identity meant that in the secessions plebs comported themselves with discipline and restraint, in contrast to the open violence of the civilian uprising in Ardea. By basing their grievances in matters of law, they allow their demands to be met through negotiation, avoiding the need for open conflict or outside arbitration. The contrast drawn by Livy is stark. Even when they have physically removed themselves from the authority of their government and generals the Roman plebs remain soldiers. While even when armed and occupying a fortified camp the Ardeate plebs remain civilians.

**The Purpose of Service**

In Livy's framing of the republic, the plebs were usually content to serve in the army when they believed the war was being fought for a purpose that benefits them. In the century before Veii the two primary justifications for war that the army would accept were to defend the republic or to benefit the Roman people as a whole. They were resistant to wars fought without proper justification or fought to extend the hegemony of the Senate over Latium. Importantly, there was no sense from soldiers that they saw war as a method

to gain personal glory, indeed, by restricting descriptions of glorious deeds to aristocratic officers, Livy himself removes that motivation from the men. The interests of the plebeians serving in the Roman legions were always more practical than a simple desire for glory. Whereas Sallust's early Romans were unified by their *cupido gloriae*, to Livy that remains a purely aristocratic preoccupation.

There are substantial differences in the way that Livy depicts aristocratic and plebeian soldiers. When aristocratic soldiers are praised, either by Livy or by those in his narrative, much is made of their personal qualities and exploits. At the trial of Caeso Quinctius the great men of the state lined up to defend the young aristocrat by referring to his breeding and his military record. The consul Quinctius Capitolinus spoke of the man '*cum multa referret sua familiaeque decora*' 'with many references to his the glories of himself and his family' and affirmed that he was the finest member not only of his family but of the state.[371] The consulars Spurius Furius and Lucius Lucretius also listed the young man's achievements.[372] Lucretius finished by suggesting that Caeso was destined to be the finest servant of the republic as he was '*instructum naturae fortunaeque omnibus bonis*' 'endowed with every advantage of nature and of fortune.'[373]

This sort of rhetoric, which links martial skill and aristocratic breeding, is particularly common in Livy's account of the 5th century. When Cinncinatus

[371] Livy 3.12.2-3
[372] Livy 3.12.4-5
[373] Livy 3.12.6

spoke of his son's banishment, he accused the tribunes of trying to strip Rome of her defences: '*cum Caesone filio suo virtutem, constantiam, omnia iuventutis belli domique decora pulsa ex urbe Romana et fugata esse*' 'With his son Caeso, manhood, steadfastness, and all the qualities which honour youth in war and in civil life had been driven from Rome and put to rout.'[374] Nor was the military virtue of the patrician merely due to the advantages of wealth. The patrician Tarquitius, who would later be named *magister equitum*, was born so poor that his time in the legions was spent in the infantry. Even so, despite his reduced circumstances, '*bello tamen primus longe Romanae iuventutis habitus esset*.' 'he was however regarded by far the as best of the Roman youth.'[375] Similar sentiments connect the skill of the consul Agrippa Furius to his patrician birth.[376] This casting of martial skill as particularly patrician is perhaps most explicit in Livy's remarks about Cornelius Cossus. The young tribune is described as not only of excellent breeding and ability, but also remarkably handsome.[377] Livy's account also hints at what motivates these aristocratic warriors. Cossus was, the historian tells us, mindful of his family name '*quod amplissimum acceptum maius auctiusque reliquit posteris*.' 'which was very famous when it came to him, he left to his descendants one still greater and more glorious.'[378]

This hits on the main aspect of the link between martial skill and aristocratic bearing. Aristocrats can win fame through martial exploits.

[374] Livy 3.19.5
[375] Livy 3.27.1
[376] Livy 3.70.10
[377] Livy 4.19.1
[378] Livy 4.19.1

Cornelius Cossus' achievements are presented firstly as a service he does to his family and his name. Further, his killing of the enemy king wins him great personal glory, so much so that in the dictator's triumph the marching soldiers sing about Cossus, not their general. The actions won the young tribune so much honour that he '*auerteratque in se a curru dictatoris ciuium ora et celebritatis eius diei fructum prope solus tulerat*' 'had drawn the gaze of the citizens away from the car of the dictator upon himself, and the honours of that crowded festival were virtually his alone.'[379] Roman nobles could use war to expand their fame and contribute to the fame of their families. Warfare then served a purpose beyond the defence of the republic or the acquisition of territory. It was a purpose in itself. Alongside concerns of national security of economics, war allowed the aristocratic class of the early republic to expand its power by gaining personal glory through military exploits.

This was not the case for the citizens that made up the bulk of Rome's armies. Whereas Rome's militarized aristocracy actively sought war, for the people it was something they merely accepted as a fact of life.[380] While the great patrician heroes are measured by their lineage, personal qualities, and individual exploits – often given detailed descriptions by Livy – Roman infantry, both the *milites gregarii* and the centurions, have their contributions and military records framed in a more general light. The centurion Verginius is described in terms of his honesty and his rank, no personal details about his

[379] Livy 4.20.3
[380] Eckstein (2006: 183)

military exploits are given: '*L. Verginius, honestum ordinem in Algido ducebat, vir exempli recti domi militiaeque*.'[381] Similarly the unnamed soldier persecuted by the decemvir Spurius Oppius was praised for the length of his military career and the decorations he had received from command.[382]

In his account of the murder of Siccius Dentatus, Livy elides his famous career as a fighter of duels.[383] One aspect of the identity of the Roman soldiery present in other sources but downplayed in Livy is the emphasis on single combat. Certainly, the historian makes much of the duelling of aristocratic officers, such as Manlius Torquatus, his unfortunate son, and Valerius Corvus.[384] Yet it is evident from other sources that single combat, rather than being restricted to the aristocracy, was practiced and lauded by all ranks.[385] Livy's history, however, contains no examples of either *milites gregarii* or centurions taking part in single combat.[386]

By downplaying the importance of single combat to the average soldier, and prioritising recognition of deeds over the deeds themselves, Livy emphasises the communal and community aspect of soldiery. Stripped of his heroic life, Siccius' part in the story is that of a murdered centurion. Livy finds no place in his account for details of the individual exploits or personal quality of common soldiers. Whereas war provides the nobility with a chance to

[381] Livy 3.44.2
[382] Livy 3.58.8
[383] Oakley (1985: 393). Cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.37.3, Val. Max. 3.2.24, Plin. *HN* 7.101
[384] Livy 7.10; 8.7; 7.26
[385] Lendon (2005: 182-192); Wiedemann (1992: 96-98); Rich (2007)
[386] Such instances do appear in other sources: see e.g. *B Afr.* 84; Joseph. *BJ* 168-176; Caes. *BGall.* 5.44

benefit through conspicuous displays of *virtus*, regardless of the purpose of the campaign, common soldiers cannot. As war was not a source of individual deeds; war needed to be justified to the plebs through some other means. If an acceptable justification could not be found, the war ran the risk of meeting resistance.

In the Livian narrative of the very early republic there also appears to have been resistance to wars fought to extend Roman hegemony over the peoples of central Italy. As the tribunes began to deploy their veto to block enlistment, they found that the willingness of the people to support them depended very much on the cause of the conflict. Even before the establishment of the tribunate the Roman people, including those liable for military service, were reluctant to agree to war if the primary purpose was simply to expand or preserve Rome's local hegemony. The war in 494 is presented by the *patres* as an emergency that threatens to expose Rome to attack by her enemies, but met determined resistance from the people.[387] The truth, however, was that the primary motivation behind the war was to preserve Rome's influence over the Latins, since if Rome did not march to the aid of their allies the senate would be forced to allow the Latins to rearm and look to their own defences, an action the senators did not look on favourably: '*tutius uisum est defendi inermes Latinos quam pati retractare arma*.' 'It was seen as better to defend unarmed Latins that to permit them to rearm.'[388] The people, however, saw the war preparations as not simply not to their

[387] Livy 2.27-30
[388] Livy 2.30.9

advantage, but actually against their own interests. The senate made no effort to justify the war to the people but instead won their support with political concessions.

As the Volsci, led by the renegade Coriolanus, marched on Rome the senate attempted to mobilise while the people demanded that the city sue for peace.[389] Livy frames this as being related to the fear that the commons had of their nemesis Marcius Coriolanus, but he also recounts that the cause for war was the Roman occupation of Volscian territory and that if the senate was willing return the land to the Volsci they would have considered peace.[390] There was similar resistance to warfare in the early years of the conflict with Veii. The senate pressed for war, while the tribunes successfully argued that the war was not in the interests of the plebeian class, but rather an attempt by the aristocracy to divert attention from domestic trouble.[391]

While resistance to war was usually led by the plebeian tribunes, the magistrates required the cooperation of the soldiers if their resistance to be effective.[392] On occasions when the tribunes attempted to stop a war without securing the support of the army, those attempts failed. In 460 efforts to refuse the levy were frustrated by the soldiers' respect of the *sacramentum*.[393] While it seems clear from Livy's account that the proposed war with the Volsci and Aequi was unpopular, and the senate was keeping men under arms through a

[389] Livy 2.39.8
[390] Livy 2.39.10
[391] Livy 4.58.6-13
[392] This likely reflects the historical reality. At this point the powers of the tribunes were ill-defined and rested mostly on their ability to organise a mob. Ogilvie (1965: 310)
[393] Livy 3.20.2.

trick of the law, the men clearly preferred to serve in the campaign rather than risk the dishonour and impiety of violating their military oath.

Attempts to block the veto during periods of national emergency were usually derailed by the soldiers' willingness to take up arms to defend the republic, as happened in 458.[394] In these situations the men made the understandable decision that any short term political gains are not worth risking the wellbeing of the state. If the tribunes attempted to block a popular war they could be outmanoeuvred by the government: after the plebeian tribunes veto the *dilectus* in 398 the military tribunes merely form an army out of volunteers, sidestepping the need for a levy.[395] While the soldiers generally acted in solidarity with the tribunes, this relationship of mutual support was by no means guaranteed.

When the tribunes' aims were not aligned with the wishes of the soldiers or when they were perceived as placing political gains over the interests of the republic, the army was perfectly willing to break with them and side with the senate. In a similar manner, when the centurion Volero Publilius refused to be enlisted at a lower rank he was sentenced to a beating by the consul. As he struggled with the lictors, the veteran called on the tribunes for support. Finding no help from the tribunes he called on his fellow citizens to aid him: '*provoco et fidem plebis imploro. Adeste cives, adeste commilitones; nihil est quod exspectetis tribunos, quibus ipsis vestro auxilio opus est*.'[396] 'I

[394] Livy 3.25.9
[395] Livy 5.16.4-6.
[396] Livy 2.55.6-7

appeal to the plebs for protection. Attend, citizens! Attend, fellow soldiers! You have nothing to expect from the tribunes, they themselves need your aid.' His appeals are successful, and in the ensuing riot the lictors' fasces are broken and the consuls forced to take refuge in the senate house. The ire of the Romans coming to Volero's aid – Romans Volero describes as both citizens and soldiers – is directed at the consuls and their representatives. The frustration, however, stems from the failure of the tribunes to fulfil their obligations to protect citizens from authority. Volero frames this starkly as cowardice as the tribunes are afraid of retribution from the senate.[397] The plebs clearly agreed with him, and in the next election the firebrand centurion himself is returned as tribune.

The Roman plebs were willing to refuse service or agitate in the interests of furthering larger constitutional issues, such as the establishment of the tribunate or the abolition of the decemvirate. However, they also exerted influence on the government in order to ensure that their military service was given to the state when it served a purpose that they themselves found acceptable. Importantly, too, the plebeian tribunes, though their power was based on the support of the soldiers, could not assume that support. When the actions of the tribunes threatened the status of the soldiers, such as by risking the violation of the *sacramentum*, or when it threatened the security of the state itself, those soldiers were willing to side with the senate against their own magistrates.

[397] Livy 2.55.5

**Agitating for Their Rights and Interests on Campaign**

Besides the *secessiones* and resistance to the *dilectus*, which was based in the city and required the efforts of the tribunes, the soldiers of the Livy's early republic were also willing to take action on their own to communicate their interests to their commanders. On multiple occasions Roman armies found themselves on campaign under the command of a hated aristocratic commander. In each of these situations the army attempted to convey their dissatisfaction with their generals by deliberately undermining their martial ability. Under the consul Caeso Fabius in 481, the consul Appius Claudius in 471, and the decemvirs in 449 the men of the Roman army took the extraordinary action of sabotaging their own military effectiveness to convey their dissatisfaction to their generals and the senate. The presence of multiple Appii Claudii in narratives of tension between aristocratic generals and plebeian soldiers should not come as a surprise. Vasaly has argued convincingly that in Livy's first pentad the Appii Claudii are used to represent unrestrained, tyrannical exercises of power.[398] Such figures would of course regularly come into conflict with the politically engaged soldiers of Livy's republic.

The difficulty between Fabius and his army arose both out of larger political issues and out of grievances on campaign. At this point in Livy's narrative the Fabii were positioning themselves as primary opponents to reform that would benefit the plebeians. However, the deep personal antagonism the soldiers showed towards their commander appears to have

[398] Vasaly (1987)

been exacerbated by the actions of the consul's relative the previous year. When the consul Quintus Fabius sold the loot taken on campaign and diverted it all into the treasury, he became the first Roman magistrate Livy describes as making the mistake that was to regularly provoke soldiers into disobedience during the republic: denying soldiers what they see as a fair share of the profits of a campaign.[399] What constitutes a fair share of the proceeds of a war is a recurring issue in the relationship between soldiers and their commanders and relates to the tension between aristocratic officers and the plebeian troops.[400] Money diverted from the troops to the treasury – controlled by the senate – provoked anger because the benefits of the war flow to the *patres* at the cost of the plebeian order. That the army was largely motivated by the slight given them by a Fabius is evidenced by the intense personal feelings involved – Livy thrice mentions the hatred felt by the army to their commander.[401]

Just as the cause of the trouble originated in the army, the resistance to command was also expressed militarily. After Fabius' cavalry routed the Aequi in battle, his infantry, acting out the deep loathing for their commander, refused to pursue the retreating enemy. Nothing would compel the men to follow orders. They then abandoned the battle line and returning to the camp in state of resentful dejection.[402] This was not simply a symbolic gesture made after the battle; Livy is clear that besides being a shameful rejection of

[399] Livy 2.42.2
[400] This tension remains despite the fact that the legality of *praeda*, that immovable property belonged to the state and movable to the men was a settled issue. Ogilvie (1965: 346-347)
[401] Livy 2.42.6 '*odio consulis*'; 2.42.8 '*invisi ducis*'; 2.42.11 '*militum odio*'
[402] Livy 2.43.6-10

discipline, it actually put the army – and indeed the state in jeopardy.[403] The soldiers felt that their commander, as a member of the Fabii, was not acting in their interest and demonstrated their disquiet to the extent of putting themselves and, if Livy's hyperbole is to be believed, the state at risk. The extraordinary activities of the soldiers under Caeso Fabius were likely so drastic because of the intense antagonism that had developed between the plebeians and the Fabii. Already unpopular due to their intense resistance to reform, the family's relationship was soured further over a decision made on campaign. The Fabii managed to alienate the plebs both as citizens and as soldiers.

There was further trouble within army under the consul Appius Claudius, father of the decemvir. In 471 in campaign against the Volsci, his army behaved much the same way as Fabius' army had done.[404] From the moment the campaign began the men were truculent and obstructive and Livy provides a vivid portrait of their behaviour:

> segniter, otiose, neglegenter, contumaciter omnia agere; nec pudor nec metus coercebat. Si citius agi vellet agmen, tardius sedulo incedere; si adhortator operis adesset, omnes sua sponte motam remittere industriam; praesenti voltus demittere, tacite praetereuntem exsecrari...
>
> Sloth, idleness, neglect, and obstinacy were in all they did. Neither shame nor fear restrained them. If he wished the column to advance more rapidly they deliberately retarded their pace; if he stood by to encourage their work, they would all relax the industry they had manifested of their own accord. In his presence they sunk their gaze; as he passed by they cursed him under their breath...[405]

[403] Livy 2.43.7. The historian is heavy with the condemnation here, stating that the army's actions '*rem publicum...prodebat.*'
[404] Livy 2.59.1 Livy draws a direct comparison.
[405] Livy 2.58.7-8 Ogilvie: 'the troops were prepared to work on their own but resented Appius' encouragement.' (1965: 384)

Such conduct is remarkable and worth analysing. This was a more complicated and targeted tactic than mutiny, the soldiers went to great lengths to demonstrate to their commander that they did not consider him to be in command. Vitally, as was common in such displays of disorder, Livy demonstrates that the soldiers had not abandoned their status as soldiers. As he says, they continued with the labours of campaign when the consul was not present. That the army had a personal issue with their commander was emphasised by the experience of Claudius' colleague, Quinctius, who, partly due to his disposition and partly due to efforts to avoid the sort of trouble afflicting the other army, cultivated an atmosphere of cooperation. Livy remarks that Quinctius army was marked by '*tanta concordia*'.[406]

Appius Claudius' problems, like much in the 5th century, come out of the larger context of hostility between the Plebs and the senate. In this struggle Appius Claudius positioned himself as one of the plebeian order's fiercest enemies.[407] However, the open disorder originated from within the army and was provoked by concerns over Appius Claudius' strictness. Livy portrays the consul as a martinet who allows his personal antipathy towards the plebeian soldiers under his command to grow into outright brutality. Though the historian does not provide examples of Claudius' behaviour in the early stages of the campaign, the language he uses makes it clear that the consul was commanding with a degree of violence unusual in Roman armies: '*haec ira indignatioque ferocem animum ad vexandum saevo imperio exercitum*

[406] Livy 2.60.2
[407] Livy 2.58.5

*stimulabat*.' 'His wrath and indignation at this thought drove his fierce spirit to torment the army with a savage exercise of authority.'[408] In attempting to regain control Claudius attempted '*omnes auctoritates.'*[409]

Excessive severity on the part of Roman generals is unusual in Livy's account of republic and usually provokes resistance from the men.[410] Just quite how bad the treatment was is indicated by Livy's comment that Appius Claudius' aggression was encouraged by the fact that soldiers in the field were not protected by the plebeian tribunes, suggesting that had Claudius behaved within the city as he did on campaign, the tribunes would have intervened.[411] The issue at hand appears to have been the exact reach of the consul's *imperium*.[412] The men appear to have felt that their general was exercising it too freely and their actions essentially denied him control. Nor do the soldiers and centurions appear to be the only ones who felt that way, when the army was besieged and still unwilling to follow orders, Claudius' tribunes and legates warned him not to force the issue.[413] It was only following a disastrous defeat that Claudius was able to cow his army and discipline them with his natural severity:

> advocataque contione invectus haud falso in proditorem exercitum militaris disciplinae, desertorem signorum, ubi signa, ubi arma essent

[408] Livy 2.58.6
[409] Livy 2.58.9
[410] Livy also presents Aemilius Paullus as an unusually severe commander and he consistently alienates his army during the campaigns in Macedonia (Livy 44-45). Livy portrays moderate and appropriate strictness, on the other hand, as effective and laudable (E.g. Cato's campaigns in Spain (Livy 34)
[411] Livy 2.58.4
[412] An issue still debated. For a summary of the differing scholarly positions see Richardson (1991:3-4)
[413] Livy 2.59.4-6 Quoted above

> singulos rogitans, inermes milites, signo amisso signiferos, ad hoc centuriones duplicariosque qui reliquerant ordines virgis caesos securi percussit; cetera multitudo sorte decimus quisque ad supplicium lecti.[414]
>
> Then he summoned an assembly and soundly berated them, not without reason, as an army which had been false to military discipline and had deserted its standards. Asking them all in turn where their arms and where their standards were, he caused the unarmed soldiers and the standard-bearers who had lost their standards, and in addition to these the centurions and the recipients of a double ration who had quitted their ranks, to be scourged with rods and beheaded; of the remaining number every tenth man was selected by lot for punishment.

That a general who could barely get his men to march at an appropriate pace was now able to inflict such brutal punishment without any resistance seems at first remarkable. However the way Appius Claudius went about punishing his army is illustrative. First to be punished were those who acted in breach of the way they were expected. Standard bearers were not supposed to lose their standards; centurions and men awarded for bravery were not supposed to be the first to flee. These men had not behaved as soldiers and as such did not have the status of soldiers. Further, with the campaign ended in defeat, the army had lost its primary weapon against its commander, the ability to refuse service. With their status as soldiers undermined by their actions they were unable to influence their commander and still beyond the protection of the tribunes. Claudius' army was at his mercy. Even so, the consul's brutal reassertion of his authority should not obscure the fact that the army's

[414] Livy 2.59.9-11 This account represents the only decimation present in Livy's narrative, and is almost certainly ahistorical, that the general responsible was an Appius Claudius is also relevant, as the family are repeat offenders when it comes to undermining the status of their soldiers. For the historical problems with the account see Goldberg (2016:143).

resistance was effective and the principle demand of the army – that they withdraw from Volscian territory – had been met.

There was a similar display of intransigence from the armies under the decemvirs. Once again they not only refused to fight but actively courted defeat. Two Roman armies, one campaigning against the Aequi and the other against the Sabines were defeated in battle due to the actions of the soldiers themselves. Livy makes it clear that these defeats were both politically motivated and intentional:

> illa modo in ducibus culpa quod ut odio essent ciuibus fecerant: alia omnis penes milites noxia erat, qui ne quid ductu atque auspicio decemuirorum prospere usquam gereretur uinci se per suum atque illorum dedecus patiebantur.[415]
>
> The only fault of the generals was that they had made the citizens detest them; the rest of the blame belonged to the soldiers, who, that nothing might anywhere prosper under the command and auspices of the decemvirs, permitted themselves to be beaten, to their own disgrace and that of their commanders.

Both armies continued this behaviour off the battlefield. One army retreated to its camp and refused to offer battle to the victorious Sabines; the other army went further, abandoning its camp to the enemy and retreating to the allied city of Tusculum.[416] These were extraordinary actions, taken at great risk not only to the men themselves but to Rome. With both Roman armies refusing to fight, the senate was forced to arm the general populace in case either the Sabines or the Aequi moved on the city. As remarkable as the risk taken by the armies in 449 was the fact that, unlike in 471, it went unpunished. The reason

[415] Livy 3.42.2
[416] Livy 3.42.4-5

for this is unclear, though it is worth noting that these mutinies occurred during the general period of unrest that preceded the collapse of the decemvirs. Appius Claudius and his colleague had learned the same lesson the army tried to teach his father, that their *imperium* only existed when the soldiers that make up the army recognised it. Nor were the two armies alone, instead they were part of the general resistance to the decemvirs that was to soon come to a head and lead to their ousting that same year. It is these two armies that lead the second secession.

One issue that that will become a larger part of Livy's later narrative that is comparatively rare in his account of the 5th century is disputes over loot. Perhaps part of the issue here is that there simply is not much plunder available in the wars of the 5th century. *Praeda* is referred to regularly, but not usually in much detail. Rather it is mentioned in passing during Livy's formulaic accounts of war declared, armies sent over the frontier, cities taken, plunder distributed, peace arranged, and the armies withdrawn. When it is described in any detail it is usually because something of interest has prompted the discussion, such as the unusual amount taken from the Aequi, or the mishandling of the booty by command.[417] Other hints in Livy's narrative suggest that the amount of plunder taken from the frequent wars in the republic's first century was not particularly large. Livy makes references to old and decorated soldiers but there is never any sense that they have profited from their military service.

[417] Livy 2.60.2; 2.42.1; 4.49

In his account of the plunder taken at the siege of Veii Livy emphasises its great amount by informing the reader that the loot taken was greater than all the loot won in the republic's previous wars.[418] Even if the statement is exaggerated, taken with earlier statements about particularly profitable wars, such as the war with the Aequi in 471, it suggests that the majority of wars fought by Rome in before Veii were not particularly profitable.[419] Given Rome's modest territory and relatively small army of the 5th century, this likely reflects the historical reality of the first hundred years of the republic.[420] Indeed, the vast majority of the campaigns fought against the Volsci and Aequi are described more akin to raiding parties than decisive military engagements.[421] This interpretation is supported by the introduction of the *stipendium* during the siege of Veii. The general sense in Livy's account is that warfare is not merely not profitable for the common soldier but when fought over extended period also represents a financial burden for those under the standards.

Yet even here there are disputes between the men and their commanders over loot. As mentioned above, the trouble between Quintus Fabius and his men grew partly from his cousin's handling of *praeda. Praeda* is present in many of the accounts of the wars fought in books two through four. Livy makes many references to the plunder taken from enemy cities and camps.[422] He even on occasion explicitly describes a large amount of loot given

[418] Livy 5.20.1
[419] Livy 2.60.2
[420] Drummond (1990: 165)
[421] Cornell (1990: 291)
[422] E.g. Livy 2.24.4; 2.31.7; 3.8.11 &c.

to the army, as happens in a war against the Aequi.[423] Rare though they are, the issues over loot in the first pentad clarify something that will become a running issue when Roman war becomes more profitable. Trouble over *praeda* arises not necessarily from the greed of the soldiers and their desire for loot, but rather from concern about their status and a sense that they, as the manifestation of the plebeian contribution to war, are benefitting from their own campaigns.

Livy also plays down the mercenary motivations of 5th-century soldiers when he recounts the lynching of the consular tribune Postumius. In Livy's account Postumius' mishandling of the booty leads to his prosecution. During the trial he made certain threatening and disparaging remarks that incensed his men. When he returned to camp he was stoned to death by his furious soldiers.[424] Livy judges this version more believable than an alternative account of the mutiny; that it sprang out of the army's anger at the lack of loot available once the city was taken.[425] The alternate story would make the army's murder of their commander a purely mercenary step, one out of character with Livy's perception of the Roman army.[426] Instead, his account focusses on men infuriated not by their commander absconding with their share of the loot, but by his disparagement of their status and threats he has made in public. This fits it into the pattern first established in the first book, where Tarquin alienates

[423] Livy 2.60.2
[424] Livy 4.49-50
[425] Livy 4.49.10
[426] Ogilvie notes that Livy's preferred account is 'sharply political' (1965: 610)

his men by forcing them to do manual labour. In Livy Roman soldiers are not often given to tolerating threats to their status as soldiers. This event is also worth mentioning because it provides the only example in Livy's history of centurions actively resisting the men during a mutiny.[427]

This interplay between status as soldiers and share of the spoils is at the heart of one of the few moments in Livy's history when soldiers do not protest when stripped of their loot. When the dictator Cinncinatus was unhappy with the performance of the part of the army commanded by Lucius Minutius against the Aequi, he refused to allow any share of the plunder to go to the consul's men, reserving it all for his own army.[428] However, Livy remarks that not only did the army not complain when they were denied plunder, they voted to give a gold crown to the dictator and '*proficiscentem eum patronum salutaverit*.' 'saluted him as a patron when they marched out.'[429] During that campaign the army of Minutius had found itself trapped in camp by the enemy and Rome was forced to dispatch a relief army. The consul's men, cowering in the camp, had not behaved as soldiers and were not deserving of a share of the *praeda*, something they appear to have recognised. This is the same dynamic that led to the decimation of 471, though both the perceived failures of the soldiers and the subsequent punishment were hardly as sever. Just as the soldiers of Appius Claudius had not behaved as soldiers, neither had those of Minutius. By abandoning their standards and fleeing, Appius Claudius' men

[427] Livy 4.50.5
[428] Livy 3.29.2
[429] Livy 3.29.3

had temporarily lost their status as soldiers and the protection it warranted. In a similar way, those men who spent the war against the Aequi in camp suffered a loss of status and therefore any claim to loot taken in battle.

The sense that soldiers on campaign earned a share of the profits is also present in the mutiny faced by Caeso Fabius. There the trouble came to a head when Fabius diverted the proceeds of a campaign entirely into the treasury. This did not just strip his soldiers of the share of the profit that they felt they had earned, but defrauded the entire plebeian class by diverting it to the treasury and placing it entirely at the disposal of the senate. While the modest proceeds of Rome's 5th-century wars mean that there was little opportunity for a dispute over loot, there was occasional trouble. Importantly, however, the trouble did not arise merely out of mercenary motivations. Instead, much like the other issues that prompt protest in Livy's narrative the trouble arose out of concerns that the soldier's status were not being recognised.

Livy's first pentad is largely focussed on the struggle of the orders and the changing political situation of the 5th century. As a result, the primary political activity of the plebs occurs in the city, as they resist the dominion of the *patres* and through the secessions and resistance to the *dilectus* are able to wring concessions from the senate. However, as the organised and politically active manifestation of the plebs, when the army is on campaign it retains the same political engagement and actively agitates for its interests. In effect the plebeian class brings its political struggle with it on campaign: the army's concerns on campaign, mirror those in the city. The soldiers are

resistant to domineering generals, much as the plebs clash with the more authoritarian members of the senate. The plebs are determined that they receive some benefit from the state, whether domestically or militarily. Plebeian soldiers even expect to have some influence in the decision-making process, agitating for a change of tactics when they feel their generals are pursuing the war incorrectly.

The internal politicking that characterises much of books two through five of Livy's history fades into the background as the narrative focus shifts to Rome's early wars of Italian conquest. This has the effect of making the urban plebs appear increasingly as passive supporters of the senate's actions. When there is trouble between the senate and the people, the circumstances are usually extraordinary, such as the demands to ransom the prisoners of Cannae or the Bacchanalian affair. If Roman *milites gregarii* and centurions are taken as representative of the plebs as a whole, however, the situation appears very different. The tension between plebs and *patres* that characterised the early republic remains throughout the surviving books of Livy's account, in the guise of plebeian troops and aristocratic officers. The plebs remained politically engaged, careful of their status and jealous of their rights and privileges. Concordia on campaign was always at risk of breaking down through the actions of autocratic commanders or recalcitrant soldiers. The following sections will examine the period following the siege of Veii, the war with Hannibal, and the period of Roman expansion to demonstrate both that plebeian military identity remained constant, and that aspects of this identity

meant that cooperation between the men and their officers, between the plebs and the *patres*, was always under pressure.

## From the Siege of Veii to 292

### The Prospect of Loot and Soldiers' Concern about Their Status.

The siege of Veii marks a turning point in Livy's narrative of the early republic. We have already noticed that the account of the ten year siege contains two changes to the experience of the Roman soldier. First, the extended duration of the war lead to the introduction of the *stipendium* in 406.[430] Second, the great amount of plunder and territory won with the fall of the city made the war with Veii the first truly profitable war Rome had fought.[431] The siege of Veii and the sack of Rome later in the same book also mark a shift in Livy's narrative. Internal disorder and politicking gradually disappears from the work, as it increasingly focusses on Rome's wars against other Italian states. These changes, however, have little influence on the behaviour of Roman soldiers. Plebeian military identity remains remarkably consistent throughout the period.

Both Livy and Diodorus Siculus identify the siege of Veii as the point at which the Roman government began to compensate their soldiers for the costs of military service.[432] The protracted nature of the siege perhaps lead to an effort to defray the expenses of those serving and, importantly, the purpose of the payment was to cover the cost of service, not to recast the relation

[430] Livy 4.59
[431] Livy 5.20.1
[432] Diod. Sic. 14.16.5; Livy 4.59-60

between the republic and the soldier as that of paymaster and mercenary.[433] Both Livy and Diodorus Siculus are careful to make this explicit. Livy states that '*stipendium miles de publico acciperet, cum ante id tempus de suo quisque functus eo munere esset*.'[434] 'the soldiers should be paid from the public treasury, whereas till then every man had served at his own costs.' The historicity of the institution of the *stipendium* need not concern us here, but in Livy's narrative the *stipendium* marks a shift towards wars fought beyond Latium, particularly against the Gauls and the Samnites.[435] However, political concerns and tension between the *plebs* and the *patres* continues into Livy's second pentad.

In Livy's account, however, pay appears to have been seen as the norm after c. 406, and political wrangling over the raising of taxes needed to pay the troops became another point of contention between the tribunes and the senate. Indeed, Livy's narrative has the tribunes alone sceptical of the proposal and the senate's offer to pay the men is otherwise universally popular. Even the tribunes' concerns about the measure are based on the source of the money raised to pay the men, not the concept of military pay itself.[436] However, the introduction of the *stipendium* changed little in the way plebeian soldiers approached war. As we have seen, Roman soldiers in Livy's account were resistant to wars that offered little benefit to them, and actively opposed any military action that they saw as disadvantageous. In this context, it was

[433] Boren (1983: 432)
[434] Livy 4.59.11 Cf. Diod. Sic. 14.16.5
[435] On the introduction of the *stipendium*, see Rich (2007: 18), Drummond (1990: 125), Oakley (1997: 630-632), Gabba (1977: 24), and Gatti (1970).
[436] Livy 4.60.4

inevitable that in extended campaigns some actions needed to be taken to limit the burden of military service on the soldiers. In the previous century, it was the financial instability caused by campaigning that lead finally to many Romans falling into debt-bondage.

According to Livy the capture of Veii introduced a new problem to the economic balance of the Roman state. As victory approached the Roman commander, Camillus, recognised that the loot from the sacked city would be unprecedented: '*urbem opulentissimam capi, tantumque praedae fore quantum non omnibus in unum conlatis ante bellis fuisset*...'[437] 'a city of great wealth was on the point of being taken, with booty more than if all previous wars had been put together.' For the first time Rome was on the verge of conquering a truly wealthy people. The war had so tested Rome's resources that it had required the levying of a tax and the compensation for the costs borne by its soldiers, but it was about to become a profitable venture. Camillus was faced with a difficult question: who would profit from the war? He referred the question to the senate. The senate debated two options, that any citizen who wished could go to Veii and take part in the sack or that the booty be used to pay the *stipendia* of the soldiers who took part in the siege, transmitting the profits directly to the soldiers who had fought at Veii and then indirectly to the remaining citizens by the suspension of the *tributum*.[438] The senate decided in

[437] Livy 5.20.1
[438] Livy 5.20.4-7

favour of the first plan and granted the right of plunder to any citizen willing to make the trip.

Arguing against this, however, Appius Claudius suggested that if the senate used the loot to pay the soldiers, '*non avidas in direptiones manus otiosorum urbanorum praerepturas fortium bellatorum praemia esse*,'[439] 'the hands of urban layabouts, grasping for plunder, would not snatch away the prizes due to brave warriors.' While the senate worries about who amongst the plebs will have a share of the spoils, it is telling that there is no indication that the soldiers at Veii had any objection to sharing the loot with the remaining plebs – urban layabouts or not. The soldiers fight bravely and successfully when the city is stormed and the soldiers and visiting plebs all cheerfully scour anything of worth from the city.[440] Indeed, what little trouble there is over the division of *praeda* concerns Camillus' choice to divert the proceeds of the sale of slaves directly to the treasury, which angers the plebs as a whole.[441] The senate, and in particular Camillus and Appius Claudius misunderstood what was likely to anger the soldiers. They do not mind sharing their loot with fellow plebeians, but they resent aristocratic efforts to divert *praeda* they feel is theirs towards the treasury.

From 396 forwards the appropriate division of spoils became a more regular bone of contention between Roman soldiers and their commanders. Trouble began within the decade after the capture of Cortuosa and

[439] Livy 5.20.6
[440] Livy 5.21.10-15
[441] Livy 5.22.1

Contenebra in 388. When the consular tribunes were slow to claim the loot, the men of the army took the initiative and seized the loot for themselves.[442] That the soldiers were willing to pre-empt and then openly defy their chief magistrates demonstrates what an issue the division of loot had become and how determined the soldiers were to see a portion of the profits of warfare go not only to the senate.

In Livy's narrative of the wars following the fall of Veii and the sack of Rome, some Roman commanders begin to show an understanding of the importance of ensuring that their men feel that they have received an acceptable degree of benefit from their campaigns. The consul Marcius in 357 gathered extensive loot devastating the lands of Privernum. '*ad copiam rerum addidit munificentiam, quod nihil in publicum secernendo augenti rem privatam militi favit*.' 'This abundance he administered bountifully, and sequestering nothing to the public treasury, encouraged the men to augment their private fortunes.'[443] That war, a punitive expedition against the rebellious Falsci, resulted in the profit only of the men on campaign and brought nothing back to the senate. A plebeian himself, Marcius tapped into the long held concern of the soldiers that war not be fought at the expense of the plebeians for the sole benefit of the aristocracy. Money kept from the troops would either be retained by the general as *manubiae*, for the general to use to

[442] Livy 6.4.11
[443] Livy 7.16 Oakley: 'one would expect a plebeian general to have been generous to his troops.' (1998: 179)

enhance his own prestige, or it would be directed into the *aerarium*, under the control of the senate.[444]

Such concerns over being properly rewarded for their service could sometimes flare into serious breaches of discipline. The mutiny of 342, which came very close to open civil war between a Roman army and the government, was provoked by dissatisfaction over who was receiving the benefits of Roman military action, and that dissatisfaction lead to a dangerous collapse of discipline.[445] Here the issue was not that the senate was reaping the benefits of Roman war. Instead, the mutineers saw the profits of their fighting going to the Campanians.

More canny commanders could even motivate their men by ensuring them that they would see to it that they received the lion's share of the *praeda* taken during a war. Campaigning against the Samnites, the consul Junius Bubulcus spurred his men on with an extraordinary declaration:

> consul ad ancipitem maxime pugnam aduectus desilit ex equo et Iouem Martemque atque alios testatur deos se nullam suam gloriam inde sed praedam militi quaerentem in eum locum deuenisse neque in se aliud quam nimiam ditandi ex hoste militis curam reprehendi posse...
>
> The consul, riding up to the place where the fighting was most critical, leaped down from his horse, and called on Jupiter and Mars and the other gods to witness that he had come there seeking no glory for himself, but only booty for his soldiers: his sole fault, he said, was a too great desire to enrich his men...[446]

[444] Oakley (1998: 409)
[445] Livy 7.38-42 Discussed at length below.
[446] Livy 9.31.10-11

Such shameless pandering was successful. By reminding his men of the great loot victory would bring and by emphasising that he is putting the interests of the soldiers ahead of his own, Bubulcus spurred his men on to victory. Publius Decius also frames war with Samnites as a venture to increase the fortunes of the men under his command.[447] The enthusiasm with which the men under the command of these two men reacted to their generals' words demonstrate that the consuls well understand how important it was to the soldiers that they feel they have been adequately rewarded. Even when commanders do not explicitly use the prospect of loot to spur their men on, those who court the support of the plebeian soldiers are careful to ensure that their men feel that they have benefitted from their service. Livy is careful to note when generals gave captured towns over to the men to sack.[448]

However, such promises had to be honoured if a general was to retain the support of his men. Livy makes this clear in the varying fortunes of the consuls Carvilius and Papirius. In a consilium held in 293 following the defeat of the Samnite army the two men decided to extend the war in order to attack enemy cities '*quarum per excidia militem locupletare praeda et hostem pro aris ac focis dimicantem conficere possent.*' 'by destroying which they would be able to enrich their troops with booty and crush their enemies, who would fight for their altars and their hearths.'[449] It is telling that the consuls rate the rewarding of their soldiers as equally or even more important that final victory

[447] Livy 10.17.5-7
[448] E.g. Livy 10.12; 10.20; 10.44
[449] Livy 10.44.8

against the Samnites. The danger of failing to provide for your troops was to suffer political blowback in Rome. Livy contrasts the reception of Papirius and Carvilius following their successful campaign. Papirius provoked public anger by reneging on his promise to his men and donating the proceeds from his war to the treasury. Insult was added to injury as, even as booty flowed into the treasury, a *tributum* with levied on the people to cover the cost of the *stipendium*.[450] Carvilius, on the other hand, diverted much of the accumulated plunder of his campaign to his men and the soldiers and people look on him with more favour than his colleague.[451] This favour comes with a direct political benefit, as it allowed him to prevent the prosecution of his legate.[452] The cases of Carvilius and Papirius represent a recurring issue of the proportion of profit that plebeian soldiers felt they were due from a campaign. Clearly one consul felt they were entitled to a greater proportion than the other. This represents a greater understanding of the plebeian military identity on the behalf of Carvilius – who is himself plebeian – while the patrician Papirius favours his troops.

As Rome began to fight more profitable wars further afield, the division of the profits of those wars became an important aspect in the balance between the aristocratic officers and the plebeian soldiers. However, the influx of money did not have a significant effect on the plebeian military identity, instead, *praeda* became yet another aspect of the soldiers' long held

[450] Livy 10.46.5-7 The reason for the consul's refusal to pay a donative and levy *tributum* is unclear. Oakley suggests it is due to his having already granted the loot from Saepinum (2005: 448).
[451] Livy 10.46.15
[452] Livy 10.46.16

expectations that they would benefit from their military service. Much of the wrangling over reward was also part of the larger struggle between plebs and *patres*, as when money was diverted away from the soldiers, the primary beneficiary was usually the senate-controlled treasury.

**Continuity**

Though the narrative shift from domestic affairs to foreign wars leads to an increased emphasis on the division of loot and a decrease in the army's presence in internal political struggles, the portrayal of soldiers in Livy's narrative remains remarkably consistent. They retain their political sensibilities. The men are clear that they retain the rights of Roman citizens. Their military identity also remains consistent. There is the same emphasis on shared experience and official recognition, while Roman soldiers retain their distinct rough sense of humour. These factors also ensure that the same tension exists within the Roman army, and Roman soldiers are quick to communicate to their generals when they feel their interests are not being looked after or they feel their rights or status have been challenged.

Though it gradually decreased in prominence, domestic political wrangling does not immediately vanish following Veii. In the first few decades after the sack, the army continued to serve as the power-base of the tribunate. Tribunes continued to deploy resistance to the *dilectus* as a tool to force concessions from the senate. However, as before, this required the cooperation of the plebeian sections of the army to be effective. In 380 the

tribunes blocked the levy to attempt to force concessions over debts.[453] A reform of the laws concerning debtors was clearly in the interests of the army as many soldiers, even those who had served with distinction, were suffering over debts owed to the *patres*. Livy describes one centurion, lead away by his creditor as '*nobilem militaribus factis*'.[454] Indeed, Livy explicitly describes the resistance to the levy in 380 as a cooperative effort: '*nam neque duci addictos tribuni sinebant neque iuniores nomina dabant*.' 'for the tribunes would not allow those who had been bound over to be led away, nor would the young men give in their names.'[455] However, in this case the effort fails as a direct threat to the city prompts the soldiers to abandon solidarity with the tribunes and enlist to fight the enemy.[456]

The plebeian military identity also remains clear and consistent throughout the second half of Livy's first decade. The cultural weight of long service is present in the description of the centurion freed from debt by Manlius Capitolinus. The man incites the crowd by bearing his scars and listing the campaigns he had served in.[457] More than any other patrician, Manlius appears able to convincingly make use of the social capital of a plebeian soldier. In his trial he takes steps to claim the status of a plebeian soldier:

> ad haec decora quoque belli non commemorasse tantum sed protulisse etiam conspicienda, spolia hostium caesorum ad triginta, dona imperatorum ad quadraginta, in quibus insignes duas murales coronas,

[453] Livy 6.27.6-8
[454] Livy 6.14.3
[455] Livy 6.27.10
[456] Livy 6.28.2-3 Kraus rightly points out that while the tribunes complaints match the general state of affairs, they are not correct in the specific context of 380 (1994: 246).
[457] Livy 6.14.6

> civicas octo; ad hoc servatos ex hostibus cives inter quos C. Servilium magistrum equitum absentem nominatum; et cum ea quoque quae bello gesta essent pro fastigio rerum oratione etiam magnifica, facta dictis aequando, memorasset, nudasse pectus insigne cicatricibus bello acceptis...[458]
>
> besides this the military distinctions which he not only enumerated but produced for all to see, comprised the spoils of thirty enemies whom he had slain, and some forty decorations from his generals, amongst which were conspicuous two mural and eight civic crowns; that he told, besides, of citizens saved from the enemy, and among these named Gaius Servilius, the master of the horse, who was not present. And after rehearsing his services in war, in a speech as magnificent as the height of his achievements and equalling his deeds with its words, he is said to have bared his breast, marked with the scars of battle...

While his success was largely due to the reminder that the Capitol served to his deeds, his convincing reframing of his military career in the form of a plebeian soldier may also have been part of his success. Certainly, Livy does not have him make a similar speech the following day at the Peteline Wood.[459] The centurion chosen to represent the mutinous army of to the dictator Sulpicius. Sextus Tullius, Livy tells us he was chosen because he had served seven times as first centurion and that he was the most decorated infantryman in the army.[460]

The men also retain their rough sense of humour and there are frequent references to the *iocus militaris*.[461] These are predominantly evident in the verses chanted by soldiers during the triumph. Though a ritual activity, they appear to have been created by the men themselves; the praise heaped

[458] Livy 6.20.7-9
[459] Livy 6.20.11
[460] Livy 9.13.1
[461] E.g. Livy 7.10.13; 7.17.5; 7.38.3; 10.30.9; 10.10.13 &c.

on, for example, Camillus and Manlius Torquatus at their triumphs appears to have originated from within the ranks.[462] The remark that the men marching in Valerius' triumph were paying too much praise to his colleague would also suggest that the trimphatores had little control over the content of the jokes themselves. Such joking also stands in stark contrast with the dour, humourless demeanours of the soldiers' aristocratic commanders.

Beyond the triumph, however, Livy portrays joking as playing an important part in the soldier's interaction with his *commilitones*. Following a poor performance in battle against the Samnites, the soldiers were shamed into fighting by their officers. Following the victory they returned to camp carrying their loot and '*militaribus iocis cum apparatum hostium tum suum increpantes pavorem*' 'making soldiers' jokes about the enemy's preparations and mocking their own fright.'[463] Joking was not simply a reaction to the release of tension; when removing the statue of Juno from the temple at Veii one of the soldiers jokingly asked the Goddess if she wanted to go to Rome.[464] When trapped at the Caudine Forks by the Samnites, the men attempted to raise morale by grimly joking amongst themselves about their dire situation.[465]

As in the 5th century, the soldiers' concern for their interests, rights and status continue to introduce tension in the hierarchy of the army. At several points in books Six through Ten this tension spills out into full disobedience. The first such case is in 358. When the dictator Sulpicius refused

[462] Livy 5.49.7; 7.10.13
[463] Livy 7.17.5
[464] Livy 5.22.5
[465] Livy 9.2

to attack an army of Gauls his decision was made on purely tactical grounds. However, the way he commanded lead to the alienation of his army which grew into the same disorder suffered by Fabius and Appius Claudius a century earlier. Angered by his delaying tactics and by the unilateral way the dictator was exerting his *imperium*, his army became mutinous. The army's resistance to Sulpicius appears to grow out of two sources. First, the dictator was attempting to maintain order through threats of '*gravis poena*'.[466] Second, by refusing to let them fight and exposing them to the insults of the Gauls Sulpicius was undermining their identities as soldiers. Finally, by keeping them in camp while refusing to offer battle the dictator is rendering their military service pointless. Eventually they elected to send the centurion Sextus Tullius to communicate their dissatisfaction to the dictator.

Livy give Tullius a public speech which stresses two of the army's grievances. The emphasis on official recognition is also one of the problems with the army under Sulpicius. First, that the army feels humiliated by their lack of action, as they see it as evidence that the dictator does not trust in their ability to defeat the Gauls and because the enemy offer them regular insults.[467] The majority of Tullius' speech is devoted to establishing the status of the men in the army as soldiers and warning the dictator that his actions are undermining their status. He begins his speech by describing the state of the army: '*condemnatum se uniuersus exercitus a te ignauiae ratus et prope*

[466] Livy 7.13.12
[467] Livy 7.13.3-7

*ignominiae causa destitutum sine armis...*' 'The entire army, deeming itself condemned in your mind for cowardice and almost deprived of its arms by way of humiliation...'[468] Later, he describes the effect that the taunting of the Gauls has on the morale of the army: '*nos et hostes haud secus quam feminas abditos intra uallum omnibus contumeliis eludunt*...' 'the enemy flout us with every species of insult, as though we were women cowering behind our rampart...'[469] Tullius repeatedly stresses that the dictator is not treating his men as he should treat Roman soldiers: '*tu imperator noster—quod aegrius patimur—exercitum tuum sine animis, sine armis, sine manibus iudicas esse*' 'you, our general —a thing far harder to bear —regard us as an army without spirit, without swords, and without hands'.[470] Towards the end of the speech Tullius offers the general a remarkable rebuke: '*milites nos esse non seruos uestros...*' 'we are your soldiers, not your slaves...'[471] The centurion makes the same point in several ways – an army without weapons is not an army; soldiers hiding behind walls are more like women than soldiers; a soldier without weapons or hands is a poor sort of soldier; the dictator is treating the men like slaves. All of these stress that Sulpicius' tactics are serious challenges to the men's status.

Another issue seems to be that unless they are going to fight they may as well go home. Present in Tullius' speech is the old resistance that Roman soldiers have to service without a purpose. To make his point he even risks a

[468] Livy 7.13.3
[469] Livy 7.13.6
[470] Livy 7.13.6
[471] Livy 7.13.9

degree of sarcasm with the dictator: '*si nihil armis opus sit, otium Romae potius quam in castris acturos*.' 'if there be no occasion for our arms, we had rather spend our leisure in Rome than in a camp.'[472] Tullius public speech is largely an entreaty to the general's sense of honour and fairness. In a private conversation after the public meeting, the centurion is much more frank with his commander. The stark nature of the language makes the statement worth quoting in full:

> illi quoque tamen uidendum magno opere esse ut exercitum in potestate haberet; differri non posse adeo concitatos animos; ipsos sibi locum ac tempus pugnandi sumpturos, si ab imperatore non detur.[473]
>
> He must none the less be very wary himself, to keep the army in hand; postponement would not do, where feelings were so exasperated; the men would choose for themselves a time and place for fighting, if their general did not provide them.

Tullius is careful to distance himself from the army's will – he prefaces his remarks by insisting that he himself will not act without the backing of the dictator – but the threat is clear. The army does not see Sulpicius' tactics as being to their favour. Their interests are not served by sitting in the camp waiting for the enemy army to disintegrate. The feel that their status as soldiers is being challenged by the Gallic taunting. The men wish to attack or withdraw to Rome and they are willing to defy their commander to do so. Even as Tullius distances himself from the sentiment, the message from the army to the dictator is clear. Much like Appius Claudius and the Decemvirs, Sulpicius is

[472] Livy 7.13.9 Oakley has noted that the language of Tullius' speech echoes the struggle of the orders (1998:163).
[473] Livy 7.14.3

being made to understand that his *imperium* is contingent on the consent of his troops.

The soldiers' preoccupation with their interests, status, and rights is also the cause of the serious mutiny of 342.[474] Established in winter camp in Campania, the army chafes at the sight of the rewards of their campaign going to foreigners:

> cur autem potius Campani agrum Italiae uberrimum, dignam agro urbem, qui nec se nec sua tutari possent, quam victor exercitus haberet qui suo sudore ac sanguine inde Samnites depulisset?[475]
>
> Besides, why should the most fertile land in Italy, and a city worthy of the land, belong to the Campanians, who were incapable of defending either themselves or their possessions? Why, rather, should it not belong to the conquering army, which had toiled and bled to drive the Samnites out of it?

The trouble began as the soldiers see others benefiting from their military service while they faced penury back in Rome, a complaint of the plebeian soldier that dated back at least as far as the trouble over *nexum* in the early 5th century.[476]

However, once the plot to take Campania by force had been discovered and the ringleaders removed from the army the men begin to worry about punishment.[477] Importantly, however, because of the underhanded way their consul has handled the suppression – by removing troublemakers on a

[474] This is a difficult event to pin down, with even Livy offering two conflicting accounts. For the historicity and other accounts see Oakley (1998: 361-364). See also particularly Gabba's suggestion that it provides insight into the social status of early republican soldiers (1976: 148-149).
[475] Livy 7.38.6
[476] Oakley (1998: 364)
[477] Livy 7.39.1-4

pretext– the punishment they fear is not the standard application of military justice, not even in the brutal form employed by Appius Claudius. Rather they suspect their commander is up to something more sinister: '*iam quaestiones, iam indicia, iam occulta singulorum supplicia impotensque et crudele consulum ac patrum in se regnum passuros*.' 'now they would have to suffer trials, discoveries, the secret punishments of individuals, and the tyrannical and cruel despotism of the consuls and the senate.'[478] The soldiers also seemed to be motivated over concerns about their status. When Marcius Rutilus begins sending individuals implicated in the conspiracy away from the army it is first greeted with happiness by the army. However, when they realised that those sent away are not re-joining the army, that they have lost their status as soldiers, the trouble begins.[479] It is this threat to their status as soldiers and citizens that pushed the mutineers to action graver than simply taking Campania for themselves. Instead they decided to march on Rome.

Though they operated in opposition to the state, they continued to behave as though they were a legitimate Roman army. The mutineers were determined to maintain their status as soldiers: '*nec quicquam ad iusti exercitus formam praeter ducem deerat*.' 'nothing was wanting to give it the form of a regular army except a general.' They kept their standards and organisation and even addressed their lack of commander by shanghaiing a patrician to serve as consul of their army.[480] The importance of their status as

[478] Livy 7.39.5
[479] Livy 7.40.2-3
[480] Livy 7.40.9-16

soldiers was also made clear in the resolution of the trouble. When the mutinous army encounters the force the senate had scrambled together to stop them, it was their appearance as Roman soldiers that reminded the mutineers of their loyalties: '*ubi primum in conspectum ventum est et arma signaque agnovere, extemplo omnibus memoria patriae iras permulsit*.' 'As soon as they came into view and recognised the arms and standards, the thought of their country instantly calmed the passions of them all.'[481] In his speech to the mutineers, Valerius Corvus was careful to reassure the men of their status as soldiers, addressing them repeatedly as '*milites'* and as '*exercitus Romanus*'.[482] The ersatz consul Titus Quinctius also addressed the mutineers as soldiers when he urged them to abandon their plans.[483] These efforts were successful. Reminded of their status as citizens and reassured that their status as soldiers is recognised by authority, the soldiers abandon their plans to march to Rome and attempt another secession. This also gives evidence that Livy saw the soldiers of the republic as different from those of his own time, as unlike the armies of the 1st century, they cannot justify marching on the city.[484]

Following their humiliation at the Caudine forks, the Roman army was so desperate to avenge their humiliation that they regularly sparred with their commanders. Throughout the campaign the army behaved with a degree of

[481] Livy 7.40.1
[482] Livy 7.40.4-14
[483] Livy 7.40.15-19
[484] Oakley (1998: 365)

fury that the generals had trouble containing. When the men were recalled from sacking a Samnite camp they expressed great anger at having their chance at vengeance frustrated.[485] Even when the general and the army agreed on the goal – to give battle to the Samnites – the soldiers were so keen to fight that they deprived the consul Publilius of his ability to command. Before the battle the general's traditional exhortations were drowned out by the shouts of the men, clamouring for a chance to get to grips with the enemy.[486] Once the battle began they paid no attention to the plans of their commander and issued their own orders to the standard bearers.[487]

In each of the three major outbreaks of disorder in Books Six through Ten, the trouble arose from the soldiers understanding of their interests, status, and rights. Sulpicius' men came close to mutiny because they feel their status was under threat, and because they felt they were kept in service without purpose. The mutineers of 342 began plotting because they felt they are not benefiting from their service and once exposed they saw their status and rights threatened by the actions of their commanders. The army that survived the Caudine forks was frustrated by the restraint shown by their commander. In each case the soldiers were willing to ignore the authority of their commander in an effort to promote their interests and to protect their status. Sulpicius' army warned him that they would stop obeying him if they did not follow their advice, the mutineers of 342 rejected the authority of their

[485] Livy 9.10-13
[486] Livy 9.13.1
[487] Livy 9.13.2-3

general and replaced him with an aged puppet. Publilius was side-lined by his own men and given little chance to direct the battle.

The strong sense of shared identity is also alluded to in Livy's account by the attempts made by politicians to exploit that identity for their own purposes. Manlius Capitolinus directly connects his own service against the Gauls with the military service of the centurion he rescues and regularly makes references to his actions on the Capitoline. At his trial he mimics the actions of the centurion he had saved by showing his scars and listing his campaigns and military decorations. Though he is eventually condemned and executed, the intense popularity Manlius was able to cultivate during his attempted coup demonstrates that appeals to common identity were not futile.

Livy has the consul Valerius Corvinus appeal regularly to his soldiers as their former commander, though he never uses the term '*commilites*'. In his exhortation to his army during a battle with the Samnites he cast himself as a common soldier: '*nostrum inquit, peditum illud, milites, est opus*.' 'Soldiers,' he said, 'this is the job for we infantry.'[488] Similarly, in a speech to the mutineers of 342, he addressed them as soldiers and reminded them twice of the campaigns they had served together, as well as the care he took to ensure that he treated them fairly.[489]

Facing punishment from the dictator for disobeying orders, Quintus Fabius appeals to his men for their protection. Speaking of their shared

[488] Livy 7.33.9
[489] Livy 7.40.4-9

campaigns and dangers he convincingly paints himself as someone who has fought and laboured alongside the men.[490] He is so successful in his attempts that the whole army is raised almost in mutiny against the dictator when he attempted to arrest Fabius. The *triarii* scuffle with the lictors and even his own staff beg him to leave off his attempt before he loses complete control of his army.[491] The efforts of Manlius, Corvinus, and Fabius demonstrate that in the 4th century the soldier's shared identity remained strong, and that politicians were beginning to recognise the benefits of exploiting it. Just as a politician's career could be damaged by misunderstanding the soldiers, others could benefit from recognising the situation. An increased knowledge and manipulation of the soldier's identity is understandable in the context of the 4th century, as more plebeians reached positions of command.

While the siege of Veii and the sack of Rome are an important turning point in Livy's history and mark a shift in focus away from domestic towards foreign affairs, neither the events themselves nor the shift in narrative has any substantial effect on Livy's portrayal of the plebeian soldier. The men had always been determined that their service serve a purpose, be it defending the state or protecting Roman honour, and the importance of adequate partition of *praeda* was simply another aspect of that. Roman soldiers retained their strong perceptions of their status, rights and interests, and when their commanders were felt to be ignoring or acting in opposition to those, the army was willing to communicate its dissatisfaction to the general, up to and

[490] Livy 8.31
[491] Livy 8.32

including outright mutiny. Further, in their position as representatives of the plebeian order, the tension between the soldiers and their aristocratic officers demonstrates that while domestic struggles recede from Livy's narrative, the tension that he detected in the republican system remains present in the camp. The relationship between aristocrat and plebeian remained fraught and this would continue to be the case when Livy's narrative picks up again eight decades later at the beginning of the Hannibalic War.

**The War with Hannibal**

The most remarkable fact about the Livian soldier during the war with Hannibal is that despite the dire situation there is little change to their behaviour. The plebeian soldiers remain in a state of tension with their aristocratic commanders. The troops are still determined that they benefit from their service. They are still willing to agitate in their interest, remain politically engaged, and jealously guard against any threats to their status as soldiers. The shared identity that arose from service together is as evident throughout the war as it was before and after. Rather than being an exception, the Hannibalic War instead provides another canvas on which to study the Livian soldier as a constant in the historian's account of the republic.

The drastic situation Rome found itself in following the defeat at Cannae prompted an unusual demonstration of patriotism from parts of the Roman army: '*non eques, non centurio stipendium acciperet, mercennariumque increpantes vocarent qui accepisset*' 'no horseman or centurion would accept of his pay, and those who would accept it were

reproached with the appellation of mercenary men.'[492] This gesture, the voluntary refusal of pay and the general condemnation of those who do is particularly interesting in light of those who do not make the gesture. The *miles gregarius* of the Roman army appears to have exempted himself from the expectation. Indeed, throughout the war the senate is careful to ensure that it has the means to continue to pay its troops. In 216 the senate was forced to lean on its allies to raise enough money to keep paying the *stipendium* to the army and the fleet.[493] The following year the senate doubled the tax levied on the allies to provide enough money to continue to pay the troops, with the exception of the survivors of Cannae, who were to be punished by having their pay cut off.[494] Even after the centurions and knights made a point of refusing pay, the senate responded to shortages of recruits by passing a law guaranteeing that any underage recruits would receive the same level of pay as their older comrades.[495] Their right to the *stipendium*, and effort taken to ensure that soldiers were not impoverished by long campaigns, had become so ingrained in the soldier's mind, and so necessary in periods of long service, that recruits were unwilling to serve without payment even with the republic under threat. In the case of the Cannae survivors, being paid for service was a large enough part of the arrangement that a denial of that pay constituted punishment, not only because it denied money to serving soldiers, but because it challenged their status.

[492] Livy 24.18.15
[493] Livy 23.21.4-5
[494] Livy 23.31.1-2
[495] Livy 25.5.8-10

Roman soldiers remained determined to ensure that they received the benefits that they believed they deserved even at a risk to their own military effectiveness. A Roman expedition to the coast of Africa suffered a serious defeat because the men had abandoned their military duties to plunder the countryside.[496] Even the men in the field against Hannibal were preoccupied with the prospect of loot. Finding Hannibal's camp unguarded they pressured their commanders to permit them to plunder it. '*clamore orto a militibus, ni signum detur, sine ducibus ituros*' 'a shout arose from the soldiers that if the signal was not given they would go on without their generals.'[497] Giving in to the inevitable, the consul Varro gave the order and when he was convinced to revoke it by his colleague, he was unable to bring the men back under control. Only when they are offered proof that the Carthaginian was lying in wait for them was command able to get them to focus on the task at hand.[498] Once again, soldiers who felt their general is not acting for their benefit were willing to ignore his imperium and take action on their own initiative.

Even in the desperate early days of the war, Roman generals recognised that the importance of providing their men with the benefits of the campaign. While Rome was scrambling to raise the funds to pay its armies, all of the loot taken from the rebellious Hirpini was given over to the soldiers.[499] The same concession, excepting the proceeds from the sale of captives, was given to the

[496] Livy 22.38.3-5
[497] Livy 22.31.7
[498] Livy 22.31.10-12
[499] Livy 23.37.13

victorious troops at Beneventum the following year.[500] Later in the war, Scipio faced a mutiny at Sucro in Spain caused, in part, by the fact that the soldiers had neither steady pay nor the chance to extract booty from the territory they were occupying.[501] With Rome in such dire financial straits these concessions appear at first to be extraordinary. But given that throughout the republic one of the quickest ways for a commander to alienate his men was to divert *praeda* they felt they had earned into the control of the senate, it was perhaps sound tactical thinking.

Soldiers during Livy's account of the Second Punic War also carefully watched for any threats to their status as soldiers. This is perhaps most evident in the struggle Fabius Maximus had to keep his army under his control following the defeat at Lake Trasimeno. Watching Hannibal devastate Roman territory infuriated Fabius' entire army, and the men make it clear they would prefer to be led by the more aggressive Magister Equitum than the dictator himself.[502] The Magister Equitum exacerbated the situation by comparing the actions of Fabius' army unfavourably with those of earlier Roman armies.[503] He finishes by telling the men: '*stultitia est sedendo aut uotis debellari credere posse. arma capias oportet et descendas in aequum et uir cum uiro congrediaris*.' 'It is folly to think that a war can be won by sitting still or making

[500] Livy 24.16.5
[501] Livy 28.24.3; On the Sucro mutiny see Chrissanthos (1997) and Salmon (1986); The mutiny of 206 BC is a tremendously complicated event, but much of the detail is not relevant here and the event will be returned to in greater depth in the following chapters. To focus the argument, detailed discussion will be withheld until chapter 4.
[502] Livy 22.14.15
[503] Livy 22.14.3-14

vows; you must arm and go down into the field, and do battle, man to man!'[504] By comparing Fabius' delaying tactics to the daring and successful actions of preceding Roman armies Minucius is suggesting to the army that Fabius is not allowing his men to behave as a Roman army should, he is, in effect, undermining their status as soldiers. Livy records that this sentiment was popular within the army, though Fabius was able to retain control of his men. Similar sentiment is evident in the army during the lead up to the battle of Cannae where the unruly army is described by the historian as '*iratis et pugnare cupentibus*.'[505] Later, only the restraining influence of the consul Paullus stops the army from engaging Hannibal.[506] As we have seen with the men taunted by the Gauls under Sulpicius and those in the 5th century trapped in their camp and relieved by Cinncinatus, Roman soldiers who do not fight when battle is offered are worried that they are losing their status as soldiers.

As the social status of Livian plebeians was asserted through military service and the recognition of their actions on campaign, soldiers are sensitive to any perceived slights to their status. This sensitivity is evident in the domestic political sphere, where the accumulated social capital of military service gave plebeian men a right to speak. But it is also evident when soldiers felt that their status was threatened or had been diminished. On the battlefield concern over status could complicate the work of a cautious general. Such cautiousness could be seen as an indication that the ability or virtues of a

[504] Livy 22.14.14
[505] Livy 22.44.6
[506] Livy 22.45.4

soldier was not being recognised. When an enemy was able to offer insult to Roman soldiers – either by action or by words – the insult were particularly effective at provoking responses from soldiers who already felt that their status had been undermined by the uncertainty of their general. Roman soldiers did not agitate for aggressive tactics out of bravado or bloodlust, but because they were concerned about their status in the community.

Even if there were no enemies to taunt them, soldiers whose status was threatened or degraded for an extended period began to agitate for a change in policy from command. A singularly interesting example of soldiers concerned with their status is provided by the forces composed of the survivors of the battle of Cannae. The men, refused pay and banished to Sicily for the duration, elected amongst themselves a series of representatives to petition their commander. Granted an audience, they lay out a series of arguments in favour of allowing them to fight again.[507] Beyond the restitution of their *stipendium*, the men are keen to regain the chance to prove themselves as Roman soldiers, rather than the reduced status they seem to be under in Sicily. In the only serious breakdown of military discipline during the war, the mutineers in 206 also demonstrate concern that their military service should serve a purpose, much as their ancestors did centuries before: '*si bellum in prouincia esset, quid sese inter pacatos facere? si debellatum iam et confecta prouincia esset, cur in Italiam non reuehi?*' 'What they were doing among people who were at peace with them, if there was a war in the

[507] Livy 25.6

province? If the war was terminated and the province completely subdued, why were they not conveyed back into Italy?'[508] The mutiny was spurred as much by concerns that they were being kept in service without purpose as it was about the lack of financial recompense. But it was also caused by a lack of action within the province. Length of service was only one way that a republican soldier proved his status, and there would be little chance of earning official recognition, dividing loot, or even gaining scars in a peaceful theatre.

The self-identification of the soldier also remains unchanged during Livy's account of the Punic war. This is perhaps most clear in the case of the survivors of the battle of Cannae. In their speech petitioning the senate to pay their ransom, those captured by Hannibal identify themselves as soldiers twice, once drawing a connexion between themselves and the soldiers that escaped capture after the battle, those other survivors are *ciues* and *commilitiones*.[509] The survivors are painted as being of equal skill, and the prisoners argue that they differ only in motivation: '*sed illis et bonis ac fortibus militibus utemini et nobis etiam promptioribus pro patria*' 'Both in them and in us you shall have good and valiant soldiers; but we shall be even more eager than they to defend our country'.[510] The guarantee of quality service from both the prisoners and the survivors of Cannae is particularly clear when compared

[508] Livy 28.24.7
[509] Livy 22.59.10
[510] Livy 22.59.11

to their silence about the effectiveness of the troops being recruited from both poor citizens and slaves.[511]

The other group of survivors – those who evaded capture – also stress their status as soldiers when petitioning the senate to allow them to return to the fight. They place themselves in the tradition of the Roman soldier, invoking the examples of the troops captured by Pyrrhus and those humiliated at the Caudine Forks as precedents for Roman soldiers permitted to regain their honour by fighting against those who had defeated them.[512] The men's primary argument is that they are not being afforded the rights they feel Roman soldiers ought to have. They stress that they are not looking for special treatment or the removal of their shamed status, but simply the same chance to redeem themselves that earlier men had.[513] The soldierly nature of their request is clear: '*laborem et periculum petimus, ut uirorum, ut militum officio fungamur*.' 'We seek for labour and danger that we may discharge the duty of men and soldiers.'[514] The situation in Sicily mirrors that in Spain. Though the soldiers were being kept in military service, as they were not allowed to fight, they had no chance to perform any of the actions that would confirm their status. Even worse, with their *stipendia* withheld, their status is even more thoroughly undermined that that of the soldiers in Sucro.

The Hannibalic War also provides an example of how Livy understands the development of plebeian military identity. Worried about unit cohesion in

[511] Livy 22.59.11-12
[512] Livy 25.6.4-12
[513] Livy 25.6.18
[514] Livy 25.6.19

his army, which was composed mostly of slave volunteers and veterans, Sempronius Gracchus takes advantage of a lull in the fighting to drill his men, careful to warn his officers that there is to be no disparagement of men because of their social status. The men happily follow these instructions '*brevique tanta concordia coaluerant omnium animi ut prope in oblivionem veniret qua ex condicione quisque esset miles factus*' 'and in a short time the men had become so fused together that it was almost forgotten what condition of life each man had been in before he became a soldier.'[515] The implication is clear, through military training and service the men, are transformed from their earlier low status into experience soldiers – men who hold the status of a plebeian citizen. While the events in Spain and Sicily show men who felt that their status had been reduced by the conditions of their service, the men of these new legions were able to earn the status of citizen-soldiers – with their commander carefully ensuring that none of his officers behaved in a way that would challenge it. After their first fight, the soldiers began to exhibit the markers of the plebeian military identity. This transformation is evident in the narrative, as after their first victory Gracchus' army indulges in the rough humour of the Livian soldier.[516]

The soldiers in Livy's account of the Second Punic War are no less prone to quibble with their commanders, no matter how drastic the situation was. The men retain their determination that they benefit from service, their political sensibilities, their dedication to their own interests, and their fixation

[515] Livy 23.35.9
[516] Livy 24.16.14

on their status. Though outbreaks of serious disorder are less common than in the earlier period – though the dire situation and the relatively short period covered in the third decade may contribute to this instability – tension between the soldiers and command still emerges when soldiers feel their status has been threatened or undermined. The plebeian military identity also remains strong, men still place weight on length of service and official recognition and share a common bond. While soldier's jokes fade out of the narrative briefly – after all, men in the Roman army in the years 217-216 had little to joke about – once the tide began to turn their humour returned. The Livian soldier, constant in his motivations and behaviour since the very foundation of the republic remains much as he was before and as he will be for the rest of Livy's account.

## The Conquest of the Mediterranean

In book forty-two of his histories, during an account of a levy held for war with Macedonia, Livy inserts the speech of the retired centurion Spurius Ligustinus.[517] The speech touches on two key issues of plebeian military identity in Livy's history. Ligustinus primarily discusses his status as a soldier in relation to the recognition he has received from famous generals he served under and the length of his service:

> miles sum factus P. Sulpicio C. Aurelio consulibus. in eo exercitu quo in Macedoniam est transportatus, biennium miles gregarius fui adversus Philippum regem; tertio anno virtutis causa mihi T. Quinctius Flamininus decimum ordinem hastatum assignavit. devicto Philippo

[517] For Ligustinus see Cadiou (2002) who is perhaps too quick to trust the details; Pina Polo (1989: 272-273); Patterson (1998: 54); DuToit (1964) suggests some possible sources for the information present in Livy.

> Macedonibusque cum in Italiam reportati ac dimissi essemus, continuo miles voluntarius cum M. Porcio consule in Hispaniam sum profectus. neminem omnium imperatorum quo vivant acriorem virtutis spectatorem ac iudicem fuisse sciunt, qui et illum et alios duces longa militia experti sunt. hic me imperator dignum iudicavit cui primum hastatum prioris centuriae assignaret. tertio iterum voluntarius miles factus sum in eum exercitum qui adversus Aetolos et Antiochum regem est missus. a M'. Acilio mihi primus princeps prioris centuriae est assignatus. expulso rege Antiocho subactis Aetolis reportati sumus in Italiam; et deinceps bis, quae annua merebant legiones, stipendia feci. bis deinde in Hispania militavi, semel Q. Fulvio Flacco, iterum Ti. Sempronio Graccho praetore. a Flacco inter ceteros, quos virtutis causa secum ex provincia ad triumphum deducebat, deductus sum; a Ti. Graccho rogatus in provinciam quater intra paucos annos primum pilum duxi; quater et tricies virtutis causa donatus ab imperatoribus sum; sex civicas coronas accepi.[518]
>
> I became a soldier in the consulship of P. Sulpicius and C. Aurelius. For two years I was a common soldier in the army, fighting against Philip in Macedonia; in the third year T. Quinctius Flamininus gave me in consideration of my courage the command of the tenth company of the *hastati*. After Philip and the Macedonians were vanquished and we were brought back to Italy and disbanded, I at once volunteered to go with the consul M. Porcius to Spain. Men who during a long service have had experience of him and of other generals know that of all living commanders not one has shown himself a keener observer or more accurate judge of military valour. It was this commander who thought me worthy of being appointed first centurion in the *hastati*. Again I served, for the third time, as a volunteer in the army which was sent against Antiochus and the Aetolians. I was made first centurion of the *principes* by Manius Acilius. After Antiochus was expelled and the Aetolians subjugated we were brought back to Italy. After that I twice took service for a year at home. Then I served in Spain, once under Q. Fulvius Flaccus and again under Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. I was brought home by Flaccus amongst those whom, as a reward for their courage, he was bringing home to grace his triumph. I joined Tiberius Gracchus at his request. Four times, within a few years, have I been first centurion in the *triarii*; four-and-thirty times have I been rewarded for my courage by my commanders; I have received six civic crowns.

Ligustinus' account makes it clear that his success as a soldier is due to his *virtus*, but his *virtus* is measured by the degree of recognition he has received

[518] Livy 42.34.5-11

from his commanders. For his promotions he is careful to mention the commander that promoted him and to stress the personal attention paid by the general. He closes his account with a list of the rewards he has received from his commanders over the course of his career. Lacking from his account is any specific detail of his own accomplishments. Ligustinus speaks in general terms about his *virtus*, we are given no examples of what he did that brought him to the attention of his commanders. Nor are we given any detail of the circumstances that lead to his receiving rewards from his commanders thirty-four times. He also tells us that he has received six civic crowns. The civic crown was rewarded for saving the life of a citizen in battle.[519] Yet we are offered neither the names of the men saved nor the contexts that lead to those rewards. Those details are immaterial to Ligustinus' point, the only detail that matters and the one he is careful to provide, is the name of the general who recognised his bravery and promoted him for it. He also praises Cato, not for his own military skill or *virtus*, but rather for his ability to recognise the quality of the men under him and ensure it is adequately rewarded.[520]

The importance of recognition is emphasised as Ligustinus finishes his speech. Despite providing a superlative record of service, he is willing to enter the army at any rank: '*quo ordine me dignum iudicent tribuni militum, ipsorum est potestatis; ne quis me virtute in exercitu praestet, dabo operam; et semper ita fecisse me et imperatores mei et qui una stipendia fecerunt testes sunt*.'[521]

[519] Plin. *HN* 16.5.
[520] Cato was also famously a plebeian, but Ligustinus' list of commanders includes both patrician and plebeian generals.
[521] Livy 42.34.14.

'What rank the military tribunes think that I deserve is for them to decide; I will take care that no man shall surpass me in courage; that I always have done so, my commanders and fellow-campaigners bear witness.' He is willing to enter the army again at any rank, confident that his quality will be recognised and rewarded by his new commander. Importantly, he also stresses that not only his commander, but also his fellow soldiers will soon come to recognise his status as a superlative soldier.

Ligustinus also appeals to the crowd of potential recruits as fellow soldiers. He begins his speech by addressing the men as '*quirites*', perhaps fittingly since the opening remarks begin with brief allusions to his family and farm.[522] Ligustinus asserts his *bona fides* as a Roman citizen by evoking the same fundamental aspects that Livy himself does in book two, here again we hear of '*pignera coniugum ac liberorum caritasque ipsius soli*'.[523] However, the old centurion makes only passing reference to his wife, children, and land. The primary focus of his speech is not his status as a citizen but his status as a soldier. After listing his campaigns, decorations, and commanders, he again directly addresses the crowd. Yet this time he addresses them not as *quirites* but as *commilites*.[524] Brief references to his children and farm allow him to speak to the men as fellow citizens. Before he can convincingly address them as *commilites* he must establish his status as a soldier, as others have

[522] Livy 42.34.2-4
[523] Livy 2.1.5
[524] Livy 42.34.15

throughout Livy's history, by speaking in terms of the social capital of long service, shared experiences and official recognition.

Though Livy makes it clear that the prospect of financial gain was the primary motivation of those enlisting: '*multi voluntate nomina dabant, quia locupletes videbant, qui priore Macedonico bello aut adversus Antiochum in Asia stipendia fecerant*.' 'many enlisted voluntarily, because they saw that those who had served in the former Macedonian campaign or against Antiochus in Asia had become rich.'[525] Livy only explicitly ascribes the desire for profit to the new soldiers, but, the numbers of returning soldiers and centurions were too large to guarantee that all would serve at their previous ranks.[526] These large numbers suggest similar enthusiasm for the war was equally high among veterans as among the new recruits. Ligustinus makes no mention of his financial gain because it is irrelevant to his assertion of status. Livy's conception of the plebeian military identity places no weight on one's personal fortune, but rather on the fact that their military service has been recognised by their fellows and by their commanders. Instead, Ligustinus claims the right to lecture his fellow veterans once he has asserted his status by emphasising the length of his service and his official recognition.

Of particular interest to the soldiers in the half century after the end of the Second Punic War was the care that Roman generals take to ensure that their men are fairly rewarded for their service. Yet while the amounts of money

[525] Livy 42.32.6
[526] Livy 42.33.5

have increased, the soldiers were always careful to ensure that their commanders give them a fair share of the proceeds, and many generals from the beginning of the republic were generous to the men they commanded.[527] The situation was the same in the 2nd century. When Lucius Apustrius captured Antipatrea, he gave all of the loot taken to his men.[528] Quinctius Flaminius similarly ensured that part of the booty captured after Cynoscephalae was distributed to his men.[529] When commanders did not appear to have handed out plunder while on campaign, the soldiers were granted a portion of the proceeds on their return to Rome during the general's triumph, as Cato did in 194.[530] Particularly lucky soldiers would receive both, as was the case with the army of Quinctius, which received loot in the field and donatives during the triumph.[531] But such large amounts were by no means guaranteed, and generals throughout this period continued to divide loot at their discretion, as they had done in earlier periods.[532]

That the benefits of campaign are seen less as a happy bonus than as a right is evident from the trouble Aemilius Paullus had following his campaign against Perseus of Macedon. The war had been very profitable for his men. Livy twice describes the large amount of loot gained by the common soldiers while fighting Perseus.[533] Despite this, the men remained unhappy and were easily

[527] Eg Livy 3.29.1; 4.47.4; 7.16.4; 8.29.14; 9.37.10-11; 10.44.8
[528] Livy 32.27.4
[529] Livy 33.11.2
[530] Livy 34.46.3
[531] Livy 34.52.10
[532] Briscoe (1981: 122)
[533] Livy 44.44.3-4, 45.34.4-6

persuaded to agitate to deny their commander a triumph.[534] The historian frames the primary complaint of the men as due to an understanding that a profitable war should translate into a more profitable share given to the men: their complaint here is explicit: '*de praeda parcius, quam speraverant ex tantis regiis opibus, dederat...*' 'he had made smaller donations out of the spoil than they hoped to receive, since the treasures of the king were so large...'[535] Livy is scathing about the men here, claiming that they would have been satisfied with nothing less than the entirety of the King's treasury.[536]

When the whole of Paullus' time in command is considered, however, the issue appears to be more complicated. The consul conducted himself with an aloofness and a severity that seems unusual for a Livian general. Indeed, on assuming command he attempted to pre-empt exactly the sort of tension present in the campaigns discussed above, instructing his men that they were only to obey orders, and not to question or comment on his tactical or strategic decisions.[537] This was a remarkable and highly unusual speech for a Roman general.[538] It is particularly striking in Livy's history where, as we have seen, Roman soldiers feel they have the right to question the decisions of their generals and withdraw their support when they disagree. Livy's narrative of the Macedonian War makes several references to the fact that Paullus had alienated both his rank and file and his officers through his authoritarian

[534] Livy 45.35-39
[535] Livy 45.35.6
[536] Livy 45.35.6
[537] Livy 44.34
[538] Chrissanthos (2004: 341-342); Lendon (2005: 197-198)

behaviour.[539] The trouble over the triumph between Paullus and his soldiers is evidently more than a simple disagreement over their reward, rather it is the culmination of an acrimonious campaign.

A comparison between Paullus' men and the men serving under Anicius also suggests that the issue is about more than simply the amount of money the men have received. Those men, returning from a far less profitable war with the Illyrians were happy with their smaller donative. In terms of actual numbers, Paullus' men profited far more than those of Anicius. Besides the plunder granted to them on campaign, each *miles gregarius* was awarded 200 denarii for the sack of Epirus and a further 100 when his triumph was finally allowed to proceed.[540] Those of Anicius were granted, beyond anything they might have taken on campaign, the more modest amount of 45 denarii apiece.[541] Yet despite the relative paucity of their reward, it is clear that Anicius' troops were far more satisfied with their recompense. Livy compares their behaviour with that of Paullus' men: '*laetior hunc triumphum est secutus miles, multisque dux ipse carminibus celebratus.*' 'The soldiers marched more joyously in this triumph, and the general himself was the subject of many laudatory songs.'[542]

The issue turned not on the amount of money distributed to the men, but the proportion in comparison with the success of the war. Anicius' men are

[539] E.g. Livy 44.36.9-10; 44.40.1
[540] Livy 45.40.4
[541] Livy 45.43.7
[542] Livy 45.43.8

satisfied with a relatively small amount of money received for their part in a relatively unprofitable war.[543] Paullus', on the other hand, feel that they have been short changed by their general based on the massive profits brought back from their campaign. To put it another way, their contribution to the benefits that Rome has received from the conquest of Macedonia has not been adequately recognised. Livy lends credence to their complaints that Paullus is not behaving fairly by reporting that it was rumoured that he had cut their donative in half to punish them for attempting to block the triumph.[544] Once again, like Fabius in the 5th century and Papirius in the Fourth, an aristocratic commander has defrauded his men to assert his authority but also to benefit the senate's finances. Aemilius Paullus appears as a 2nd-century echo of the likes of Appius Claudius or Camillus, aristocratic and domineering, more interested in promoting the interests of the senate than the plebeian class, and with a knack for alienating his own soldiers.

While Livy focusses heavily on the soldier's concern that they benefit from service in his account of the wars of the 2nd century, the other aspects of the Livian soldier do not fall out of the narrative. These soldiers are also willing to agitate for their interests, rights, and status if they feel they are not being protected. There is near mutiny amongst the army in Macedonia, arising from a body of soldiers who feel their terms of service are up and they should

[543] In comparing the two triumphs Livy suggests that Valerius Antius' numbers for the Macedonian triumph are too low and that his numbers for the Illyrian triumph are too high.
[544] Livy 45.40.5

be discharged.[545] Indeed, the Cannae legions had by this point been enrolled for the legally required 16 years.[546] In 193 there is resistance to a *dilectus* from among the veterans within the city that, like those from the fifth and fourth centuries, is only put aside when an uprising in Liguria endangers the city.[547] During an unpopular and unprofitable campaign in Istria the soldiers take their officers' part in a dispute between their commander and those officers. They go so far as to threaten to refuse obedience if the commander continues in his course.[548] During the war with Perseus the army under the consul Marcius Philippus were unhappy with their general's cautious nature and pressed him to commence an attack on the Macedonians.[549]

Their political engagement is also evident from both their resistance to the *dilectus* in 193, supported by the tribunes, and their attempt to derail the political career of Aemilus Paullus by denying him a triumph. Besides this, the troops also resist another *dilectus* to raise reinforcements for the Macedonian war in 169.[550] This in itself is interesting, considering the enthusiasm of the recruits at the outset. However, after several years of setbacks and little prospect of victory, there seems to be little interest in service.

Ligustinus' speech provides a fairly clear summary of plebeian military identity, but the strength of the identity in the decades after the Hannibalic

[545] Livy 32.3.2-7
[546] Briscoe (1973: 172-173).
[547] Livy 34.56.9-13
[548] Livy 41.10.8-9
[549] Livy 44.3.8-9
[550] Livy 43.14.2-4

War is also evident in the efforts that various commanders make to appear as fellow soldiers to their men. Philippus was careful to be seen performing all the duties of a soldier, even though he was of advanced age and hardly possessed of a soldier's physique.[551] Though the trouble over his triumph would suggest that he was not successful, even the dictatorial Paullus makes a point of sharing the dangers and labours of his men.[552]

Though Livy pays more attention to the division of spoils between men and commander in the years following the Second Punic War, this is likely due to the vast sums of money being generated by Rome's eastern conquests. The other aspects of the soldier in Livy's account, the self-interest, the political engagement, the shared identity, remain as a constant. The soldier of 167 is not noticeably different in outlook and behaviour than the soldier in 507. Further, though there are no serious outbreaks of mutiny or disorder, the tension between Roman soldiers and their generals remains, and when that tension is present in the narrative it is being caused, as it always is, by the same dynamic as throughout Livy's history, the feeling that their interests, rights, and status are not being served by service, or that they are being deprecated by command.

## Conclusion

This chapter began by noting the similar way two armies challenged the power of their commanders. These examples were drawn from Books Two and

[551] Livy 44.4.9
[552] Livy 44.41.1

Forty-Five, from the 5th and the 2nd century. Both hinted at the consistent way that plebeian soldiers related to their commanders. This relationship was always grounded in the soldiers' keen understanding of their own statuses and their determination to assert it and defend it. Having begun the chapter with two examples of status asserted to a commander, we can end by providing two examples, again from Books Two and Forty-Five, again from the fifth and the 2nd century, that demonstrate the consistent way that Livian soldiers relate to each other. In the 5th century the centurion Volero Publilius faced prosecution when he refused to serve in the army unless he retained his rank as centurion. In 176 a group of former centurions refused to enlist in the Macedonian campaign unless they too could retain their rank. The resolution of both situations was very different, Volero incited a mob and forced legislative change in Rome, while Spurius Ligustinus was able to convince his fellow soldiers to enlist at a lower rank. But the way the two situations were resolved were similar. Both ended not with the intervention of a magistrate or aristocratic grandee, but by a plebeian soldier asserting his status to his peers and then convincing them to side with him.

The figure of the soldier in Livy's account of the early and middle republic remains remarkably similar despite separation of time. His self-identity, his political engagement, his devotion to his own interests all remain constant from the beginning of book two to the end of Book Forty-Five. With the introduction of financial incentives as Rome began to fight profitable wars this figure was less changed than augmented. The prospect of financial benefit did not introduce tension into the hierarchy of the Roman army because that

tension had been there from the beginning. This was a result of the dual identities in Roman society. That of the aristocratic élite and that of the plebeian class. In Livy's understanding of the republic, the plebeian class was a military class. Generally, all plebs present in his narrative either are, have been, or have the potential to be soldiers.

As a result, from the outset Roman soldiers were politically engaged, understood their rights and interests, jealous of the status, and aware of their power. There is throughout always the possibility of tension between a Roman commander and his army. This was because the soldiers understood the same issue that Appius Claudius' officers had attempted to teach him in the early decades of the republic, that a Roman general's *imperium* depended on the consent of his men. If Claudius' actions undermined the status of his soldiers, either by refusing them the chance to fight or by denying them their fair share of profits from a conflict, they would withdraw that consent. This was the same lesson that the entire plebeian class – organised and lead by the army – had taught the senate during the secessions. The consent of the soldiers was predicated on the understanding that a Roman general understood his men's interests and status, and that he acted to their benefit. Though subject to a powerful military hierarchy, the soldiers still saw themselves as citizens and free men. This introduced a tension into the military dynamic that could, if left unchecked, could result in mutiny – the wholesale rejection of the military hierarchy. Mutiny was a serious step, and could result in ferocious punishment, but it remained a powerful tool of negotiation and a reminder that even under the standards, Roman soldiers were citizens with rights.

When Livy's narrative shifted from the domestic troubles of the early republic to Rome's wars abroad, first in Italy an then across the Mediterranean, the plebeian class becomes less prominently involved in the domestic political sphere. However, in their rôle as soldiers, the plebeian class remained engaged and often at odds with the aristocracy – represented by the commanders of Rome's army. As the plebs and their tribunes reminded the aristocracy during the tumultuous 5th century, the republic required the cooperation of the orders. That same cooperation was necessary throughout Livy's history if a general was to retain the support of his men. When a general failed to do that, or if he acted against the interests of his men, violated the rights the soldiers believed they had, or undermined their status, that support would be withdrawn and the cooperation would be lost. Many of the generals in Livy's account, such as Valerius Corvus or Porcius Cato, made use of this to the benefit of their careers and their reputation. Those who preferred to interact with their soldiers with aristocratic arrogance, such as the Fabii, the Appii Claudii, Postumius Albinus, Aemilius Paullus, could expect to be reminded by their men of this republican dynamic.

Properly understood, the Livian conception of the plebeian soldier has lasting ramifications for our understanding of Livy as an historian. It contributes to recent scholarship that refutes the longstanding narrative that Livy's portrayal of military matters was shaped by incompetence or disinterest.[553] Just as recent work by Koon and Roth have shown that Livy is

[553] Livy as an incompetent amateur, see Mcdonald (1957: 161); Walsh (1961: 158); Kraus (1994: 1 n.1). As a writer disinterested in military detail, see Luce (1977: 41); Sage (1991: 926).

consistent, competent, and convincing in his handling of battles scenes and siege technology, this chapter has demonstrated a similar care when portraying the Roman soldier and the experience of military service. Further, by establishing that Livy's plebeian soldier should be read as representative of the larger plebeian order and by demonstrating the constant political engagement the soldiers show throughout Livy's history, this understanding problematizes attempts to read the Roman people as essentially apolitical across large sections of the work, or the tendency to read the first pentad as a 'political' section distinct from the 'foreign and military' later books.[554]

Livy was, of course, not writing during the early or middle republic. His context was Augustan.[555] Yet the army he presents in his histories is not that of the Augustan age or the civil wars. Rather, when writing about a republican Rome, Livy has reconstructed a republican army. The fluid hierarchy – where centurions have to earn their rank in each new campaign, men serve for intermittent periods, and soldiers occasionally agitate to be discharged – is a far cry from the permanent force established by Augustus. Neither is it the army of the last decades of the republic. The men show little attachment to individual generals, at best they earn the passing praise that Ligustinus gives Cato the Elder. There is no cadre of veteran centurions following a commander from campaign to campaign, and when mutiny breaks out, it is usually for

[554] Campbell (2002: 105); Vasaly (2015: 102).
[555] Miles (1995: 29-93), Luce (1965), Walsh (1974: 6); Cf. Burton (2000) who argues for an earlier date for the first pentad.

reasons beyond a desire for loot or land. Livy's army is something else, something different from the armies presented by other ancient historians.

# CHAPTER THREE

## Republican Mutiny and Imperial Discipline in Pannonia and Germany

In the early stages of Tacitus' account of the Pannonian mutiny, the commander of the mutinous soldiers, Junius Blaesus, attempted to dissuade his men from their seditious path. The words that Tacitus gives the commander seem at first glance both sensible and reasonable:

> Blaesus multa dicendi arte non per seditionem et turbas desideria militum ad Caesarem ferenda ait; neque veteres ab imperatoribus priscis neque ipsos a divo Augusto tam nova petiuisse.[556]
>
> Blaesus, with great eloquence, affirmed that the wishes of a soldier should not be brought to Caesar by disorder and mutiny; the veterans of old never made such unprecedented demands of their commanders and neither had they themselves done so of the divine Augustus.

Although Tacitus prefaces the commander's statement by telling his readers that he spoke '*multa arte*', he refrains from providing the reader with direct speech. Instead we are given the bald facts of the speech in an accusative infinitive construction. Even with the curtailed version, it is clear that something is wrong with Blaesus' claim. If the reader considers Blaesus' words with even a cursory knowledge of the armies of the Roman republic, his claim that the actions of his men had no precedent is demonstrably false.

The history of Rome's wars was littered with examples of soldiers mutinying in order to communicate their dissatisfaction or demands to their commander or the government at Rome. The sources record thirty mutinies in

[556] Tac. *Ann* 1.19.2

the last fifty years of the republic alone.[557] The disingenuous statement '*neque veteres ab imperatoribus priscis*' directly refutes events when *veteres* did in fact address their concerns to their commanders. The previous chapter has established the many times that armies in Livy mutinied to express their unhappiness. Besides this, the troublesome armies of the Social War, Lucullus' campaigns in the East, and even Caesar's legions mutinied when they were unhappy. Tacitus himself states from the outset that the mutiny arose '*nullis novis causis*' 'for no new causes'.[558] The change of emperor offered a new context for mutiny, but, if the circumstances were novel, the grievances were those that Roman soldiers had complained about for centuries: the work was too hard, the pay too low, and the length of service too long.

Blaesus' claim of unswerving obedience under the republic was as untrue as his subsequent claim that Augustus had never faced any trouble from his troops; Octavian faced his first mutiny in the aftermath of the Sicilian War.[559] In 31 BC, following the battle of Actium, troops stationed in Brundisium mutinied demanding pay and discharge. According to Suetonius, the situation was serious enough that Octavian was forced to return quickly to Italy to personally satisfy the demands of his men.[560] In Dio's account, the mutineers

[557] Chrissanthos (2001: 68)
[558] Tac. *Ann* 1.16.1
[559] Dio 35.13-14; Reinhold notes that Dio's narrative is structured to emphasise Octavian's severity (1988: 32-33) However, even Dio does not obscure the fact that some of the demands of the soldiers were met (35.14.1) and that Octavian was forced to distribute donatives (35.14.2); On this mutiny see Brunt (1962: 81-82).
[560] Suet. *Aug* 17.3 Carter notes that his reaction to this was likely spurred by the memory of the Sicilian mutiny and that he was obliged to displace communities that had supported Antony to satisfy his troops (1982: 109).

were recently discharged troops unhappy with their reward and Octavian dispatched Agrippa to Brundisium rather than handle the matter himself.[561] Whether the trouble was dealt with personally or by Octavian's chief general, the situation was clearly serious enough to delay the campaign. From the beginning, the relationship between Augustus and his troops was not as harmonious as Blaesus would have us believe. Nor was the rest of his reign placid, in 19 BC Agrippa faced a mutiny while on campaign in Spain and, after repressing it, stripped the rebellious legion of the honorific *Augusta*.[562] Troublesome legions were not even a novelty in Pannonia; in 10 BC Tiberius was moved by rumours of mutiny to station his legions in separate camps.[563]

What, then, is the reader to make of Blaesus' disingenuous claims? Were they merely a sign of a desperate commander, who, having futilely offered his own life to quell the revolt, resorted to bald-faced lies to sway his men? Or was Blaesus intentionally attempting to rewrite the history of the Roman army to deny his men a traditional avenue of resistance? The answer lies in the second part of his claim – that mutiny was not an acceptable way to bring grievances to the attention of the *princeps*. Blaesus' speech both swept away the long republican tradition of mutiny and asserted that under the empire soldiers had no recourse to a similar last resort. This new *status quo*

[561] Dio 51.3.1-5
[562] Dio 54.11.3-5; Rich, noting a passage from Tacitus *Ann.* 1.42.3, suggests that the legion may even have been temporarily disbanded (1990:88) On this mutiny see Le Roux (1982:62).
[563] Dio 56.12.1-2; Cf. Swann, who sees the redeployment of the legions as more related to the strategic concerns of his campaign than the discipline of his troops (2004:243).

would later be established forcibly and brutally by the sons of Tiberius at the end of the mutinies.

This chapter argues that the interplay between the *miles*, who remember the republic, and the officers, who understand the new context of the principate, is central to Tacitus' account of the Pannonian mutiny.[564] Tacitus has Blaesus state a clear mistruth – that the Roman army had never faced serious mutiny – in order invoke those very republican mutinies that he is denying. This allows the historian to depict the mutineers as exercising rights that soldiers of the republic believed they held and were willing to use to protect themselves. The message that Tacitus conveys with the mutiny is that, in the new imperial context, the dangers posed to the state by a mutinous army invalidated the rights that legionaries had enjoyed under the republic.

This will be demonstrated by establishing that the events of AD 14 more closely resemble mutinies under the republic that the later imperial mutinies that Tacitus describes in the *Historiae*. By placing the events in Pannonia and Germany in their republican context, the long Roman tradition of mutiny as a form of protest against command will be analysed, alongside the ambiguous view of mutiny that prevailed in the republic. This will demonstrate that republican soldiers and the men serving under Augustus believed that they had the right to oppose command, and even mutiny, when they felt their

[564] As befits such a disorderly event, there are many other interpretations of the mutiny of AD 14: Williams (1997) considers it rooted in Tacitus' stoicism; Woodman (2006), prompted by Tacitus' use of the word *lymphatus*, sees the mutiny as an account of madness; Auerbach (1953) and Rancière (1994) are largely concerned with Percennius' right to speak; O'Gorman (2000: 23-39) has Tacitus present the imperial authorities and the soldiers as 'good' or 'bad' readers.

circumstances were unbearable. Tacitus' portrayal of the mutiny will then be examined to show that while he saw the behaviour of the mutineers as republican, he connected it not with the early or middle republic but with the chaotic 1st century BC and saw it as inextricably linked to civil war. Finally, an exploration of the imperial reaction to, and suppression of, the mutiny will establish that the principate understood that mutinous legions posed a threat to the new status quo. This led to a response that was distinctly imperial, more decisive and brutal than was common under the republic, and allowed the imperial authorities to provide an object lesson: that the new status quo could not and would not allow Roman soldiers to use mutiny as a form of protest.

## The Mutinies of 14 AD as a Republican Moment

The opening of Tacitus' account of the Pannonian mutiny establishes two facts about the event. First, it declares from the beginning that this was a case of *seditio*. Then it states that this was, at the same time, something new and something old:

> Pannonicas legiones seditio incessit, nullis novis causis nisi quod mutatus princeps licentiam turbarum et ex civili bello spem praemiorum ostendebat.
>
> Mutiny struck the Pannonian legions, prompted by no new causes except that the change of emperor offered the license for disorder and the hope of profit from a civil war.[565]

[565] Tac. *Ann* 1.16.1

This outbreak of mutiny is different from all previous such events in Roman history because it arises out of a unique context. The transmission of power from one *princeps* to another had never happened before.[566] At the same time, by stating that it arose from *nullis novis causis* Tacitus suggests that the soldiers' grievances were themselves not new.[567] The motivations for the mutiny are less obvious than Tacitus' opening statement suggests. The reader of this passage has two options. They can accept the authority of Tacitus, who ascribed the mutiny to a desire for license and a hope for the profits of civil war. Alternatively, they can take the soldiers at their word. In both Germany and Pannonia, the soldiers claimed that their actions were prompted by more practical and immediate concerns: the men chiefly complained of the length of their service, the level of pay, and the quality of their conditions. In Pannonia, the ringleader Percennius outlined the poor conditions of legionary service in his address to the troops:

> satis per tot annos ignavia peccatum, quod tricena aut quadragena stipendia senes et plerique truncato ex vulneribus corpore tolerent. ne dimissis quidem finem esse militiae, sed apud vexillum tendentes alio vocabulo eosdem labores perferre. ac si quis tot casus vita superaverit, trahi adhuc diversas in terras ubi per nomen agrorum uligines paludum vel inculta montium accipiant. enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, infructuosam: denis in diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari: hinc vestem arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi. at hercule verbera et vulnera, duram hiemem, exercitas aestates, bellum atrox aut sterilem pacem sempiterna.[568]
>
> Enough wrong had been done through shirking for so many years: old men, their bodies very often maimed from wounds, were tolerating thirty or forty years' service; not even discharge put an end to their soldiering, but, pitched by the banner, they endured the same toils under

[566] Pagán (2005:419)
[567] Wilkes suggests that it is possible, however, that conditions and prospects in Pannonia were particularly dire at the time. (1963)
[568] Tac. *Ann*. 1.17.2-4

> a different designation; and anyone who survived so many hazards with his life would still be dragged off to different and distant countries to be given swampy marshes or uncultivated mountains called 'land.' Indeed soldiering itself was heavy in cost and unprofitable: soul and body were reckoned at ten asses a day, and out of this came their clothing, arms, and tents; out of this the savagery of centurions was bought off, the exemptions from responsibilities bought. On the other hand, as Hercules was his witness, the whippings and woundings, the hard winter, gruelling summers, frightful warfare, and barren peace were everlasting.

On the Rhine the mutineers declared that their mutiny was driven by the same concerns as the men in Pannonia: '*venisse tempus quo veterani maturam missionem, iuvenes largiora stipendia, cuncti modum miserarium exposcerent saevitiamque centurionum ulciscerentur*.' 'the time had come for veterans to demand their due discharge, young men more lavish wages, and everyone a limit on their pitiable conditions and to avenge the centurions' savagery.'[569] Percennius never once mentioned the more sinister motivations alluded to by Tacitus; he did not urge civil war or suggest they supplement their meagre pay with loot. Rather, he suggests a list of changes to service that they should attempt to wrest from Tiberius' government.

At no point does Tacitus contradict the soldiers' claims about their conditions, indeed the historian's narrative independently confirms the deprivations of the soldiers independently. Describing the reaction of the

[569] Tac. *Ann.* 1.31. The recurring complaints about centurions and the fact that they are mistrusted and targeted by the mutineers is striking when compared to their consistent solidarity they demonstrate with the mutinies described by Livy. This is likely a reflection of Tacitus' understanding of his own context. Following the Augustan military reforms, centurions developed from legionaries with temporary promotions for a single campaign to a permanent rank with increased social status and career prospects, on this see Dobson (1970), Maxfield (1981), Birley (1988), Patterson (1993), and Thomas (2004). At the same time, centurions increasingly played the part of agents of imperial authority, particularly in the provinces, on this see Campbell (1985: 104-107) and Alston (1995: 86-96).

soldiers to the speech of Percennius, the historian states that: '*hi verberum notas, illi canitiem, plurimi detrita tegmina et nudum corpus exprobrantes.*' 'some remonstrating about the marks of their beatings, others their white hair, most of them their worn out coverings and naked bodies.'[570] When Germanicus arrived in camp many of the mutineers also thronged around him to demonstrate their advanced age.[571]

The alleged pitiful levels of pay are confirmed elsewhere in Tacitus' narrative. He records that the imperial administration was aware of the effect that low wages was having on military service and that this situation was constant throughout the early Julio-Claudian period. Bemoaning the lack of quality amongst the soldiers a decade later, Tiberius considered resorting to conscription to bring the army up to strength:

> voluntarium militem deesse, ac, si suppeditet, non eadem virtute ac modestia agere, quia plerumque inopes ac vagi sponte militiam sumant.[572]
>
> Volunteer soldiery was lacking, and if a supply existed, they did not behave with the same courage and restraint, because for the most part it was only the impoverished and vagrants who took up soldiering spontaneously.

Military service was so unpleasant and unrewarding that by 14 AD that only the truly desperate were willing to volunteer for the legions. Such refrains about the misery of military service – low pay, distance from home, poor conditions and unfair length of service – were, as we shall see, also commonly

[570] Tac. *Ann*. 1.18
[571] Tac. *Ann.* 1.34
[572] Tac. *Ann.* 4.4

voiced by soldiers of the republic as justification for their own mutinies. If these are the *nullis novis causis* that lead to the events in Pannonia and Germany in AD 14, they are simply another part of an old republican tradition of mutinying as way to protest their lot.

However, even if the reader chooses to accept Tacitus' judgement that, regardless of their conditions, the men were primarily motivated by the desire for licence and a hope for the opportunities of civil war, this judgement does not necessarily remove the mutiny from the republican tradition. By AD 14 civil war and the license that it granted would have been distant memories for the soldiers on the frontiers.[573] The Battle of Actium was four decades in the past and even the men kept under service past their twenty years would likely have no personal memory – and certainly no military experience – of civil war. If the soldiers on the Rhine and the Danube are mutinying for the opportunities offered by civil war then they are doing so because of the opportunities enjoyed by their republican forbears.

Imperial soldiers were inadvertently reminded of the opportunities of civil war by the principate itself. The spectre of civil war looms large in the official narrative of the Augustan and Tiberian periods. It is invoked early in the *Res Gestae* as one of Augustus' most important achievements.[574] This narrative, in which the Julio-Claudian family is all that stands between the state and civil strife, was continued under Tiberius. Velleius Paterculus stresses that

[573] However, for an alternative reading that Tacitus paints the Augustan age as a *continuation* of the civil wars see O'Gorman (2000) 23-45; Keitel (1984)
[574] *RGDA* 2

Tiberius repressed any civil disorder and preserved the *pax Augusta*.[575] The *Senatus Consultum de Cn Pisone Patre* explicitly stated that only the divine will of Augustus and the virtues of Tiberius protected Rome from evils of civil war.[576] The man condemned by the decree, Calpernius Piso, was portrayed as a man who attempted to plunge the state into chaos by defying the imperial family.[577] While such propaganda was intended to legitimise imperial rule and reassure the civilian populace, it must also have served to remind the soldiers suffering in squalid conditions on the Rhine and the Danube that, during the civil wars, their predecessors had enjoyed far better prospects for profit and promotion.[578]

The republican nature of these mutinies will become clear if we compare the mutinies described by Tacitus and periods of military disorder under the republic. These, as mentioned before, are the mutiny repressed by Scipio in 206 BC and the mutinies of the Social War. The similarities between Tacitus' account of the mutinies in AD 14 and Livy's account of the Spanish mutiny of 206 BC have been noted before.[579] In the context of my interpretation of the republican themes of Tacitus' account several of these similarities are striking and worth consideration.

[575] Vell. Pat. 126.2-3
[576] *SCPP* 45-47
[577] Potter (1999: 71)
[578] On civil war in Augustan and Tiberian propaganda, see e.g. Potter (1999) and Gurval (1995).
[579] Woodman goes so far as to call Livy's account 'the principle intertext for Tacitus' narrative of the Pannonian and German mutinies' (2006: 313).

The mutiny of Scipio's army at Sucro in 206 BC is relatively well documented in the ancient sources.[580] Appian and Livy provide full accounts and there is a fragmented account by Polybius and Dio's account is epitomised by Zonaras.[581] As far as can be constructed from the remaining parts of his account, all three later sources followed Polybius' version.[582] However, each account differs in the details, and it is those details that are most interesting when compared to Tacitus account of AD 14.

The strong linguistic connexions between Livy and Tacitus' accounts of the mutinies have already been analysed by Woodman, and he has shown convincingly that both Tacitus and Livy are using the language of medical malaise to describe mutiny.[583] In this they are preceded by Polybius, who also describes the mutiny of 206 BC in medical terms.[584] All three approach mutiny as a form of disorder, for Polybius the illness is internal, while Tacitus and Livy use the language of mental illness. However, Woodman focused carefully on the language used and less on the events of the mutinies themselves, and restricts his analysis to the accounts of Livy and Tacitus. By considering Tacitus' account of the mutiny of AD 14 alongside all of the accounts of the events of

[580] On the mutiny see particularly Chrissanthos (1997) and Salmon (1986); the event is also briefly covered by Moscovich (1988: 107-110), Develin (1970: 85-92); Scullard (1970: 100-1), and Walbank (1982: 306-309)
[581] Liv. 28.24-32; App. *Iber*. 34-37; Polybius' fragmented account makes no mention of Scipio's illness, but the beginning of the account is missing, 11.25-30; Dio's abbreviated account suggests merely that there had been previous trouble with the soldiery, Zon. 9.9-10.
[582] Chrissanthos (1997: 173)
[583] Woodman (2006: 312-319)
[584] Pol. 11.25.1-7.

206 BC, we can demonstrate the strong republican flavour he gives the mutineers, as well as the way he emphasises the changed imperial context.

First, excepting Dio, all of the sources describe the mutiny as arising due to the idleness and greed of the soldiers, and incited by Scipio's illness.[585] Livy's account is the most detailed:

> motae autem eorum mentes sunt non tum primum cum de uita imperatoris rumores dubii allati sunt, sed iam ante licentia ex diutino, ut fit, otio conlecta, et nonnihil quod in hostico laxius rapto suetis uiuere artiores in pace res erant. [586]
>
> Their disloyalty, however, was not just beginning when unsubstantiated reports of the general's imminent danger reached them, but existed even before, owing to the usual licence resulting from long inaction. It was also to some extent because men accustomed to live unrestrainedly on plunder in an enemy's territory felt the pinch of peace-time.

The outbreak of disorder is thus due to three factors: the soldiers' inherent desire for wealth, the deleterious effects of *otium*, and a gap in the command structure caused by Scipio's illness. According to Tacitus the mutinies of 14 AD were caused by the same issues: license given to the soldiers, a desire for loot, and a gap in the command structure – the death of Augustus.[587] Tacitus' account takes on a more sinister aspect, at least to a Roman reader, as the mutineers in Pannonia and Germany consider civil war as the most profitable source of loot.[588]

Second, like Tacitus, each account's opening statement of base motives is somewhat undermined by its own narrative. As in Pannonia and Germany,

[585] Pol. 11.25.6-7; App. *Iber.* 7.34; Zon. 9.10
[586] Livy 28.24.6
[587] Tac. *Ann*. 1.16.1
[588] Tac. *Ann*. 1.16.1

Livy has the mutineers voice concerns about their terms of service and the narrative confirms that their complaints are based in fact:

> si bellum in provincia esset, quid sese inter pacatos facere? si debellatum iam et confecta provincia esset, cur in Italiam non revehi? flagitatum quoque stipendium procacius quam ex more et modestia militari erat...[589]
>
> If there was a war in the province, what were they doing among people already pacified? If the war was over now and the province set in order, why were they not transported back to Italy? They made demands also for their pay with more petulance than accorded with the customary self-control of the soldier...

In Livy's account the grievances of the Spanish mutineers are essentially the same as those voiced in AD 14: That the men are being kept under the standards longer than is necessary, that their service has taken them far from home, and that they are not being properly compensated for their time and toil. Appian also describes the poor conditions of the soldiers in Spain, though he presents it as a result of their own profligate spending.[590] These complaints are never refuted by Livy. In fact, the mutineers' two chief demands are supported by the narrative. The men are stationed far from home and in an area where there is little chance for action, and therefore see no reason why they must remain in Spain.[591] The men are also correct when they claim that they haven't been paid, and even Scipio does not dispute the accuracy of the men's complaints.[592]. One of the first steps Scipio takes to address the mutiny is to send out tax collectors to the Spanish tributary states and raise the money

[589] Livy 28.24.7-8.
[590] App. *Iber.* 7.34.
[591] Livy 28.24.6.
[592] Chrissanthos (1997: 182).

necessary to pay the men what they are owed.[593] The other accounts all make reference to the fact that the soldiers are owed pay by their generals.[594] Polybius has Scipio refer to the situation in a meeting with his tribunes.[595] Like Tacitus' account of the mutiny of AD 14, the narratives of 206 BC lend credence to the mutineers' demands, even as they dismiss the mutiny as merely the result of the soldiers' greed and desire for *otium*.

There are, however, differences in the accounts of the mutiny, and one of these is worth discussing here: Livy alone names the ringleaders of the mutiny. They are two *milites gregarii*: C. Albius and C. Atrius.[596] The impobable names he gives them – Mr. White and Mr. Black – should give the reader pause.[597] However, by personifying the leaders of the mutiny, Livy ground the mutiny in the personal experiences of common soldiers, not simply in the general dissatisfaction presented by the other sources. Like Percennius and Vibulenus, Livy presents the men responsible for the mutiny are of humble origins: both are *milites gregarii* and neither are from the city of Rome.[598] The presence of named individual soldiers amongst the mutineers has the effect of grounding these events in the practical concerns of the individual *miles*

[593] Livy 28.25.10.
[594] App. Iber. 7.34; In Dio's account the issue is that the soldiers haven't been adequately provisioned, rather than paid, Zon. 9.10.
[595] Pol. 11.25.9.
[596] Livy 28.14.13.
[597] De Sanctis (1968: 625) There is, however, little evidence to support Salmon's claim that the names are likely the creation of an 'unknown annalist' (1986: 82).
[598] Livy 28.24.3; Salmon reads Livy's comments to mean that Atrius and Albius were non-Romans, and that their presence served to exonerate Romans from the mutiny (1986: 81-82); However, as he himself states, there is no other indication from Livy of the presence of Italians or Latins within the mutinous legions, and Livy claims: '*civilis alius furor in castris ad Sucronem ortus*' (28.24.4) which suggests that Livy understood the mutiny as fundamentally a rebellion of citizens.

*gregarius*. Speaking from the bottom rung of the army, Albius and Atrius, like the chief Pannonian mutineers Percennius and Vibulenus, make it clear to the reader that the mutiny has its origins in, and is driven by, the desires and dissatisfaction of the common soldier. As we shall see later, this has important ramifications for the Tacitean mutinies in the context of the shift from the republic to the principate.

Another issue Tacitus raises in his account of the mutinies of AD 14 is the urban origin of the troublemakers. In both Pannonia and Germany, the mutiny is incited by soldiers who were recruited from the city of Rome. Percennius, whose speech marks the shift from disorder to outright mutiny, is described in unflattering terms by Tacitus in a way that connects him not only with the city but also with a section of the urban populace inclined toward public disorder:

> erat in castris Percennius quidam, dux olim theatralium operarum, dein gregarius miles, procax lingua et miscere coetus histrionali studio doctus.[599]
>
> In the camp was a certain Percennius, once the head of a theatre claque, then a common soldier, who had an insolent tongue and had been taught by actors how to stir up a crowd.

Tacitus also stresses that the trouble in Germany began among troops recruited from the city: '*vernacula multitudo, nuper acto in urbe dilectu*' 'a pack of freedmen, who had been recently conscripted from Rome'.[600] This correlation between city recruits and trouble in the ranks appears to have been

[599] Tac. *Ann* 1.16.3; Goodyear notes that theatre workers had a reputation as troublemakers (1972:199).
[600] Tac. *Ann* 1.31.4

a recurring issue in the late republic, when there were often disputes between armies recruited in the city of Rome and their commanders.[601]

Livy's account of the social war does not make urbans soldiers the ringleaders – Albius and Atrius are '*Calenus'* and '*Umber*' respectively. However, the Social War provides an example of the troublesome nature of soldiers recruited from the city. In 89 BC, the consul Porcius Cato struggled to keep order in an army that had largely been recruited at Rome.[602] The objections of Cato's men also echo one of the primary complaints voiced in AD 14, that the men under in his army are too old for service and unable (or unwilling) to bear hard labour.[603] The mounting tension culminates with a mutiny in which the army attempt to stone their commander. Cato is only saved by the softness of the ground; his men are unable to do more than pelt him with mud. There is another striking connexion between this mutiny and that described by Tacitus. Dio provides a name to the chief mutineer, Gaius Titius.[604] This Titius, is described in a way that is remarkably similar to Percennius: 'ἀνὴρ ἀγοραῖος καὶ ἐκ δικαστηρίων τὸν βίον ποιούμενος, τῇ τε παρρησίᾳ μετὰ ἀναισχυντίας κατακορεῖ χρώμενος ', 'a man who hung about the Forum, making his living in the courts, and abused his freedom of speech excessively and shamelessly.'[605] He appears to be almost a republican

[601] Chissanthos (2004: 349)
[602] Dio *fr*. 100
[603] Dio *fr*. 100
[604] Dio *fr.* 100; As with Albius and Atrius, readers should perhaps be careful about assuming that Titius was an historical figure. The name 'Titius' was a common placeholder name for a citizen in Roman law, Riggsby (2010: 113); Titius appears as a placeholder frequently in the Justinian digest: e.g. 1.5.15, 2.10.3, 13.4.2, 15.1.52, &c.
[605] Dio *fr*. 100.

counterpart to Percennius, occupying the public space of the republic – the courts and the forum – where Percennius occupies that of the principate – the theatre.[606] The troublesome nature of soldiers recruited from Rome was demonstrated again by another mutiny in 89 and a further one in 83.[607] By emphasising that the ringleaders of both Pannonian and German mutineers were recruited from the city, Tacitus is connecting his account with the republican tradition of troublesome urban soldiers.

Tacitus also strengthens the republican nature of the events of AD 14 by the use of an unusual adjective used in his description of Percennius. The mutineer, Tacitus tells us, '*contionabundus interrogabat*'.[608] The verbal adjective *contionabundus* is rare in the ancient sources and appears only once in Tacitus.[609] Besides that, it only occurs a single time in the SHA and five times in Livy.[610] Tacitus' meaning here is 'he asked, as if he was speaking at a *contio*.'[611] This is essentially the same meaning that Livy uses, that of speeches made unofficially in the manner of a formal address to the Roman people. The usage appears in both political and military contexts and is ascribed both to serving magistrates and private citizens. Livy uses it twice in a civilian context to describe unofficial addresses to the people of Rome. The first describes the

[606] On the theatre as a source of popular disorder during the principate see Tac. *Ann*. 1.77; Suet. *Tib*. 37.2, *Nero* 20.3; Plin. *Ep*. 7.24.7, 2.14.4.
[607] On 89, see Livy *Per*. 75, Plu. *Sul.* 6, Val. Max. 9.8.3; On 83, see App. *B. C.* 1.83.
[608] Tac. *Ann* 1.17.1
[609] On *contionabundus* as a verbal adjective, see Pultrová (2006: 275-278) and Pianezzola (1965).
[610] Goodyear (1972: 201)
[611] Pianezzola (1965: 207-208)

centurion Verginius pleading for his daughter under the decumvirs.[612] The second describes the former dictator Furius Camillus condemning the behaviour of both the senate and tribunes during a period of civil disorder.[613] In both cases the speaker holds no magistracy and the speeches given appear to be impromptu and unofficial.

In a military context Livy deploys it to describe attempts by commanders to persuade their men to action. The adjective is used to describe the actions of the consul Sempronius took to convince Scipio and the men to attack Hannibal at the River Trebia.[614] Livy also uses it to describe the actions of Aemilius when he was attempting to rally his men to defend the camp.[615] The word appears to describe a way of speaking that is inherently republican; speaking to a crowd in an attempt to persuade them to agree to a course of action. Its other two uses, once in Livy and once in the *SHA*, reinforce this sense; both describe situations where local politicians attempt to sway the people of their city.[616] Tacitus' use of the adjective *contionabundus* strengthens the republican atmosphere of the mutinies by describing Percennius' speech as of a sort more common under the republic than the principate and also one that linguistically echoes the *contio*, both the public

[612] Livy 3.47.2
[613] Livy 5.29.10
[614] Livy 21.53.6
[615] Livy 40.27.8
[616] Livy 23.10.7 SHA *Gordiani Tres* 7.4

gatherings of the republican city and military assemblies of the military camp.[617]

If Percennius speaks as *contionabundus*, then it is worth clarifying what kind of *contio* Tacitus means to evoke; the *contio* could be either a civilian gathering or an organised military muster.[618] Aulus Gellius, writing under the empire, suggests that *contio* had three meanings: the location and tribunal of the speaker, the members of the audience, and the speech itself.[619] The word was used both for gatherings of citizens within the city of Rome and for assemblies *in castris*. The civilian *contio* was a public assembly that had three defining characteristics: it had to be called by a sitting magistrate, it allowed speakers to directly address the public, and it did not have any power to pass legislation.[620] It generally served one of two purposes. It was primarily used to allow a debate on legislative action before it was put to a vote in the tribes.[621] Otherwise, it would be used by candidates to canvas before an election.[622] The military *contio*, on the other hand, was summoned by the commander of the army, usually to allow him to address his troops.[623]

The gatherings of mutineers in both Pannonia and Germany more closely resemble the civilian form of the *contio* than those convened in camp by a general. Crucially, during a military *contio* the troops being addressed

[617] Pianezzola (1965: 207-208); Goodyear (1972: 201)
[618] For a survey of the sources and scholarship on both military and civilian *contiones* see Pina Polo (1995); On the republican civilian *contio* see Lintott (2003:42-45).
[619] Gel. 18.7.5-9
[620] Pina Polo (1995: 203)
[621] Lintott (2003: 45)
[622] Taylor (1966: 16)
[623] Pina Polo (1995: 213)

stood before their commander in formation.[624] During the mutinies the soldiers gather together in a disorganized mass, without any separation between cohorts or even legions.[625] Similarly, during civilian *contiones* the audience was not grouped by tribe or century but rather simply gathered around the *rostra*.[626] This has interesting implications for the events of AD 14. When first facing the mutinous soldiers, both Blaesus and Germanicus attempt to impose some military organisation on the gathered troops. To no avail, Blaesus first orders and then begs his men to separate the legionary *aquilae* and cohort standards that the men have grouped together to demonstrate their common purpose.[627] At first, Germanicus would not even listen to the mutinous men until they organised before him in their maniples; eventually, the men compromised by gathering roughly by cohort.[628] When marching from winter quarters to Cologne, the I and XX legions don't appear to have done so in any formation, as Tacitus tells us that they grouped their loot together with all of their standards.[629]

Since the audience of a military *contio* paraded in formation and that of a civilian *contio* gathered as a crowd, the attempts by generals to organise their men represented an attempt to change these gatherings from disorderly civilian activities to something governed by military hierarchy. Germanicus and

[624] Pina Polo (1995: 214)
[625] Tac. *Ann*. 1.16.3-17.1; Following the speech soldiers outright reject military organisation in the army as a whole and group their eagles together at 1.18.2.
[626] Pina Polo (1995: 205)
[627] Tac. *Ann*. 1.18.2-3
[628] Tac. *Ann*. 1.34.3
[629] Tac. *Ann*. 1.37.2

Blaesus want the legionaries to stand before them as soldiers, but the men themselves are determined to speak to their commanders as citizens. The lack of any order or hierarchy in the troops listening to Percennius' speech precludes it from being seen as a form of military assembly, rather it matches much more closely a civilian *contio*.[630] Here it is serving in both the deliberative and electoral senses. Percennius is working to both persuade the men to action and to present himself as their leader. Further, the deliberative nature may also reflect the republican period as although *contiones* continued to be held under the principate, their primary function was as a way for the imperial administration, or the emperor himself, to convey information to the people of Rome.[631] Prompted by Percennius, the legions in Pannonia are making a statement; they, like their forebears in the republican armies, are citizen-soldiers and retain the rights belonging to Roman citizens.

Tacitus links the Pannonian and German mutinies back to the mutinies of the republic by depicting in his account the same motivations, causes, and class of individuals that marked the pattern of mutinies in earlier centuries. The republican aspects of the mutinies will become even clearer when compared to the distinctly imperial mutinies in Germany in AD 69.

[630] There is a tendency among scholars to read Percennius' speech as a form of military *contio* and an effort to position himself as *imperator*. Thus Pianezzola says that Percennius speaks '*con il calore e i gesti di un generale*' (1965: 207) and Auerbach describes hims speaking '*wie ein Oberkommandierender*' (1946: 41). However, while this matches the narrative presented by the imperial representatives (1.28.4), there is little about the speech of Percennius that matches a military *contio* and his speech argues for communal action, not that he be elected as their leader. For the speech as a form of public assembly, see Alston (2017: 105-106).
[631] Pina Polo (1995: 215)

## The Mutinies of 69 AD as an Imperial Moment

The degree of connexion between the mutinies described in the first book of the *Annales* and those in the first book of the *Historiae* is complex; both narratives involved the outbreak of disorder amongst frontier troops. Both also occurred early in their respective works and both were, at least partially, set in the German provinces. This has led some scholars to read the events of 14 as a precursor to the events of 69. Doing so, however, has the possibility of overstating the importance of 69 in the narrative Tacitus' gives of 14.[632]

Beyond the superficial similarities, however, the mutinies shared little in common. The revolt under Galba had different causes, motivations, and goals. In the *Annales* the legions in Germany and Pannonia mutinied during a peaceful – albeit uncertain – transition of power between two emperors. In the *Histories* the German legions rebelled in the aftermath of a coup that has deposed not just a *princeps* but the ruling dynasty. The stated motivations of the men were also different. While the Tiberian troops mutinied in protest at their pitiful pay and poor conditions, the rebellious legions' motivation in 69 arose primarily out of concerns about imperial favour.[633] The mutineers also expressed doubts about the capability of their legate.[634] Nowhere in the

[632] E.g. Kotzé (1996); McCulloch calls the civil war of 69 'the single most important influence of Tacitus' conception of history (1991: 2928).
[633] Tac. *His.* 1.8.5-6
[634] Tac. *His*. 1.9.1

account of their uprising is any discussion of their dissatisfaction with pay or conditions.

The mutineers in both cases also presented their demands differently. The mutineers' stated goal, as described in the *Annals*, was to force reform within the army. The demands Percennius made in his speech were concrete and practical: an increase in pay, a limit to the length of service, and a payment on retirement.[635] These echo similar demands made by mutineers in the republic and under Octavian, which were related to the conditions of the soldiers.[636] The hopes of the German mutineers in 69 were far grander. While Tacitus ascribes a desire for civil war and licence to both mutinies, only the mutineers in Germany were explicitly determined to start a civil war.[637] In AD 14 the German legions did offer Germanicus their support should he choose to challenge Tiberius, but when he demurred they returned to attempting to improve their conditions.[638] Even this fits a republican context as a change of commander was often one of the demands voiced during a mutiny.[639] In 69 the men of the German legions were bent not merely on forcing concessions from the government, but actually causing a change in that government, with the hope that their actions would lead to a new *princeps* better disposed to the German legions.[640]

[635] Tac. *Ann.* 1.17.5
[636] Wilkes (1963: 268)
[637] Tac. *His*. 1.51.2-3
[638] Tac. *Ann.* 1.35
[639] Keaveny (2007: 77)
[640] Tac. *Ann.* 1.12.1

The mutiny in the *Historiae* also lacked other aspects shared between those in the *Annals* and during the republic. There was no named individual who corresponds with Percennius in Pannonia, the two Caii in Spain, or Titius during the social war. The anonymous nature of the unrest in 69 is significant as the men were more concerned with the status of the army as a whole and the destiny of the empire than the individual complaints of the *miles gregarius*.

Absent too was any link between the mutineers and the city of Rome. Indeed, Tacitus stresses on multiple occasions how alien the soldiers of the German legion appeared to inhabitants of the city. The German legionaries are described as '*tergis ferarum et ingentibus telis horrentes*' 'bristling with the skins of wild beasts and with huge lances' and Otho's praetorians deride them as '*peregrinum et externum*' 'foreigners and outsiders'.[641] The men were so unfamiliar with Rome that the large crowds of people disturbed them.[642]

While Tacitus' narrative of AD 14 is superficially similar to the imperial mutinies he describes in the *Histories*, in all of the important details it shares much more with earlier mutinies occurring under the republic. The urban connexion, the complaints about conditions, and the presence of individual mutineers all give the Pannonian and German mutinies a much stronger republican flavour.

[641] Tac. *His.* 2.88; 2.21

[642] Tac. *His.* 2.88; This picture of the legions as unfamiliar with the city and more connected with the provinces they served in may reflect historical reality as the legions had by 69 began to draw recruits from outside Italy and almost never from the city itself, as Keppie (1997: 95); The legions in Germany, while still recruiting from northern Italy, were increasingly supplementing their numbers with men from Spain and Narbonensis and had begun to recruit from the frontier settlement, as Mann (1983: 93-107)

## Percennius' Right to Speak

Writing in the nineteen-fifties, Erich Auerbach described the account in the *Annales* of the Pannonian mutiny as totally grounded Tacitus position as a man of the highest rank who classified and judged the actors in the narrative based on his social position.[643] According to Auerbach's reading Tacitus saw the revolt as originating amongst the worst sort of soldier and due merely to a suspension of the customary discipline and labour of military service.[644]

Following on from Auerbach, Jacques Rancière continues with the idea that Percennius is an illegitimate speaker. He claims that Tacitus gainsays Percennius before giving him a place to speak both by undermining the motivations of the mutineers and by placing it in a period when military duties had been suspended.[645] Rancière argues that Tacitus sees the motivations of the mutineers as suspect not because they are untrue, but because they are voiced by a common soldier: 'Their illegitimacy is not due to their content but to the simple fact that Percennius is not in the position of legitimate speaker. A man of his rank has no business thinking and expressing his thought.'[646]

Certainly, as Auerbach says, Tacitus' 'profound contempt' for Percennius is clear from the text.[647] The historian takes pains to de-legitimise both the mutiny and the speaker before the mutineer speaks. At the opening

[643] Auerbach (1953: 46)
[644] Auerbach (1953: 37)
[645] Rancière (1994: 25)
[646] Rancière (1994: 26); For a reconsideration of both Auerbach and Rancière's readings that is grounded more in theory than Roman culture, see Bhatt (2016).
[647] Auerbach (1953: 37)

of the narrative, as we have seen, Tacitus ascribes the revolt to base motives. He calls into question the soldiers' own justifications for the disobedience. He attacks the character of Percennius by clarifying his lowly rank, connecting him with the theatre, by depicting him as a demagogue, and by referencing his '*procax lingua*' 'insolent tongue'.[648] Percennius is clearly the sort of person the historian doesn't want speaking in public. What Auerbach and Rancière have missed, I will suggest, is that despite Tacitus' attempts to discredit him it was by no means a settled fact that Percennius was prohibited from speaking in public.

Given the nature of our sources, our understanding of the Roman concept of *libertas* is heavily dominated by aristocratic sensibilities. My focus here is not to examine general Roman conceptions of liberty or freedom of speech.[649] Outlining a universal Roman understanding of Freedom of Speech is complicated by the lack of a specific term for it in the Roman sources.[650] Instead, I hope to examine the degree to which Roman soldiers considered themselves able to speak back to authority. Two factors complicate the issue. Firstly, the Roman conception of *libertas* has been described as 'the non-subjection to the arbitrary will of another person or group of persons.'[651] Secondly, the republic lacked any legal mechanism to repress the speech of its citizens.[652] When on campaign a soldiers behaviour was regulated by the

[648] Tac. *Ann* 1.16.3
[649] On *libertas* generally, see Arena (2012), Mouritsen (2001: 9-14), Syme (1939: 149-161); On freedom of speech specifically, see Raaflaub (2004: 54-57), Brunt (1988: 281-350), Chrissanthos (2004).
[650] Raaflaub (2004: 54)
[651] Arena (2012: 6)
[652] Chrissanthos (2004: 344)

*sacramentum* and he was subject to the *imperium* of his commander, these factors would suggest that the citizen serving in the army exercised his *libertas* in a very different context than the man in the street. However, the following discussion will demonstrate that there is little difference in the way that common Romans conducted themselves in the civilian sphere and the same class of citizen behaved when in the camp.

Certainly, there is a sense in some of the later sources that the lower classes were expected to moderate their tone in the presence of their betters. Writing under the empire, Quintillian warned that men without illustrious ancestry should guard their tongues, '*nam quae in aliis libertas est, in aliis licentia vocatur*' 'for what is regarded as liberty in some is called licence in others.'[653] However, Quintillian's statement should be approached with caution, coming as it does from the changed context of the principate.

Further, if the state lacked any mechanism to repress the speech of its citizens, it also lacked a mechanism to protect those who spoke against the powerful. Valerius Maxiums provides examples of outspoken men of lower status who criticised Pompey Magnus. This is presented, although again by an imperial writer, not as reflections on common license but as examples of Pompey's forbearance. Valerius lists a number of occasions when Pompey was insulted by men of all ranks: '*omnis generis hominum licentiae ludibrio esse quieta fronte tulit*.' 'with unruffled countenance he let himself be a mockery to

[653] Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.48

the license of all sorts of men.'[654] The anecdotes record citizens of all ranks speaking their mind to the great man, from illustrious consuls to a lowly actor.

Two particular occasions bear examination, the cases of Helvius Mancia and the tragic actor Diphilus. While Helvius Mancia, the rustic son of a freedman, was denouncing Scribonius Libo before the censors, Pompey interrupted the proceedings to mock Helvius' advanced age and lowly station by quipping that he must have come from the underworld. Helvius Mancia turned on him and replied that he had indeed come from the underworld, and proceeded to list all of the illustrious men he had encountered there who had been sent to their deaths by Pompey during Sulla's proscriptions. He ends his rant by stating that '*omnesque eos una voce indignantes quod indemnati sub te adulescentulo carnifice occidissent*.' 'and all of them, with a single voice, indignant that they had been killed without sentence by you, the adolescent executioner.'[655] Valerius is shocked that such a man, '*servitutem paternam redolenti*' 'reeking of his father's slavery'[656], felt able to insult Pompey publicly.

As deplorable as Valerius Maximus finds the impertinence of Helvius Mancia, he is even more horrified at the thought of the actor Diphilus, who repeated the line '*miseria nostra magnus es*' 'to our miseries you are great' while gesturing at Pompey, sitting in the audience. Later in the performance, Diphilus repeated the trick, this time with the more sinister warning '*virtutem istam veniet tempus cum graviter gemes*' 'But that same valour bitterly in time

[654] Val. Max. 6.2.4
[655] Val. Max. 6.2.8
[656] Val. Max. 6.2.8

to come shalt thou lament'.[657] Once again Valerius expresses shock about such a public berating of a grandee of the republic.[658] Two things are worth bearing in mind. Valerius Maximus is writing in the changed circumstances of the Julio-Claudian regime and, as he says, his purpose here is to provide anecdotes that illustrate Pompey's forbearance. As Valerius Maximus sees it, the common men that talk back to Pompey are only protected from punishment because Pompey is willing to permit such challenges to his authority.

A similar account of the same story is preserved by Cicero in a letter to Atticus, though this account lacks the scandalised tone of the later version.[659] Cicero is more concerned with the hostility of the crowd toward Pompey that the license shown by the speaker, though he does describe Diphilus as speaking '*petulanter*'.[660] Unlike Valerius Maximus, Cicero shows no surprise at Diphilus' behaviour, rather the event is reported as part of a discussion of the ways that the Roman people have been making their dissatisfaction towards Pompey known. Indeed, the disrespect from the actor, the crowd's positive reaction to Diphilus' improvisation, and hisses at earlier gladiatorial games are all cast as the people's natural reaction to Pompey's policies. '*populi sensus maxime theatro et spectaculis perspectus est*.' 'The feeling of the people was

[657] Val. Max. 6.2.9
[658] Although the issue here is complicated by the nebulous social and legal status of actors in Rome, Marshall (2006: 86-87); Actors on stage were granted a degree of license by the audience, Moore (1998: 15-18)
[659] Cic. *Att.* 2.19.2-3 There are other differences, the wording – though not the meaning - of the actor's insults differs. Perhaps tellingly, while Valerius Maximus has Pompey sitting in the audience, Cicero reports that he was in Capua at the time.
[660] Cic. *Att.* 2.19.3.

shown as clearly as possible in the theatre and at the shows.'[661] However, the dynamic here is different, certainly crowds making their dissatisfaction known was a common occurrence in Rome, and to an extent the anonymous nature of a mob offered protection, as reflected in Caligula's famous remark to the crowd at the circus.[662]

In the context of individuals speaking publicly to powerful men, Cicero's account of the *praeco* Granius in the years before the Social War is also illustrative.

> consuli P. Nasicae praeco Granius medio in foro, cum ille edicto iustitio domum decedens rogasset Granium quid tristis esset; an quod reiectae auctiones essent: 'immo vero,' inquit, 'quod legationes.' idem tribuno pl. potentissimo homini, M. Druso, et multa in re publica molienti, cum ille eum salutasset et, ut fit, dixisset: 'quid agis, Grani?' respondit: 'immo vero tu, Druse, quid agis?' ille L. Crassi, ille M. Antoni voluntatem asperioribus facetiis saepe perstrinxit impune.[663]
>
> Granius, the crier, replied to the consul Publius Nasica in the middle of the forum, when he, after a suspension of all judicial proceedings had been proclaimed, as he was returning home, had asked Granius 'why he was sad; was it because all the auctions were postponed?' 'Rather,' said he, 'because they have sent back the ambassadors.' The same man made this answer to a tribune of the people, Marcus Drusus, a most influential man, but one who was causing great disturbances in the republic. When Drusus had saluted him, as is the fashion, and had said, 'How do you do, O Granius?' he replied, 'I should rather ask, O Drusus, what are you doing?' And he often reproved with impunity the designs of Lucius Crassus and Marcus Antonius, with still harsher witticisms.

As a public *praeco*, Granius occupied a position higher than that of Diphilius or Mancia, however he still ranked below the men he was speaking to.[664] The

[661] Cic. *Att*. 2.19.3.
[662] Suet. *Cal.* 30.
[663] Cic. *Planc.* 33.
[664] On the status of public *praecones* see Rauh (1989) and Bond (2016: 21-58).

impunity with which an auctioneer was able to publicly lampoon the great men of the republic, including tribunes and even a consul, demonstrates the lack of restriction placed on the speech of a Roman citizen. At the same time, these exchanges appear to happen conversationally, though in public, and as with Pompey there is perhaps a sense that Granius was tolerated by the great men, after all, both Nasica and Drusus chose to engage him in conversation despite his reputation.

What the stories of Helvius Mancia, Diphilus, and Granius show, however, is that these men felt that they had the right to speak frankly against the great men of the republic, not just from the safety of a crowd but in openly and in public. Cicero goes further. In *de Oratore* he has Marcus Antonius the orator argue that citizens not only have the right to disagree and even disobey their superiors, but that they may go further '*etsi omnes semper molestae seditiones fuissent, iustas tamen fuisse non nullus et prope necessarias.*' 'even if all civil disorders were always dangerous, they had on occasion been just and almost necessary.'[665]

The differing accounts that Cicero and Valerius Maximus give of the impudent Diphilus highlight two differing strains of thought concerning the people of Rome. The élite sources are all but unanimous concerning the right of a republican aristocrat to speak.[666] However, it is unclear whether the lower orders enjoyed the same right. While this can be explained on account of the

[665] Cic. *De or.* 2.199
[666] Brunt (1988: 314)

élite sources lack of interest in the issue, there is another possibility: the issue is not clear to modern scholars because it was not clear to the Romans themselves.

Certain sources, most prominently the early imperial authors Valerius Maximus and Quintillian, suggest that the lower orders were supposed to be spoken to, not speak for themselves. Others, such as Livy and Cicero, appear to view the relation of the people to those of a higher social status more as dialogue than dictation. In these narratives it is evident that some Roman citizens believed that they had the right to speak up in response to the actions of magistrates.

This difference of opinion concerning whether the relationship between the people and the élite was a dialogue or a dictation carried over into the Roman military. At the start of his campaign against Perseus of Macedon, the famously strict Aemilius Paullus called a *contio* in the camp and gave a speech to his men. In it, he made clear that he did not expect to hear any opinions from common soldiers for the duration of the campaign:

> unum imperatorem in exercitu providere et consulere, quid agendum sit, debere, nunc per se, nunc cum iis, quos advocaverit in consilium; qui non sint advocati, eos nec palam nec secreto, consilia sua. [667]
>
> There should be a single general in an army who foresees and plans what should be done, sometimes by himself, sometimes with the advisers he calls into council. Those who are not called into council should not air their own views publicly or privately.

[667] Livy, 44.34.2

This speech is unique in the ancient sources; in no other recorded instance did a Roman general place a similar interdiction on his men.[668] His instructions were extraordinary; he banned not only public complaints from his soldiers but even private griping within the tent lines.

To Paullus, his men's only duty was to keep themselves fit to follow his commands: '*militem haec tria curare debere, corpus ut quam validissimum et pernicissimum habeat, arma apta, cibum paratum ad subita imperia;*' 'A soldier should concern himself with the following: his body, to keep it as strong and as nimble as possible; the good condition of his weapons; and the readiness of his food-supply for unexpected orders.'[669] Paullus was going to issue orders and the men were going to follow them without question or complaint. His justification for this is practical, and it highlights how unusual his commands are: '*in quo exercitu milites consultent, imperator rumoribus vulgi circumagatur, ibi nihil salutare esse.*' 'In an army in which the soldiers deliberate and the general is led about by the gossip of the rank and file, conditions are utterly unsound.'[670] The very situation which he decries as *nihil salutare* appears to have been the usual practice in Roman armies. Indeed, Livy alludes to this when he states that not only the recruits but also the veterans were taught the correct way to conduct a campaign, suggesting that the armies in which those veterans served involved much more participation from the soldiers.[671]

[668] Chrissanthos (2004: 341)
[669] Livy, 44.34.3
[670] Livy, 44.34.4
[671] Livy, 44.34.5

Aemilius Paullus appears here as the military context for the mind-set demonstrated by Valerius Maximus and Quintillian. To Paullus, the Roman army ought to be a strict hierarchy and decisions were made from the top down with no input from the lower ranks. The serving soldiers were not to concern themselves with matters beyond their immediate battlefield responsibility and were to refrain from discussing the campaign either publicly or in private.

We are lucky that we have the first-hand accounts of a general who appears to have subscribed to the opposing view, or at least wished to signal his sympathy for it. Caesar's *Commentarii* show an army that accepts and even occasionally encourages dialogue between a commander and his men, both during the conquest of Gaul and the Civil Wars. They contain passages in which Caesar's men expressed their opinions about his command, both good and bad. Interestingly there are also accounts of moments when the demands of his men forced Caesar to modify his plans, and even several occasions when Caesar is represented actively seeking out the opinion of his men.

During his campaign in Spain, Caesar was locked in a stalemate with Pompey's legates Afranius and Petreius. When the two armies had been facing each other for some time, Caesar was surrounded by his officers, who were conveying a message from the army: '*ne dubitaret proelium committere. omnium esse militum paratissimos animos*' 'urging him not to delay the engagement, the soldiers were all eager for a battle.'[672] In this case Caesar did

[672] Caes. *BCiv.* 1.71.2-3

not bend to the will of his army and refused to attack Pompey's forces, hoping to force their surrender without bloodshed.[673]

At other points in his commentaries, Caesar describes moments when he was swayed by the demands of his soldiers and acted against his own judgement. Following the capture of the rebellious Gaul Gutruatus, Caesar intended to offer the man clemency but his army had other ideas. As his men blamed Gutruatus for the dangers and losses of the recent rebellion, they insisted that he be punished. Caesar relented, '*contra suam naturam*', and has the man executed.[674] It may be that this episode exists in the *Commentarii* in order to exonerate Caesar for the death of a captive, but even so the inclusion suggests an audience that was willing to believe that a general's actions could be governed by his men.[675] Caesar even shows that, on occasion, the common soldiers influenced his tactical decisions. During the same Spanish campaign discussed above, Caesar found his army separated from the retreating Afranius and Petreius by a swollen river.

> totis vero castris milites circulari et dolere hostem ex manibus dimitti, bellum necessario longius duci, centurionesque tribunosque militum adire atque obsecrare, ut per eos Caesar certior fieret, ne labori suo neu periculo parceret; paratos esse sese, posse et audere ea transire flumen, qua traductus esset equitatus.[676]
>
> At this sight, the legionary soldiers, running up and down the camp, complained that the enemy would escape out of their hands, and the war necessarily be prolonged. They addressed themselves to the centurions and military tribunes, and desired them to beg of Caesar not to spare them; that they feared neither danger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the river as the horse had done.

[673] Caes. *BCiv.* 1.72
[674] Caes. *BGal*. 8.38
[675] Chrissanthos (2004: 357)
[676] Caes. *BCiv.* 1.64.2

Caesar's soldiers here were acting in exactly the way Aemilius Paullus tried to pre-empt in Macedon. Dissatisfied with their general's policy, they were determined to influence his tactical decisions. In this case they succeeded, Caesar again let his men dictate his policy by going against his own misgivings and move his army across the river.[677]

Even more unusually, Caesar would on occasion gather his men and ask their opinion. During the siege of Avaricum, when enemy action left the Roman army undersupplied and nearing starvation, Caesar toured the siege lines, addressing each legion in turn and making an offer: '*si acerbis inopiam ferrent, se dimissurum oppugnationem diceret*' 'if the burden of scarcity were too bitter for them to bear he would raise the siege.'[678] Caesar's men refused, insisting that they could handle the hardship. Of course, it is unlikely that Caesar would have either asked or reported the event had he not been sure of the answer. He even decided to portray his decision to cross the Rubicon as a dialogue between himself and the men. In a twisted reflection of a military *contio* in which a general might call on his men to fight for Rome, Caesar listed the many wrongs he had suffered and asked his men to march with him on Rome. The men of the 13th Legion agreed.[679]

As in the civilian sphere, there appears to have been disagreement amongst the élites over whether or not a *miles gregarius* had the right not only

[677] Caes. *BCiv.* 1.64.3
[678] Caes. *BGal*. 7.17.4
[679] Caes. *BCiv*. 1.7

to express his opinions about the conduct of a campaign and the degree to which a commander was obliged to listen to those opinions. These opinions ranged from a total ban on private complaining under Paullus to even the possibility that the men might influence the commander's decisions, as Caesar relates. As with their civilian counterparts discussed above, what emerges consistently in the campaigns of both Paullus and Caesar is that the Roman soldiers themselves believed that they had a right not only to discuss their commanders' actions and policies amongst themselves but also to express concerns and complaints up the hierarchy.

A soldier within a Roman legion was a Roman citizen and brought with him a tradition of independent thought and action. Even when Paullus ordered his men not to discuss his orders or policies publicly or in private, they immediately began to talk amongst themselves about what a sensible policy they found it to be, in direct violation of their general's decree.[680] Detailed accounts of Roman military actions show a soldiery that expected to be kept abreast of the intentions of their commanders and even on occasion influence them.[681] The previous chapter illustrated the extent to which Livy's soldiers were willing to debate and protest aspects of their service, but other historians of the wars of the republic often show Roman soldiers freely and openly discussing aspects of the campaigns, including the orders they have been given, religious omens, and even the mood of their commander.[682] Most

[680] Livy 44.34.6-7
[681] MacMullen (1984: 455)
[682] Debating orders: Caes *BGal.* 5.31, Polyb. 3.89; religious omens Plu. *Cras*. 19, 23; the commander's mood Sal. *Iug.* 82.

relevantly here, republican soldiers clearly felt they had the right to discuss their conditions amongst themselves and with their commanders. Besides the examples discussed above, Lucullus had continual trouble with his soldiers in the East.[683] Even a commander as popular as Caesar felt the need to address his men's grievances on occasion.[684]

Just as the mutiny of AD 14 fits the pattern of republican mutinies, so Percennius fits into a pattern of troublesome soldiers serving as ringleaders and mouthpieces for the dissatisfaction and unrest of their fellow soldiers. There seems to be some confusion in the sources about how far the soldiers' rights as citizens protect them in the event of mutiny. Of the thirty recorded mutinies at the end of the republic, the sources suggest that only seven were successfully repressed by command and in only three did the perpetrators face serious punishment.[685] When such outbreaks were punished, the sources all represent it as working within the framework of the state or the army and happening in an organised way. Albius and Atrius, the ringleaders in Spain, were executed while Titius was taken to Rome for trial but subsequently left unpunished.[686] The most troublesome mutineers in Sicily were discharged from the army without donative or land grant.[687] The situation in Pannonia and Germania ended differently. Both mutinies were repressed unofficially and

[683] Plu. *Luc.* 32-34
[684] Plu. *Caes.* 37
[685] Chrissanthos (2001: 68)
[686] Livy 28.29, Dio *fr*. 100
[687] Dio 49.14

with a degree of personal violence more reminiscent of the imperial capital than the republican army.

## A Catiline in the Camp

If Tacitus is portraying the mutinies of AD 14 as an outbreak of republicanism amongst the soldiers on the frontier, then his has something to say about his opinion of the republic. Certainly he is making a practical point: that the events in Pannonia and Germany demonstrated that the republic had permanently ended and the principate was irreversibly established. The fact that the republic is long past and never to return is a common theme in Tacitus' works.[688] However, throughout his works, Tacitus seems to hold an ambiguous opinion of the republic.[689] An examination of the language Tacitus uses in his account of the events of AD 14 suggests that beyond a simple practical point, the historian is using the mutiny to make a moral point about the republic in general. Tacitus does this in three ways. He delegitimises the mutineers by attacking their motives and their personal social and moral status. He also discusses the mutineers by using language that associates them with disorder and disunity. Finally, he uses language that evokes the conspiracy of Catiline, one of the more famous and dangerous moments in the late republic. These methods, combined with the graphic violence that ends the mutiny, cast republican sentiment amongst the troops as an inherently disruptive force that

[688] Classen (1988: 116)
[689] Percival (1980: 123-124); Mittelstadt (1995: 35). Though for Tacitus' view of the republic as more positive, see Morford (1991).

led inevitably to violence between Roman citizens, and even risked plunging the empire into civil war.

From the moment Tacitus introduces the mutiny he takes pains to delegitimize the motives and characters of the men involved. As discussed above, the reader is warned from the outset that the men were motivated by a desire for the profits available during periods of civil war.[690] The ringleaders in Pannonia are discredited by their introduction. Percennius is a former theatre worker and '*procax lingua'*.[691] The soldier Vibulenus is depicted stirring up the crowd with blatant lies and exaggerated histrionics.[692] As a group the Pannonian mutineers were fickle and superstitious, easily led by the lies of their ringleaders and cowed by an unexpected eclipse. While Tacitus' account of the mutiny in Germany lacks the defined personalities of the events in Pannonia, from the start it is scathing about the men involved. The ringleaders are '*vernacula multitudo, nuper acto in urbe delectu, lasciviae sueta, laborum intolerans*' 'it was – after a levy held recently in the city – an crowd of freedmen, inured to recklessness and intolerant of toil. .'[693] The older soldiers they infect with mutiny are dismissed by Tacitus as men with '*rudes animos.'*[694] Tacitus wants the reader to be clear; the men leading the mutiny and those following them were neither respectable nor admirable. These were not worthy centurions like Verginius or Sextus Tullius.[695]

[690] Tac. *Ann.* 1.16.1
[691] Tac. *Ann.* 1.17.1
[692] Tac. *Ann*. 1.23.1
[693] Tac. *Ann*. 1.31.4
[694] Tac. *Ann*. 1.31.4
[695] Verginius: Liv. 3.44.2; Sextus Tullius: 7.12.13.

O'Gorman has shown that a pervasive feature of the mutiny episodes in the first book of the *Annales* is the repetition of the language of separation and conjunction. This is most clear with the use of the competing prefixes of *dis*- and *con*-, as well as the less common *se*-. O'Gorman sees this as a stylistic choice that allowed the narrative to echo the conflicting definitions of the mutineers and the figures of authority.[696] Examined in the context of the mutineers as representatives of the republic and the officers as those of the principate, however, this language suggests a more political point is being made. While the narrative and the speeches of the officers use both divisive and conjunctive language, the mutineers never use the language of cohesion in their speeches.[697] Every statement and action taken by the mutineers increases the divisive sense of the passages.

Even in moments when they come together as a group there is a sense of disorder. When the mutineers in Pannonia attempted to merge their three legions into one, the project immediately collapsed due to infighting as each soldier wished to retain the number of his former legion.[698] With this plan abandoned, the men began piling turf to form a platform for their standards, only to abandon the effort when it was half complete at the entreaties of their commander.[699] Disunity also surfaced when the men begin to punish their officers. There is nearly violence between VIII and XV legions over whether the

[696] O'Gorman (2000: 28)
[697] O'Gorman (2000: 29)
[698] Tac. *Ann.* 1.18.2
[699] Tac. *Ann*. 1.19.1

centurion Sirpicus is to be killed. Finally the men of IX are able to diffuse the situation with entreaties and threats.[700] Even in Germany, where there does not appear to have been as severe a breakdown in the discipline of the camp, Tacitus is quick to warn his readers not to misunderstand the situation. What appeared to be discipline, he warns, was merely a manifestation of the intense fury of the soldiers: '*pariter ardescerent, pariter silerent, tanta aequalitate ut regi crederes*.' 'they were unanimous in their fury and equally unanimous in their composure, with so uniform a consistency that one would have thought them to be under command.'[701] Even when the mutineers appeared disciplined it was merely an indication of the danger they pose. Tacitus portrays the mutineers as dangerous agents of disorder both through their behaviour and through the language used by and about them. This is directly connected to the outbreak of mutiny; the soldiers are not described this way when acting under orders.

In Pannonia, Clemens and other popular centurions went about the camp attempting to undermine the commitment of the mutinous soldiers. Their argument to the troops began with a familiar rhetorical phrase: '*quo usque filium imperatoris obsidebimus*?' [702] 'How long will you besiege the emperor's son?' This echoes the famous opening of Cicero's speech against Catiline: '*quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?*'[703] The

[700] Tac. *Ann.* 1.23.5
[701] Tac. *Ann*. 1.32.3
[702] Tac. *Ann*. 1.28.4.
[703] Cic. *Catil.* 1.1.

connexion is strengthened by the series of questions that follow the opening line, which mirror the pattern of Cicero's speech.[704] If Tacitus is linking Clemens' position during the mutiny, and by extension that of Drusus and ultimately Tiberius, with Cicero's during the Catiline conspiracy, then he would appear to be granting the moral high ground to the agents of the principate. However, as Pagán points out, Clemens' speech is also remarkably similar to the speech Catiline makes in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*, complicating a simple moral reading of the situation.[705] In Sallust's account, Catiline asks his followers: '*Quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi viri*?'[706] If Clemens is Cicero then Percennius is Catiline, and the mutiny is simply a rebellion against the legitimate authority. If, however, Clemens is to be read as Catiline, then the situation become more nuanced. By blurring the positions of mutineer and officer, Tacitus paints the mutiny less as a rebellion against legitimate authority and more as a civil war.

The spectre of civil war haunts the episodes of mutiny in AD 14 from the beginning. The soldiers' primary motivation, Tacitus tells us, was the hope of profits only available to soldiers during a civil war.[707] Even the term he uses for mutiny, *seditio* carries a sense of civil disorder beyond the military context. For example when Scipio berates his troops following the mutiny of 206 BC he paints the mutiny as both a military and a civilian crime:

[704] Pagán (2005: 420).
[705] Pagán (2005: 421).
[706] Sal. *Cat*. 20.9.
[707] Tac. *Ann*. 1.16.1

> apud vos quem ad rodum loquar, nec consilium nec oratio suppeditat, quos ne quo nomine quidem appellare debeam scio. cives? qui a patria vestra descistis, — an milites? qui imperium auspiciumque abnuistis, sacramenti religionem rupistis, — hostes?[708]
>
> But how to speak to *you* —for that both thoughts and language fail me. I do not know even by what name I ought to address you. Citizens? When you have revolted from your country? Or soldiers? When you have rejected the high command and the auspices, have broken the sanctity of your oath? Enemies?

Under the republic, where soldiers were citizens on temporary campaigns, the differentiation between mutiny and civil revolt seems to have been less clear. So too with the mutinies in Pannonia and Germany, where the mutineers presented themselves as aggrieved citizens. Percennius, then, speaks less as a soldier disobeying his commander than a citizen protesting his conditions.

Scipio' sentiments are echoed by Germanicus in his speech to the mutinous men of I and XX. As in Spain, Germanicus conceived of mutiny as an act of both civil and military disobedience, but his phrasing had significant differences:

> Quod nomen huic coetui dabo? Militesne appellem, qui fillium imperatoris vestri vallo et armis circumsedistis? An cives, quibus tam proiecta senatus auctoritas?[709]
>
> What name am I to give a gathering like this? Shall I call you soldiers — who have besieged the son of your emperor with your earthworks and your arms? Or citizens — who have treated the authority of the senate as a thing so abject?

Germanicus' choice of words is illustrative. Whereas republican soldiers were soldiers under the *imperium* of their generals and citizens who owed loyalty to

[708] Livy 28.27.3-4
[709] Tac. *Ann.* 1.42.2

the *patria*, imperial soldiers served under an *Imperator*, no longer an abstract political concept but a man with descendants. Here Germanicus was trotting out the official line of the Tiberian régime: both Velleius Paterculus and the *SCPP* were clear that it was the person of the emperor that stood between the state and civil war.[710] The primary pillar of this new order was the allegiance owed by the Roman army to the *Princeps*. Augustus had made this situation explicit in the *Res Gestae*: '*millia civium Roma*(norum adacta) *sacramento meo fuerunt circiter* (quingen)*ta.*' The number of Roman citizens who bound themselves to me by military oath was about 500,000.'[711] The language was explicitly personal. Every soldier of the Roman state owed his personal allegiance to the emperor.

That republican sentiment amongst the soldiers would lead to civil war seems to have been a foregone conclusion to Tacitus. By AD 14, the Civil Wars were thirty-five years past. Even the long-suffering veterans on the Pannonian and German frontiers had no personal memory of civil conflict or its possibilities for profit. Rather Tacitus is showing that civil war is the natural inclination of a republican soldier. Indeed, in both Pannonia and Germany the mutiny ends with open conflict between Roman citizens. Tacitus explicitly describes the violence at the end of the German mutiny as civil war.[712] This is the essential point that Tacitus makes by portraying the mutinies as republican moments. While the mutineers may have been following the examples of their

[710] Vell. Pat. 126.2-3; *SCPP* 45-47
[711] *RGDA* 3
[712] Tac. *Ann*. 1.49.1

republican forebears, the *exempla* they choose were not worthy of admiration. The republic that these mutineers represented was dangerous, driven by emotion and desire for personal gain, and destined inevitably for civil conflict. Percennius evoked the republic as he incited mutiny, but the republic he evoked was that of Catiline and the civil wars.

## The Imperial Resolution of the AD 14 Mutinies

The mutinies in AD 14 ended in a markedly different way from their republican counterparts. The accounts of the mutinies during the social war are too brief to form a detailed picture of their suppression, but Livy describes the repression of the Spanish mutiny in great depth. In 206 BC Scipio quelled the trouble in three steps. First, he mollified his men, addressing their concerns by sending out collectors to the tributary states in Spain to raise the money necessary to supply his men with their back pay.[713] Then he had the ringleaders of the mutiny arrested and brought out of the army camp under guard. He then cowed the rest of the mutineers with the presence of troops under discipline.[714] After addressing the men and castigating them for their behaviour, he had the ringleaders executed.[715]

This was a straightforward case of the military hierarchy re-establishing order. Everything was done officially and out in the open on the orders of the army's commander. The chain of command was involved in the suppression of the mutiny as it was the tribunes who were responsible for arresting the

[713] Livy 28.25.10
[714] Livy 28.26.10-14
[715] Livy 28.29.9-11

mutineers before the commander's speech. Though we lack the details, the sources suggest that the mutiny of Porcius Cato's army during the social war was supressed officially as Dio reports that the ringleader Titius was sent back to Rome to face trial, though was not in the end punished.[716] As it was a regular problem, the republic had methods and means for handling mutiny. Indeed, the fact that Titius was tried and acquitted for his part in a mutiny rather than summarily executed suggests that there was a legal process that was meant to be followed. Mutinies under the republic were resolved within the framework of the republic, either through the exercise of a general's *imperium* or the legal apparatus of the state.

There was nothing republican in the way the Pannonian and German mutinies was finally suppressed. Though both AD14 mutinies ended similarly, with order restored through chaotic violence, the early responses to the trouble from the sons of Tiberius differed in interesting ways. From the outset the response to the Pannonian mutiny was distinctly imperial. Tiberius dispatched his son Drusus to deal with the trouble. The young Claudian was accompanied with the manifestations of his father's power; two praetorian cohorts, a large detachment of Praetorian cavalry, and some of Tiberius' German bodyguards. The future prefect Aelius Sejanus, the man who would preside over the brutal manifestation of Tiberius' imperial power in later books of the *Annales*, was also present.[717] Throughout his interaction with the men Drusus stressed his position as a conduit between the soldiers and their

[716] Dio fr. 100
[717] Tac. *Ann*. 1.24.2

emperor. Further, he informed them that any changes to the conditions of the soldiers would go through the imperial family. Tiberius' own letter reinforced this point:

> Ubi primum a luctu requiesset animus, acturum apud patres de postulatis eorum ; misisse interim filium ut sine cunctatione concederet quae statim tribui possent ; cetera senatui servanda...[718]
>
> The first moment his spirit rested from its grief, he would discuss their demands before the fathers; meanwhile he had sent his son to concede without hesitation whatever could be granted immediately; the rest had to be kept for the senate...

Tiberius' letter, however politely written, firmly informed the troops that they had no direct recourse to the senate. He and his son would handle their complaints, and bring them before the senate when the emperor thought it appropriate.

When an eclipse began to erode the confidence of the Pannonian mutineers, Drusus seized the opportunity and ordered the centurions regarded as reliable, led by Julius Clemens, to go out and undermine the mutiny. This process looked nothing like the public speech given by Scipio in Spain or even the public complaints of the mutineers themselves:

> accitur centurio Clemens et si alii bonis artibus grati in vulgus. hi vigiliis, stationibus, custodiis portarum se inserunt, spem offerunt, metum intendunt.[719]
>
> The centurion Clemens was summoned with those others whose good qualities had endeared them to the troops. These men mingled with the pickets, sentries, and gate guards, offering hope and stoking fears.

[718] Tac. *Ann*. 1.25.3
[719] Tac. *Ann* 1.28.3-4

While Percennius' speech was made in public – *contionabundus*, – to a gathering of men, the message of the centurions is portrayed almost as rumour, with no clear speaker or listener.[720] Here Tacitus provides a glimpse of the old Rome and the new. Percennius, speaking openly and publicly, evoked the republic. Clemens, whispering in the dark and appealing to individual hopes and fears, was an agent of the principate.

The final moments of the mutiny were also marked by deceit and personal violence. Drusus had the ringleaders of the mutiny, Percennius and Vibulenus, summoned to headquarters and then quietly killed. Tacitus says that this was done so secretly that some accounts record that the bodies were buried inside the tent.[721] Percennius' career as a mutineer began with a public speech before the camp and ended with a private killing in his commander's tent. The final suppression of the remaining mutineers was equally unofficial and violent:

> Tum ut quisque praecipuus turbator conquisiti, et pars, extra castra palantes, a centurionibus aut praetoriarum cohortium militibus caesi: quosdam ipsi manipuli documentum fidei tradidere.[722]
>
> Search was then made for all the chief mutineers. A part, roaming outside the camp, were cut down by the centurions or by soldiers of the praetorian cohorts. Some others the maniples handed over in proof of their loyalty.

It is true that neither the chief mutineers in Spain nor those in Pannonia faced trial; as *Imperator* Scipio held the right to summarily execute his men.

[720] Pagán (2005) 422
[721] Tac. *Ann* 1.29.4
[722] Tac. *Ann* 1.30.1

However, the executions in Spain were handled publicly, before the assembled troops, and proceeded in an orderly manner. In AD 14 there was no official procedure or organised executions. While the Spanish mutiny was ended through the public reestablishment of military hierarchy, the Pannonian mutiny ended with a series of private killings and betrayals. Conspicuously taking an active part in the bloody suppression were the praetorians, the household guards of the emperor, responsible on the frontiers at the beginning of Tiberius' reign for the extrajudicial killing of Roman citizens, a purpose they would later serve in his reign back in Rome. The connexion with the later dark days of Tiberius is further strengthened by the presence of the Sejanus, attached to Drusus' staff as an advisor.

Germanicus' early response to the mutiny in Germany was substantially more moderate than that of Drusus.[723] Unlike Drusus, Germanicus did not arrive in camp surrounded by the trappings of imperial power. His early statements to the mutineers also adopted a different tone from that of his adoptive brother. While Germanicus connected Tiberius to Augustus, he primarily painted Tiberius as their former commander, not as their *princeps*. His statement concerning the reaction of the empire to Tiberius' ascension is also interesting: '*Italiae inde consensum, Galliarum fidem extollit: nil usquam turbidum aut discors.*' 'He praised the concord in Italy and the loyalty of the Gauls; nowhere else was there disorder or dissent.'[724] The *consensus* required

[723] For more detailed analysis of how Tacitus portrays Germanicus' handling of the Rhine mutiny see Salvo (2010); Pelling (1993); Rutland (1987); Ross (1973).
[724] Tac. *Ann*. 1.34.4

in Italy was made clear in contrast to the situation in the provinces; as provincials, the Gauls were expected to be loyal, as citizens the Italians supported the government. This framing is important as the men of the German legions were citizens and, in AD 14, still predominantly recruited in Italy.[725] What Germanicus expected from his men was the *consensus* of citizens, not the *fides* of provincials. When he addressed the mutiny directly, he framed their behaviour as a breakdown of military discipline: '*ut seditionem attigit, ubi modestia militaris, ubi veteris disciplinae decus*.' 'when he touched on the mutiny he asked where was the military subordination, where the famous traditional discipline?'[726] Like Blaesus, as we saw at the beginning of the chapter, he unfavourably compared their behaviour to that of their predecessors, but he spoke in abstract concepts. Unlike the Blaesus, Germanicus made no mention of either the current or the former *princeps*.

As the situation in German failed to improve, there was a hardening of tone from command when they addressed the recalcitrant soldiers. This shift appears to have originated not with Germanicus but lower down the military hierarchy. Fearing a mutiny amongst his own troops, the commander of a detachment, Marcus Ennius, ended up outraging his own troops by executing two of their number. Facing down an angry mob, the prefect warned his men that violence against his person was also violence against the imperial system: '*non praefectum ab iis, sed Germanicum ducem, sed Tiberium imperatorem*

[725] Mann (1983: 25-30)
[726] Tac. *Ann*. 1.35.1

*violari*.' 'It was not their prefect, but Germanicus, their general, but Tiberius, their emperor, they were insulting.'[727] Ennius' actions marked a shift in approach in comparison to the early stage of the mutiny. The cooperative, conciliatory approach that Germanicus began with had been replaced with unilateral action taken, Tacitus writes, '*concesso iure*'.[728]

By the time of his harangue of the I and XX in Cologne, Germanicus' tone had changed completely. As he instructed the reliable soldiers to distance themselves from the mutineers he spoke not of co-operation but of obedience:

> si legatos senatui, obsequium imperatori, si mihi coniugem et filium redditis, discedite a contactu ac dividite turbidos : id stabile ad paenitentiam, id fidei vinculum erit.[729]
>
> If you restore the legates to the senate, your obedience to the emperor and my wife and son to me, if you break association with and point out the mutineers, this will be the foundation your repentance and make clear your loyalty.

The language of conciliation was by now long gone. The only recourse for the soldiers was to submit fully to the authority of the imperial family. The mutinies in Germany were quelled in an equally unofficial and bloody fashion as those in Pannonia. Germanicus' speech managed to shame the men into obedience, and he allowed them to demonstrate their loyalty by punishing the mutineers themselves. This leads to a scene of mob violence where the ringleaders were

[727] Tac. *Ann*. 1.38.2
[728] Tac. *Ann*. 1.38.1
[729] Tac. *Ann*. 1.43.4

thrown to a crowd of vengeful soldiers without any semblance of order or legal process.[730] Tacitus himself calls it an act of *invidia* and *saevitia*.[731]

The commander of the second mutinous camp supressed his men before Germanicus could arrive with loyal troops. Much like in Pannonia, Caecina secretly summoned his officers and sent them out into the camp to quietly alienate the mutineers. When the disloyal ones had been identified, they were massacred at a secret signal from command.[732] Here again the command structure re-established itself not with a public imposition of justice but with a series of extra-judicial killings. Tacitus framed this as a new variety of civil war. '*diversa omnium quae umquam accidere civilium armorum facies*.' 'This was unlike any other civil war.'[733]

The mutinies of AD 14 had begun as a republican moment, but their suppression was purely imperial. The images of soldiers denouncing their fellows, of men quietly killed by government representatives, and of praetorians stalking the camp with the blood of citizens on their swords evoked the later years of Tiberius' reign. This was how the imperial state would respond to challenges to its authority. By emphasising the brutality of the government in re-establishing order, Tacitus firmly shows that soldiers of the principate do not hold the rights of their forebears. The fundamental message

[730] Tac. *Ann* 1.44
[731] Tac. *Ann* 1.44.3
[732] Tac. *Ann* 1.48.2-3
[733] Tac. *Ann* 1.49.1

of Tacitus' account of the mutinies of AD 14 is one that he returns to again and again in his work: the republic is gone for good.

## Conclusion

What, then, is Tacitus telling the reader happened with the troops in Pannonia and Germania? Part of the answer lies in his statement that the mutiny arose *nullis novis causis*. That answer is complicated by the apparent difference between what Tacitus tells the reader and what his narrative shows. As discussed in the opening of this chapter, Tacitus' account ascribes two sets of causes to the mutiny of AD 14. At the outset of the mutiny he informs the reader that the trouble came from the opportunity for disorder offered by the death of an emperor and the hope of a profitable civil war. In his narrative of the episode and in the speeches of the troops themselves, their dissatisfaction with the conditions of their service plays a far more prominent part.

The simplest way to read this episode would be to decide which of the causes Tacitus' *nullis novis causis* refers to. If the mutiny sprang from frustration at the circumstances of military service, as Percennius claimed, then the events of AD 14 fell within the tradition of the republic. It was a revolt against military authority to express the men's dissatisfaction at their conditions. If, as Tacitus states, the revolt was caused by the interregnum following the death of Augustus and the prospect of loot, then the mutiny challenged the legitimacy of the government and risked civil war. At first glance, then, the reader is forced to decide whether to believe the voice of the historian or his narrative.

Such differing interpretations of events are also present in the perceptions of the actors. The soldiers behaved as if their actions were justified and within their rights as Roman soldiers. As we have seen, their mutiny fits within a long tradition of disorder and protest in the armies of the republic. They also behaved as though they were working within the structure of the Roman state, even as they rejected the immediate military hierarchy. When the Pannonian mutineers threatened violence against a senatorial representative it was because they feared that the representative will oppose their cause in the senate.[734]

The violent response from the imperial authorities suggests that command interpreted the situation in a markedly different way. They saw the mutiny as inherently revolutionary and warned the men repeatedly that they were operating in opposition not only to their commanders but also to the political order. Both Germanicus and the prefect Ennius told the men that their actions were tantamount to violence against the imperial family. The centurions in Pannonia, led by Clemens, even suggested that the mutineers intended to replace the imperial family with Percennius and Vibulenus, though the mutineers themselves had made no such suggestions.[735]

The confusion in the narrative stems from the misinterpretation of the situation by the mutineers. In the opening sentence of his account of the events of AD 14, Tacitus states that the mutiny arose from no new causes

[734] Tac. *Ann*. 1.27.2
[735] Tac. *Ann*. 1.28.4

except that the change of emperor offered the chance for disobedience.[736] This statement provides two vital pieces of information about the mutinies: that the cause was similar to mutinies in the republic and that the context was the new process of the transmission of imperial power. The tension between the old cause and the new context was ultimately irreconcilable. Percennius, Vibulenus, and the other mutineers have failed to understand the new context for their mutiny.

By mutinying against their terrible conditions, the legionaries in Pannonia and Germany followed in the same tradition as their forebears. Those republican citizen-soldiers had, or believed they had, the right to protest their conditions during their military service. As we have seen, such protests were common under the republic and frequently resulted in open mutiny. Particularly in Livy's conception of the republic, while the act of mutiny could significantly affect the republic's ability to prosecute a war, but it did not in itself pose a threat to the stability of the state. That mutiny did not offer Rome an existential threat may account for the ambiguous republican attitude to mutiny, the result of which was that Cicero felt able to describe the mutinous behaviour of Lucullus' legions in the East as little more than an understandable desire to return home.[737]

By AD 14 the context had changed. Rebellious soldiers no longer challenged the authority of generals appointed by the senate, they challenged

[736] Tac. *Ann*. 1.16.1
[737] Cic. *Leg. Man.* 9.23-24

the authority of Tiberius, the head of the imperial state itself. For the outset the mutiny is portrayed by Tacitus as inherently violent, disordered, and headed inevitably towards civil war. The loyalty of the soldiery was crucial to the imperial regime and the social order. Simply by exercising their traditional rights the armies in Pannonia and Germany threatened to return Rome to the violence of the last decades of the republic.

The threat that disorderly troops posed to the state influenced the rhetoric of discipline and punishment during the principate. Writing under the republic, Sallust describes the correct approach to maintaining discipline. To his mind punishment was best tempered with moderation and employed alongside good examples from command and appeals to the honour of the men.[738] In the imperial sources there is a much stronger emphasis on strict discipline enforced with brutal punishment. Tacitus speaks with approval of the brutal methods used to quell the mutinies in AD 14, describing even extra-judicial executions as *bona exempla*.[739] He speaks similarly well of the extreme severity employed by Corbulo to toughen his troops in Syria.[740] Velleius Paterculus celebrates the *severitas* employed by Germanicus and Drusus in the suppression of the mutinies.[741] Also writing under Tiberius, Valerius Maximus puts it bluntly: '*aspero...et absciso castigationis genere militaris disciplina indiget*' 'military discipline requires a direct and cruel form of punishment.'[742]

[738] Sallust discusses discipline at length at *Bel. Jug.* 45, 100.5, and *His.* 1.94
[739] Tac. *Ann*. 1.38.1
[740] Tac. *Ann*. 13.35
[741] Vell. Pat. 2.125.3-4
[742] Val. Max. 2.7.14

As discussed above, the fact that the Julio-Claudian family was the only thing that stood between Rome and a return to the civil wars was a common narrative in the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. It is present in both official proclamations and the writings of Velleius Paterculus. Tacitus himself begins the *Annales* with an account of the republic's descent into civil war and the rise of Augustus and the establishment of peace.[743] If the principate was the primary bulwark against civil conflict, then to challenge the authority of the system was inevitably to court civil war. Any such challenge must be dealt with swiftly and decisively.

In this new context, the act of mutiny was no longer an acceptable way for soldiers to express their grievances, no matter whether those grievances were or where not legitimate. Germanicus demonstrated this in Germany. Even as he was preparing to supress the mutineers, he made what concessions he could by paying donatives and discharging those held past their length of service.[744] This was not merely an attempt to play for time, as he made the same concessions to the loyal and ordered legions of Upper Germany.[745] Further, as soon as the mutiny had been repressed, Germanicus immediately took steps to address another of the complaints that had provoked the disorder by discharging any centurions known to be greedy or brutal.[746] Germanicus accepted the legitimacy of their complaints, and once order had been restored and the leading mutineers punished, once the men had learned

[743] Tac. *Ann*. 1.1.1
[744] Tac. *Ann*. 1.36.3
[745] Tac. *Ann*. 1.37.3
[746] Tac. *Ann*. 1.44.5

that mutiny was not going to be tolerated, those complaints could be addressed. The message from the imperial family was clear; the men no longer enjoyed the same rights as their republican predecessors. The Roman army was no longer one that would tolerate mutiny as a form of protest from the lower ranks.

Primarily, this and the following chapter push back firmly against the tendency to assume in Tacitus a dismissive and wholly negative conception of the Roman soldier as simply an armed *vulgus*.[747] The soldier depicted in the mutiny of AD 14 is a nuanced individual, with practical interests and capable of organising in order to agitate for them. It is certainly not the case that Tacitus does not consider him a citizen, as others have asserted.[748] Rather, the mutinous soldiers of Pannonia and Germania are keenly aware of their status as citizens, and attempt to assert that they retain the rights that their predecessors of the Republic held.

Velleius Paterculus' brief account of the Pannonian and German mutinies explicitly accuses the mutineers of wanting to destroy the state: '*novum ducem, novem statum, novam quaerebant rem publicam.*' 'They wanted a new leader, a new order, and a new republic.'[749] Except for a half-hearted attempt by the German legions to offer the throne to Germanicus, Tacitus does not depict the mutineers as hoping for regime change. Indeed,

[747] Recently articulated by Späth (2012: 453n8), but an idea with a long lineage. A survey of such thought is present in the introduction.
[748] E.g. Carrié (1993: 105).
[749] Vell. Pat. 2.125.1

even if their inclination was towards civil war, it was driven by the hope of loot, not a change of government.[750] They did not desire a new republic because they had failed to understand that they no longer served the old republic. Percennius, Vibulenus, and the ringleaders of the German mutinies believed that they, as citizen soldiers, still retained the rights that the new social order had made obsolete. This was the purpose of Blaesus' lie. He warned his men that Roman soldiers no longer had the right to mutiny in protest of their conditions, then he attempted to soften the blow by suggesting that they never did anyway. Germanicus and Drusus established with steel and blood what Blaesus had failed to do *multa arte*: that '*non per seditionem et turbas desideria militum ad Caesarem ferenda ait*' 'the wishes of a soldier should not be brought to Caesar by disorder and mutiny.'

[750] Tac. *Ann*. 1.16.1

# CHAPTER FOUR

## Tacitus' *Historiae* and the Loyal Soldier

As is to be expected during a civil war, the army of the *Historiae* is a fractured army. Obviously, it is fractured between the major factions backing the emperors Otho, Vitellius, and Galba. In this chapter, these factions will largely be referred to by the Latin term used by Tacitus: *Othoniani*, the *Vitelliani*, and the *Flaviani*.[751] It should be stressed, of course, that membership in these factions is not necessarily set in stone, may of the *Othoniani* – in particular the Praetorians and the Danube Legions – ended up supporting Vespasian after Otho's death, and there was a general defection of officers from Vitellius to Vespasian as their emperor's fortunes waned. The degree of fracturing that Tacitus portrays goes deeper. The army described in the *Historiae* is one with destructive – or at least disruptive – rivalries and mistrust between units. Even within those units the army remains fractured even down to the individual soldier. Further, it is evident from the *Annales* that, though the civil war was an exceptional period, the dynamics that contributed to the fracturing of the army were present in the earlier period. The cause of this fracture was the fact that that the primary social and political bond that drove a Roman soldier was not his relationship to his comrades, nor his place in the hierarchy of the legion. It was not even his position as a Roman citizen, it was

[751] Ash suggests a fourth faction, the 'Galbians' but in no part of the *Historiae* does Tacitus talk about sections of the army that have strong loyalty towards Galba (1999: 23-26). There is no equivalent term for Galba's men to match '*Vitelliani*', '*Othoniani*', &c. Indeed, excepting a few loyal centurions, there is little evidence in the *Historiae* for any significant group of soldiers loyal to the emperor.

his personal loyalty to his emperor. According to Syme, as discipline broke down 'the soldiery recaptured, as it were, the rights of citizens.'[752] Yet the soldiers of AD 69 show few of the traditional traits of Roman citizen-soldiers. An analysis of the way that these soldiers interacted with their emperor, the military hierarchy, and the larger Roman state will establish that these soldiers had very little in common with the soldiers of the republic.

The army described by Tacitus in the *Historiae* is an army of individuals and each of these individuals is motivated by his own ambitions and fears.[753] Sallust's understanding of military service paints it as a grand, unifying experience – at least so long as it is done under an old-fashioned, vigorous general – that brings plebeian and aristocrat together and reaffirms Roman values. To Livy, military service unified the plebs but maintained their position – carried over from the civilian sphere – in opposition to the *patres*. In both the communal nature of military service is emphasised. To Sallust the army was a unified entity, good or bad depending on the ability and diligence of their general. In Livy the plebeian soldiery acted in unison, sharing the same values and motivations. This sense of common feeling is present in the opening of the *Annales*, where Tacitus frames the mutinies of AD 14 as an echo of the republican soldier's willingness to assert himself.

[752] Syme (1959: 169)

[753] There is a tendency among scholar's to play up Tacitus' disdain for the soldiery and suggest a universal pattern of behaviour characteristic of the *miles gregarius* E.g. Mellor (1993: 56-57); Chilver (1979: 101); Flaig (1992: 25-26). However, Tacitus' account does not support this. He regularly refers to both 'good' and 'bad' elements among the soldiery (e.g. *Hist*. 1.16.3) and the worst behaviour of the soldiers comes when the 'good' are absent or cowed.

In the *Historiae*, soldiers are somewhat different. The *milites gregarii* distrust their officers and hate their centurions and even amongst themselves there is little evidence of common sentiment and almost no evidence of any organised communal action. The rhetoric of *commilitio* is common in the civil war of AD 69, often invoked by aristocrats hoping to win support from the men.[754] Despite this, actual displays of common feeling between soldiers of different units are rare in the *Historiae*. Again, this can be compared to the *Annales*, where Corbulo's men display common feeling when meeting the survivors of Paetus' army.[755]

This chapter will argue that unlike the army conceived of by Sallust and Livy – and indeed the army he himself presented in AD 14 – Tacitus' army of the *Historiae* is an army of individuals, and that military service never truly unifies the men under the eagles. Rather military service results in a strong personal bond between the emperor and the soldier, which overrides other bonds the soldier might have. In AD 69, when the state is fractured between multiple emperors, the overriding loyalty individual *milites* have to their emperor leads in places to the collapse of military hierarchies, but in other times to the fracturing of armies not only from each other, but from the civilian society of the empire. It is this fracture that results in violence towards other armies and civilians and marks the soldiers of the civil war.

[754] Piso addresses the praetorians, absurdly, as *commilitones* (Hist. 1.29.2); Galba rebukes one of his men as *commilito* (1.35.2); Otho is particularly fond of the term, responsible for 6 of the words 8 uses in speeches, at one point he goes a step further and calls the praetorians his *contubernales* (Hist. 1.23.1). Galba's, Piso's, and Otho's attempts to portray himself as *commilito* are discussed in detail below.
[755] Tac. *Ann*. 15.16.4

## An Army of Individuals

Tacitus often portrays soldiers as acting in different ways and from different motives, without common cause and with little organisation. He emphasises this nature by having them susceptible to individual persuasion and private subversion. By doing so he presents a picture of the Roman army that is much more atomised and fractured than those provided by Livy and Sallust. This image of the *miles gregarius* as an individual part of a larger organisation is made clearer by Tacitus' regular focalisation, which provides the reader with a sense of the emotional state of the soldier, particularly in dramatic moments, including on the eve of battle and outbreaks of mutiny. Further, Tacitus regularly records the names of the common soldiers who populate his narrative.

The chaotic events in Rome leading up to the assassination of Galba provide an excellent case study of the Roman army as a force composed of men of differing motivations, aims, and interests. When Otho was carried off to be proclaimed emperor, Tacitus makes it clear that the soldiers were not acting communally and with a singular purpose:

> ibi tres et viginti speculatores consalutatum imperatorem ac paucitate salutantium trepidum et sellae festinanter impositum strictis mucronibus rapiunt; totidem ferme milites in itinere adgregantur, alii conscientia, plerique miraculo, pars clamore et gladiis, pars silentio, animum ex eventu sumpturi.[756]

[756] Tac. *Hist*. 1.27.2

> There three and twenty soldiers of the body-guard saluted him as Emperor, and, while he trembled at their scanty number, put him hastily into a chair, drew their swords, and hurried him onwards. About as many more soldiers joined them on their way, some because they were in the plot, many from mere surprise; some shouted and brandished their swords, others proceeded in silence, intending to let the issue determine their sentiments.

This picture of the mutinous soldiers coming together as a mob, almost by chance as the procession moves through the city underscore how little organisation and planning had gone into the soldiers' plot to overthrow Galba. It also mirrors the coming together of the mutineers in the *Annales* and demonstrates that Tacitus' army was much more atomised than that of Sallust or Livy. This is clarified if the scene is compared to the actions of the Plebs in the first secession, where all were acting in harmony and with a communal will and purpose. Here, instead, Tacitus provides an image of a group of soldiers, some of whom were committed, some of whom were merely waiting to commit until the outcome is clear, and many who were simply confused.

This mixed bag of soldiers, with different loyalties and motivations is also evident in the reaction to Piso's speech. There too some of the soldiers were ignorant of the plot, while others – it is suspected – were merely play-acting loyalty.[757] Tacitus makes the same point about the *Vitelliani* as they begin to rise against Galba: '*multi in utroque exercitu sicut modesti quietique ita mali et strenui*.'[758] 'As there were many in both armies who were loyal and restrained, so there were many who were unprincipled and unruly.' The chaos

[757] Tac. *Hist*. 1.31.1
[758] Tac. *Hist*. 1.52.3

that marked Otho's proclamation at the Praetorian camp was also part of this, there was no control or direction. The army behaved as a mob, seizing individual soldiers and bringing them before the pretender to swear allegiance. Even Otho was unable to exert any control or organisation.[759] Unlike in other accounts of Roman soldiers, the soldiers in Tacitus were much more likely to take action individually and on their own initiative, such as when individual soldiers took it on themselves to spy on senators suspected of insufficient loyalty to Otho.[760] Similar initiative was shown by the praetorians accompanying the embassy to Valens, who took care to watch the senators for any suspicious behaviour.[761]

People within Tacitus' account were aware of the Roman army as a collection of individuals and used it to further their own ends. When soldiers were corrupted, as by Otho and his cronies, the corruption often began at the individual level, indeed, Tacitus names the individuals who first began to act in Otho's name: Barbius Proculus and Veturius.[762] Similarly when important Romans were denounced under Tiberius or Claudius, they were often accused of conspiring with individual members of the Praetorian Guard.[763] During Vitellius' march to Italy, the people of Lugdunum took advantage of the individual sensibility of the *Vitelliani* to prompt them to attack the rival city of

[759] Tac. *Hist*. 1.36
[760] Tac. *Hist*. 1.85.1-2
[761] Tac. *Hist*. 1.74. Chilver suggests they are also attempting to subvert Valens' legionaries, (1979: 137)
[762] Tac. *Hist*. 1.25.1
[763] Tac. *Ann*. 4.28, 11.2.1 Calpurnius Piso tries much the same tactics when undermining Germanicus (2.55.3-6)

Vienna: '*Lugdunenses extimulare singulos militum et in eversionem Viennensium impellere*.'[764] 'the people of Lugdunum began to work on the passions of individual soldiers, and to goad them into destroying Vienna.' This tactic was particularly successful, so much so that the officers of the legion doubted that they could restrain the men.[765]

Fortunately, the people of Vienna also understood how to manipulate the soldiery, and were able to divert the army also by appealing to them individually: '*cum haud ignari discriminis sui Viennenses, velamenta et infulas praeferentes, ubi agmen incesserat, arma genua vestigia prensando flexere militum animos*.'[766] 'the people of Vienna, aware of their danger, assumed the veils and chaplets of suppliants, and, as the army approached, clasped the weapons, knees, and feet of the soldiers, softening their hearts.' This constant appeal to the greed or emotion of individual soldiers was in contrast to the attempts to subvert or persuade soldiers of the republic, described by Livy, where the men were approached in public, and as a group.[767] The Tacitean soldier was much more susceptible as an individual to personal persuasion, and was often worked on in private.

Tacitus also uses internal focalisation to provide the reader with insight into the personal feelings and motivations of the common soldier, something

[764] Tac. *Hist.* 1.65.2
[765] Tac. *Hist*. 1.66.1
[766] Tac. *Hist*. 1.66.1 Though Valens' subsequent bribe of 300 HS to each man probably helped to preserve Vienna.
[767] Verginius spurred the Roman army to secede by making a public speech in the army camp, in front of not only friendly soldiers, but the representatives of the decemvirs (Livy 3.50.4-10). Manlius Capitolinus attempted to win the support of the Plebeian soldiers with public speeches in the forum, not by meeting privately with individuals (6.11).

uncommon to other historians.[768] He makes explicit the mixed opinions, feelings and motivations of the *Othoniani* during the plot against Galba, demonstrating that it was hardly a concerted or unified action: '*isque habitus animorum fuit ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur*.'[769] 'Such was the temper of men's minds, that, while there were few to venture on so atrocious a treason, many wished it done, and all were ready to acquiesce.' He also often uses battle narratives as a chance to present the feelings of the individual soldier.[770] There are many examples of this. The reader is given a sense of the mood of the soldiers about to fight Tacfarinas' soldiers in Africa.[771] So too does Tacitus describe the insulted anger of Germanicus' men when Arminius' soldiers tried to convince them to defect by offering wealth and land.[772] During the Iceni revolt, Tacitus vividly describes the fury and savagery of the Roman soldiers following the destruction of Londinium and Camoludonum.[773] In the *Historiae*, *Tacitus* gives an account of the thinking of the common soldiers before the battle of Cremona: '*illa sibi quisque*...'[774] 'each one to himself said this...' Here Tacitus is not reporting the rumours or mutterings of the camp, but rather providing the reader with insight into the thoughts and motivations of the soldiery. Further, it is framed not as the general mood of the army, but as the individual thoughts of

[768] Ash (1999: 21-22, 27-28)
[769] Tac. *Hist*. 1.28
[770] Formicula 2013: 148
[771] Tac. *Ann*. 3.25.3
[772] Tac. *Ann*. 2.55.3-6
[773] Tac. *Ann*. 14.37.1
[774] Tac. *Hist*. 3.19.1

individual men. In comparison, neither Sallust nor Livy use focalisation regularly if at all.[775]

One final aspect of Tacitus' works that contributed the sense of the Roman army as a collection of individuals is his tendency to provide the reader with the names of common soldiers far more often than other historians. Whereas centurions are regularly named by the ancient historians, it is uncommon for the names of *milites gregarii* to be given.[776] Livy does give the names of Albius and Atrius, the ringleaders of the mutiny as Sucro, but this is an exceptional case.[777] Sallust does not name a single *miles* in his work.

Tacitus, on the other hand, often provides the name of common soldiers. Through him we know the names of the ringleaders of the Pannonian mutiny, Percennius and Vibulanus, and the men first approached by Otho, Barbius Proculus and Veturius. Tacitus also gives the name of the soldier who signalled the assassination of Galba, Atilius Virgilio and his assassin, either Terentius or Camurius.[778] He also names the killers of Vinius, and Piso, and

[775] In Sallust, for example, we are not given direct information about the mind-set of Postumius Albinus' army, rather the reader infers that the men are demoralised from their actions, both the aggressive plundering of their allies and their unwillingness to stand against Jugurtha's forces (*Iug*. 44.1). Similarly, Livy hardly ever uses focalisation in his descriptions of soldiers, thus, we are aware of the relief of the soldiers at having defeated the Falscians because Livy depicts them joking afterwards about their fright, not by describing the soldiers' feelings directly (7.17.5). Livy does the same thing to signal the elation of the victorious troops after the battle of Beneventum, once again having them laugh and joke as they return to camp rather than explicitly describing their emotions or thoughts (24.16.14). A rare example of focalisation in Livy occurs in his vivid account of the Romans caught at the Caudine Forks (9.2.10-15).

[776] Centurions e.g.: Lucius Verginius and Sextius Tullius in Livy (3.44.2, 7.12.13) Volero Publius in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 9.39.1) Crastinus in Appian (*BCiv.* 2.11) Pullo and Vorenus in Caesar (*Gal.* 5.44)

[777] Livy 28.25

[778] Tac. *Hist*. 1.41

names a deserter, Aemilius Longinus.[779] He records the Praetorian Cocceius Proculus, whom Otho helps with a legal dispute.[780] Though the roll call is mostly dominated by mutineers and assassins, Tacitus also occasionally names more respectable soldiers, such as Rufus Helvius, a *miles gregarius* who received the civil crown for service in Africa.[781] Unlike Sallust or Livy, Tactius' Roman army is populated with *milites gregarii* whom the historian has turned into named individuals.

This presentation of the Roman army as a group of individuals has effects on the surrounding narrative. The way that Tacitus presents Roman soldiers as distinct from their fellows by quality, motivation, mood and name has been discussed. Just as individualising the Roman soldier separates him from his fellows, it also dislocates him from the army hierarchy. The next section will discuss how Tacitus' model of the Roman soldier shapes his relationship with his emperor, strengthening it or weakening it depending on how the emperor relates to the individual interests of the soldiers in his army.

## The Soldier and His Emperor

With the exception of Galba, whose military support was confined to a handful of tribunes and centurions, each of the contenders in AD 69 was able to build strong military support structures that proved to be considerably loyal. Each of these factions were built by explicit appeals to the individual interests and motivations of the soldiers in their armies. While each faction had at its

[779] Julius Carus (1.42) and Statius Murcus (1.43) respectively. Longinus (4.59)
[780] Tac. *Hist*. 1.24
[781] Tac. *Ann*. 1.21.3

core the personal loyalty of each soldier to his chosen emperor, these factions were recruited in markedly different ways and formed of differing coalitions, and as a result the soldiers in the armies interacted in differing ways with the fellow soldiers, the military hierarchy, and with the emperor himself.

I have touched briefly on the origin of the Othonian conspiracy above, but a vital aspect to Tacitus' presentation is the fact that though the plot was instigated by Otho and a confidant of the praetorian prefect, the organisation was quickly placed in the hands of the *milites* themselves and the soldiers soon became the driving force behind Otho's cause. Importantly, it was common soldiers, not centurions or tribunes who were responsible for recruiting their fellows.[782] From that point the initiative remained with the soldiers until the death of Galba. The scene of Otho's proclamation demonstrates that he was exercising very little control.[783] Further, as the plot progressed without the direction of the tribunes or centurions, in the narrative they either offered resistance, and risked imprisonment or violence, or stood aside and let the soldiers have their way. Though Tacitus suggests that the majority of them were in favour of the plot, they took no active part in the preparation.[784] When Otho was made emperor by his men, the tribunes and centurions were excluded from the ceremony by the legionaries: '*nec tribunis aut centurionibus adeundi locus: gregarius miles caveri insuper praepositos iubebat*.'[785] 'Neither

[782] Tac. *Hist*. 1.25 Barbius Proculus and Veturius are a tesserarius and a optio respectively, but those legionaries that occupy a rank between *gregarius* and centurion exclusively side with their fellow soldiers in the mutinies of AD 69. The absence of similar ranks from the narrative of AD 14 may suggest that the same thing happens
[783] Tac*. Hist.* 1.27.2, quoted at length above.
[784] Tac. *Hist*. 1.28
[785] Tac. *Hist*. 1.36

tribunes nor centurions could approach. The common soldiers even insisted that all the officers should be watched.'

That the cause of Otho is the cause of the common soldier was made evident in the lead up to and aftermath of Galba's death. The soldiers – Otho's only source of support – were in favour of the coup because they had been alienated by Galba. It was his unwillingness to pay the donative the soldiers expect that prompted them to support Otho.[786] Following his death, Tacitus reports that the soldiers were in total control of the situation at Rome.[787] Otho understood this and was careful to demonstrate his affection and respect for the soldiers, and to ensure that they recognised that his interests and theirs were aligned. Even before the plot began, Tacitus reports the lengths Otho went to in order to ingratiate himself with the men: '*in itinere, in agmine, in stationibus vetustissimum quemque militum nomine vocans ac memoria Neroniani comitatus contubernalis appellando; alios agnoscere, quosdam requirere*.'[788] 'On the march, on parade, and in their quarters, he would address all the oldest soldiers by name, and in allusion to the progresses of Nero would call them his tentmates. Some he would recognise, he would inquire after others.' Otho made a serious effort to cast himself as *commilito* to the soldiers who support him and here he went further, using the term

[786] Tac. *Hist*. 1.18
[787] Tac. *Hist*. 1.46
[788] Tac. *Hist*. 1.23.1. Perkins suggests that Otho's actions 'typify and good *dux* in the field', ignoring the fact that nowhere else in Tacitus – or in earlier Latin historians – does a Roman *dux* address his men as *contubernales* (1993: 852).

*contubernalis*, a term of close affection.[789] No other Roman emperor is recorded as having addressed his men as *contubernalis*. This carefully cultivated image of himself as *commilito* was also reflected in Tacitus' description of Otho marching to war: '*lorica ferrea usus est et ante signa pedes ire, horridus, incomptus famaeque dissimilis*.'[790] 'He wore an iron breastplate and marched on foot before the standards, ill-shaven, unkempt and belying his reputation.' Otho adopted the appearance of a *miles gregarius* as part of his program to identify himself as *commilito* with his supporters.[791]

*Commilito* was a common part of the military rhetoric of the civil wars, and particularly favoured by Julius Caesar, who preferred to use it to address his men rather than *milites*.[792] Augustus refused to use it, feeling it was deleterious to morale and discipline.[793] Over the course of the Julio-Claudian period, however, it appears to have become a regular part of imperial propaganda.[794] By the late 1st century it had become ubiquitous enough that it was lampooned in graffiti on the guard posts at Pompeii.[795] In the *Historiae*

[789] Lendon has shown that it was commonly used as a term of affection between soldiers as evidenced by its prevalence in epigraphy. Its usage did not necessarily imply that men had served together as tent mates, but rather carried a meaning similar to *frater* (2006: 276)
[790] Tac. *Hist*. 2.11.3
[791] The meaning of this self-presentation has been noticed by other scholars but misunderstood. Ash (2007: 109) notes its significance, but directs the reader to Chilver, who suggests that Tacitus means to say that he was outfitted like a centurion (1979: 176). That reading, however, makes little sense in the context of the *Othoniani* and their relationship with both Otho and their centurions. Further, *horridus* is an adjective with long association with common soldiers. Livy remarks that Roman soldiers were unimpressed with the magnificent war-gear of the Samnites because '*horridem militem esse debere*' (9.40.4). For *horridus* as associated with *milites* see Cloud (1993: 127, 132-3)
[792] Suet. *Jul*. 67.2
[793] Suet. *Aug*. 25.1
[794] Campbell (1985: 32-37)
[795] CIL IV 4618, 4622

the only other men who addressed the soldiery as *commilitiones* were Galba and Piso.[796] Even then Otho stands out as he used it five times over the course of two speeches.

Otho's engagement with the personal emotions of his men went beyond simply using a flattering term of address. In his rebuke to the Praetorians, Otho presents his men as true Romans and the *Vitelliani* as Germans:

> caput imperii et decora omnium provinciarum ad poenam vocare non hercule illi, quos cum maxime Vitellius in nos ciet, Germani audeant. ulline Italiae alumni et Romana vere iuventus ad sanguinem et caedem depoposcerit ordinem, cuius splendore et gloria sordis et obscuritatem Vitellianarum partium praestringimus? nationes aliquas occupavit Vitellius, imaginem quandam exercitus habet, senatus nobiscum est sic fit ut hinc res publica, inde hostes rei publicae constiterint.[797]
>
> To clamour for the destruction of what is the head of the Empire, and contains all that is distinguished in the provinces, Hercules! it is a thing which not even those Germans, whom Vitellius at this very moment is rousing against us, would dare to do. Shall any sons of Italy, the true youth of Rome, cry out for the massacre of an order, by whose splendid distinctions we throw into the shade the mean and obscure faction of Vitellius? Vitellius is the master of a few tribes, and has some semblance of an army. We have the Senate. The country is with us; with them, the country's enemies.

The contrast between the two factions is stark. The *Othoniani* are true Roman youths and sons of italy, supported by the senate and the state. The *Vitelliani*, by contrast, are a mere image of an army, a gathering of hostile tribes and Germans at that. Otho's casting of the Rhine legions as roving bands of hostile Germans is often dismissed as rhetorical exaggeration.[798] Yet the rhetorical

[796] Galba at 1.35.2, Piso at 1.29.2.
[797] Tac. *Hist*.
[798] Chilver (1979:152); There is a tendency among scholars to take this framing more seriously, however, and argue that Tacitus conceives of the Othonians as Italians and the other factions

point was a powerful one, and framed the Othonian side as legitimate while repainting the Vitelliani not simply as Romans of another faction but as a foreign enemy. It was also one of the few moments where Otho presented his cause as larger than simply him and his men. It was likely driven by recent tension between his soldiers and the senate. Even here, though, there is evidence that Otho was playing to the sensitivities of his men. His framing of the army as divided between proper Italian soldiers and foreign legions may have reflected the mentality of the Guard. In an inscription, a centurion boasts that the century he commanded was '*cohortis*...*praetoriae fidus non barbaricae legionis*' 'of loyal praetorian cohort not of barbarian legion'.[799]

Tacitus' narrative suggests that Otho's attempts to frame himself as *commilito* to the soldiers in his army were successful, in a way that neither Galba nor Otho's were. Part of the issue is that neither Galba nor Piso used it correctly. Throughout the opening of the *Historiae*, Galba was consistent in his misunderstanding of the relationship between himself and his soldiers.[800] His sole use of *commilito* during the narrative demonstrates this, Galba addressed one of the praetorians using the term, but this was part of a rebuke:

as foreign armies. Master (2016: 65-73); Ash (1999: 70-72); Doing so elides the fact that a large proportion of Otho's army was composed not simply of non-Italians, but of former *peregrini.* The Urban cohorts and Praetorians would obviously have been citizens, but the soldiers in the new *legio classiariorum* had not been citizens before enlistment and it is likely that the men of the fleet were not even granted the Latin right until the Flavian period. On the sailors of the fleet as *peregrini*, see Rankov (2007: 57) and Reddé (1986: 525-526). The men of the *legio classiariorum* were most likely enfranchised on enlistment. Miller (1981: 77)

[799] CIL V 923.

[800] Sancery (1983: 125-127)

> obvius in Palatio Iulius Atticus speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans, occisum a se Othonem exlamavit; et Galba 'commilito', inquit 'quis iussit?'[801]
>
> Encountering him on the Palatine, the bodyguard Julius Atticus, showing a bloody sword, claimed that he had killed Otho and Galba asked 'Comrade, who gave you the order?'

As he has before, Galba presumed the loyalty and affection of his men that he felt his due, though, as Tacitus states earlier, he had done nothing to earn it.[802] Even worse, the complaints from the men of the *legio classica* suggest that Galba's actions had undermined his status of fellow soldier. They, Tacitus says, made common cause with the praetorians against Galba out of anger against the emperor: '*infestae ob caedem commilitonum, quos primo statim introitu trucidaverat Galba.*'[803] 'enraged by the massacre of their comrades, whom Galba had slaughtered immediately on his entry into the capital.' It would have been difficult for Galba to successfully frame himself as a comrade to those whose comrades he had ordered killed, even if he was later willing to be more lenient and generous. Galba's use of the word *commilito* points to the tyrannical exercise of military authority and his complete failure to take steps to win over his soldiers.[804] This total failure is emphasised by Tacitus' account of Galba's death, where he was totally abandoned by his soldiers.[805] This is in contrast to Plutarch who has him defended by a single centurion, and

[801] Tac. *Hist*. 1.35.2
[802] Tac. *Hist*. REF
[803] Tac. *Hist*. 1.31
[804] Cf. Damon who suggests that Galba was the only of the three men – alongside Otho and Piso – whose career made him fully entitled to use the term (2003: 160). But this raises the interesting question of whether a general's standing as *commilito* required the acceptance and agreement of his men.
[805] Tac. *Hist*. 1.41

Suetonius, who describes a party of German bodyguards rushing to his aid but arriving too late.[806]

There is less here to say about Piso, a man of no military or administrative experience.[807] Though he uses the term twice in his speech to the praetorians it is without effect and unconvincing, precisely because it was so obviously a rhetorical fiction.[808] Unlike Galba he had no military career to establish the military credentials that term laid claim to. Unlike Otho he had no personal connexion with the men to build affection, and he took no steps to rectify either of these flaws. Piso's use of the word may have been politically correct: an emperor or his representative should be able to speak that way to the troops in a near civil war situation. But such usage would be meaningless without some effort to cultivate or purchase the individual affections of the soldiers. That neither emperor nor his heir did so emphasises in another way the imprudence and incompetence of the Galban regime. Piso, in spite of all his qualities, was unable to change that political reality.

This strong connexion between the *Othoniani* and Otho himself is much more prominent in Tacitus' narrative than the accounts of Suetonius or Plutarch. Neither of them describe the efforts that Tacitus' Otho goes to in order to present himself as a comrade to the soldiers, and description of the loyalty of the *Othoniani* are present only in their accounts of his death.[809] Though both the efforts of Otho to paint himself as a *commilito* and the

[806] Plut. *Gal*. 26.5, Suet. *Gal*. 20
[807] Murrison (1993: 61)
[808] Tac. *Hist*. 1.29-30.
[809] Suet. *Oth*. 12.2; Plut *Oth.* 17.3-5.

Othonian cause's origins as a soldiers' rebellion lead to a strong degree of loyalty towards the emperor, they also introduced a flaw into the Othonian army. As neither the centurions nor the tribunes played much part in Otho's rise, as far as the army was concerned they remained of questionable loyalty. Of the three factions, the *Othoniani* retained the greater distrust and hostility towards their centurions, officers and generals. The traditional social hierarchy of the legion was pushed aside as Otho forged such a strong bond with the *milites gregarii* under his command. Though Tacitus is clear that Otho's forces contained centurions, tribunes, and legates loyal to their emperor, to the soldiery the ranks between them and Otho continued to be seen as disloyal interlopers, their every action and motivation open to second guessing and suspicion. The great weakness of the Othonian cause is that it never truly moves beyond its beginning as a military mutiny. It never develops – as the Flavian and Vitellian sides do – the larger social structures of either an army or a state. Otho's only source of power is the *milites gregarii*, regardless of their individual loyalty, the officers, provincials and citizens are seen as outsiders and threats. As Otho's army lacks the hierarchy of a Roman army it remains divided and undermined by lack of cohesion.

The proclamation of Vitellius occurred in a significantly different way. In Germany there was much more cooperation between the ranks. Tacitus makes it clear that there were no legates or tribunes willing to act to preserve Galba's power, and that some were active in the conspiracy from the beginning.[810]

[810] Tac. *Hist*. 1.55

Vitellius himself was largely absent from the early stages of the conspiracy, and Tacitus describes him as being the figurehead for an almost entirely unified mutiny, from Fabius Valens down to the *milites gregarius*, though it is evident that the initiative belongs to the *milites*.[811] Surprised – and delighted – to find himself proclaimed emperor Vitellius played little part in the recruitment or development of the plot. There is no evidence of any attempt to engage with his men as *commilitones*. Indeed, the Vitellius presented by Tacitus was a decidedly un-martial figure, more often on the dining couch than in the saddle, and largely disinterested in military planning.[812] Significantly, when he is described in his military gear, he is presented: '*insigni equo, paludatus accinctusque*,' a very different style of self-presentation from Otho, on foot with his iron breastplate.[813]

The higher officers of the Vitellian army were much more enthusiastic participants than they were in Rome, certainly they were more active. It was the inaction of the tribune Martialis that led Tacitus to suggest that he was involved.[814] In contrast, the legates Valens and Alienus Caecina were prime actors in the conspiracy.[815] The only group not explicitly described as enthusiastic partisans for Vitellius was the centurions. Indeed, the only resistance to the mutiny came from four centurions and as Tacitus gives each of their names, they perhaps were the only men who resisted the plot.[816] As a

[811] Tac. *Hist*. 1.62; Birley (2007: 385)
[812] Tac. *Hist*. 2.59.2; On Vitellius' unsuitability as a military emperor see Saddington (1991: 3490).
[813] Tac. Hist. 2.89.1
[814] Tac. *Hist*. 1.28
[815] Tac. *Hist*. 1.52 Tacitus describes them as '*profusa cipidine et insigni temeritate*.'
[816] Tac. *Hist*. 1.56

result, the military hierarchy remained largely intact, and though there was some tension between the men and their centurions, the *Vitelliani* did not show the same open and constant distrust of the Othonian *milites*. The connexion between Vitellian tribunes and *milites gregarii* is shown following the first Battle of Bedriacum, where the soldiers and officers were equally delighted in their victory:

> iam tribuni praefectique, sua quisque facta extollentes, falsa vera aut maiora vero miscebant. vulgus quoque militum clamore et gaudio deflectere via, spatia certaminum recognoscere, aggerem armorum, strues corporum intueri mirari.[817]
>
> The tribunes and prefects extolled their individual achievements, and mixed together fictions, facts, and exaggerations. The common soldiers also turned aside from the line of march with joyful shouts, and recognized the various scenes of conflict, and gazed with wonder on the piles of weapons and the heaps of slain.

The two main pillars of Vitellian support – the *milites* and the senior officers – took heart from their victory. Indeed, in his account of the aftermath Tacitus mentions all of the various parts of the Vitellian army: the generals, the legions, the cavalry and auxilia, the tribunes, prefects, and *milites gregarii*. Missing from the narrative is any mention of centurions, the only section of the German army not unified in its support for their contender.

The Vitellian faction presented a much more cohesive structure than that of Otho. Excepting a handful of centurions, Vitellius' army was unified and committed to the cause – even if there was less evidence of the intense personal loyalty shown by the average Othonian soldier, the *milites gregarii*

[817] Tac. *Hist*. 2.70

were the only part of the army that remained loyal to the end. Vitellius entered the civil war less as the leader of a mutinous army than as the head of an imperial state. He had his own army – not simply a loyal corps of soldiers but full military units commanded by legates and tribunes equally invested in the success of the venture. Unfortunately, Tacitus shared with Sallust and Livy the belief that the quality of a Roman army was directly related to the quality of its commander. As Tacitus makes clear, under the command of the dissolute and disinterested Vitellius, the efficacy of his army quickly began to dissolve. The individual vices and weaknesses of the emperor became mirrored in the individual weaknesses and vices of the soldiers.[818]

The beginnings of the Flavian cause are markedly different than either of the other factions. When it comes to the Flavians, Tacitus explicitly states that: '*tribuni centurionesque et vulgus militum industria licentia, per virtutes per voluptates, ut cuique ingenium, adsciscebantur.*'[819] 'The tribunes, the centurions, and the common soldiers, were brought over to the cause by appeals to their energy or their love of license, to their virtues or to their vices, according to their different dispositions.' This passage is fundamental to demonstrating the relatively cohesive nature of the Flavian army. Each member of the army had been approached in a way that allowed them to connect their individual fortunes with the success of the Flavian endeavour. Due to his almost total absence from the narrative, the personal relationship

[818] Tacitus refers to the negative effect that Vitellius command was having on the quality of his men at 2.62.1 and 2.93
[819] Tac. *Hist*. 2.5

between Vespasian and his men is harder to articulate than that of Galba, Otho, or Vitellius. However, in his introduction Tacitus suggests that Vespasian was exactly the kind of general that Otho took such great pains to emulate: '*Vespasianus acer militiae anteire agmen... veste habituque vix a gregario milite discrepans*...'[820] 'Vespasian was an energetic soldier; he could march at the head of his army...his dress and appearance hardly distinguished him from the common soldier.' Tacitus presents as habit for Vespasian what was carefully constructed theatre from Otho. Both marched at the head of their armies and both dressed as common soldiers. Vespasian does not speak to his soldiers in the extant books of the *Historiae*, but if he did he would be justified in calling them *commilitones*. They loyalty of his men suggests that they would not have quibbled with his phrasing.

Otho primarily cultivated affection of the *milites*, and created a force that saw centurions and officers as possible interlopers, while the Vitellian rebellion was carried out partially in cooperation between the tribunes and the soldiery. The Flavians were recruited individually, and none of the ranks were privileged over the others. Thus, Vespasian's army presented a more cohesive face than the *Othoniani* or *Vitelliani*, not due to any difference in quality or dedication – indeed, it is clear throughout Tacitus' account that the soldiers of each of the factions were capable both of extraordinary bravery and of unjustified panic.[821] Further, while the Othonian and Vitellian plots are rushed,

[820] Tac. *Hist*. 2.5.1
[821] E.g. the bravery of the *Othoniani* (2.41-42); the *Vitelliani* (3.77 ); Othonian panic (1.80); Vitellian (3.18); Flavian (3.10)

nearly spontaneous affairs, Tacitus gives the impression that the formation of the Flavian power base was a more cautious, methodical affair.[822] Missing from the *Flaviani*, as a result, are any outbreaks of violence between ranks. Tacitus records no centurions or tribunes attacked or lynched by their men, unlike the forces of Vitellius or the Otho. The Flavian army entered the war as a cohesive group, with their ambitions and interests aligned with Vespasian and with each other. The only officers seen as suspect by the Flavian legions were late-coming legates or governors – such as Flavianus and Aponius Saturnius – who were regarded by the men as unacceptably connected to Vitellius.[823] The social hierarchy of the Flavian army remained intact.

## The *Miles* and the Social Structure of the Legion

Tacitus himself clearly viewed the military hierarchy of the army as a mirror to the social structure of the Roman world, during the republic, at least. He laments the new policy of forming colonies of veterans from different units, by comparing it to the earlier practice of settling whole legions together: '*olim universae legiones deducebantur cum tribunis et centurionibus et sui cuiusque ordinis militibus ut consensu et caritate rem publicam efficerent*.'[824] 'Of old whole legions were settled with their tribunes and centurions, and soldiers of

[822] Ash (2007: 90)
[823] Tac. *Hist*. 3.10-11
[824] Tac. *Ann*. 14.27.3. MacMullen suggests that this is a reference to the reign of Augustus, but the language leads me to suggest that it refers to the Republic. It is difficult to see the army of AD 14 as being marked by *consensus* and *caritas* between the soldiers and their officers (1984: 442, n.11).

every rank so that, by their harmony and mutual affection, they would form a republic.' Other ancient commentators compared the legion to the social order of the republic, with the Emperor at the top as commander in chief, the aristocracy providing the officers and the *miles* at the bottom.[825] In this framing, the *miles* became the military counterpart to the *plebs*.[826] This structure had built into it certain fracture points, the most obvious one being the gulf between the mass of soldiery and the officers of the legion.[827] Recruitment into the Roman army also meant a long term separation from the civilian sphere that would last decades, until the soldier's retirement.[828] Absent from the social hierarchy of the civilian world, the maintenance of the military hierarchy was essential to the correct running of the Roman legion, although the day to day mechanisms of the army could be preserved for brief periods during periods of mutiny.[829] These hierarchies were, however, largely self-contained in each legion. In periods of stability, each legion shared the same emperor but the lower strata – the officer-aristocracy and the *miles-plebs* – were separated from those of the other legions, usually by distance as well as by unit loyalty. This meant that each legion functioned, as Tacitus said, as a separate quasi-state, with its own aristocracy and populace. In times of peace, the only connexion that Roman soldiers of all armies shared was the emperor.

[825] Phang (2008: 15-16)
[826] Alföldy (2000: 35)
[827] MacMullen (1984: 454)
[828] Wesch-Klein (2007: 435)
[829] As seen at Sucro in 206 BC and Pannonia in AD 14.

Roman historians and Roman generals both were aware of the danger posed by keeping legions in shared quarters for extended periods.[830]

Each of the three military factions of AD 69 is presented by Tacitus as having an internal social structure largely governed by the military hierarchy of the Roman army. These three factions, the *Othoniani,* the *Vitelliani*, and the *Flaviani*, were separate quasi-states, now no longer unified by a common emperor. For each the internal social structure broke down to a degree and for a period, but the severity of the break-down varied. Amongst the *Othoniani* there was a complete and largely permanent collapse, with the centurions, tribunes, and legates consistently viewed as disloyal and untrustworthy by the *milites*. The *Vitelliani* had little trouble with their legates, and the majority of tribunes and centurions were accepted as comrades. The *Flaviani* were marked by two distinct groups: the Eastern legions operated with the military hierarchy intact, while the Danube legions remained distrustful of their legates, though the remaining social structure of the legions remained intact. What remained consistently unchanged, however, was the link between each factions and its emperor. Whatever the remaining social structure, the fundamental loyalty of the soldier to his emperor remained unchanged. This chapter will demonstrate the status of the internal hierarchy of the three factions, beginning with the *Othoniani*.

Serious breakdowns of the internal discipline of the army in Tacitus' works almost always resulted in the death of centurions and often of tribunes

[830] Tac. *Ann*. REF; Dio 56.12.1-2

or even legates. The previous chapter discussed how centurions were targeted by the mutineers in both Pannonia and Germany. This same hostility was present in the cascade of mutinies that began the civil war of AD 69. Although Tacitus portrays the *Othoniani* as almost entirely subverted by Otho – officers and *milites* alike – there was clear tension between the men and their centurions. There was, of course, outright violence directed to any officers who remained loyal to the previous regime: the centurion Sempronius Densus was killed defending Piso.[831] Yet even once the plot was in motion the soldiers consistently distrusted and side-lined their officers, who were unable to control their men during the coup. When Otho was proclaimed emperor at the Praetorian Camp, the soldiers' distrust of their officers was clear: '*nec tribunis aut centurionibus adeundi locus: gregarious miles caueri insuper praepositos*.'[832] 'The tribunes and centurions were allowed to access to the spot, and in any case the common soldiery warned him about the officers.' This was despite the fact that Tacitus has told the reader that the majority of the centurions were either in sympathy with Otho's plot or unwilling to interfere.[833]

Later, when a group of drunken soldiers, incorrectly, suspected a plot against their chosen *princeps*, their suspicion fell immediately upon their centurions and tribunes: '*fremit miles et tribunos centurionesque proditionis arguit, tamquam familiae senatorum ad perniciem Othonis armarentur.'*[834]

[831] Tac. *Hist.* 1.43.1
[832] Tac. *Hist.* 1.36.1
[833] Tac. *Ann.* 1.28
[834] Tac. *Hist.* 1.80.2 Tacitus is unique in having the disorder rise out of the soldiers' fears of the centurions and tribunes. Other accounts place the blame on the senate alone. (Ash 1999: 30)

'The troops raised a clamour and accused the tribunes and centurions of a treasonable plot to arm the household slaves of the senators and murder Otho.' This sudden panic soon spiralled out of control, the praetorians were deep into their cups – '*vino graves*' Tacitus tells us – and the tribune on hand was killed, along with those of the nearby centurions most disliked by the soldiery. The mob stormed the palace, interrupting Otho at banquet, and denounced their entire officer corps to the emperor, accusing them of making common cause with the senate against the soldiers and their *princeps*.[835] This event is particularly illuminating, as is suggests that the soldiers saw their centurions not merely as disloyal soldiers, but rather as connected to a separate interest group, aligned not with the men themselves, but with the military hierarchy – the tribunes – and the larger political establishment – the senate. The threat that his soldiers fears of this 'deep-state' alliance between centurions, tribunes and the senate posed to Otho's cause was addressed in his speech at the praetorian camp the following morning. There Otho attempted to reframe his military revolt in terms of a grand struggle against a foreign enemy, with the *Othoniani*, the senate, and the res publica fighting in concert against Vitellius' German hordes.[836]

That the social structure of the Othonian military had completely broken down was demonstrated by the fact that they are the only faction who were consistently hostile not only to their centurions, but to the senior officers

[835] Tac. *Hist.* 1.82.1
[836] Tac. *Ann*. 83-84

and generals.[837] Tribunes are often grouped with centurions in Tacitus' narrative, and usually appeared as a restraining force on the worst excesses of the men.[838] Indeed he appears to use variations of the phrase *tribuni centurionesque* as shorthand of the legionary officers throughout his works.[839] They were also clearly linked together in the minds of the *milites gregarii*, as they were often ignored – and on occasion attacked – together as a group when discipline was breaking down. It should be stressed from the outset that, unlike centurions, Tacitus makes it explicit that there were tribunes involved with each of the contenders from the very beginning.

In the Flavian and Vitellian armies the tribunes were willing participants in the uprising, or at least did nothing to stop it. In Rome, the loyalties of the tribunes appear to have been divided. The first individual mentioned as part of the Othonian plot is a tribune, Julius Martialis, who Tacitus suggests was either actively involved or allowed the conspiracy to develop.[840] At the same time there were tribunes who remain loyal to Galba; when three tribunes entered the Praetorian barracks in an attempt to quell the incipient *Othoniani*, two were turned away by threats, but Pomponius Longinus was imprisoned by the men as his personal connexion to Galba was seen as particularly suspicious.[841] This indicates an important difference between the interaction between *milites* and tribunes when compared to the interaction between the soldiery

[837] Ash (2007: 126)
[838] Chilver (1979: 204)
[839] Ash (2007: 126)
[840] Tac. *Hist*. 1.28
[841] Tac. *Hist*. 1.31

and the centurions. With a few exceptions, angry soldiers tended to confine tribunes rather than kill them. Besides Longinus, the tribune Julius Fronto was arrested and put in chains by the *Othoniani*, who suspect him due to the fact that his brother was serving under Vitellius.[842] A single tribune was killed and another is wounded during the panic of the *Othoniani* in book one.[843] Here, however, the circumstances appear to be exceptional. Tacitus mentions that the soldiers were drunk and he stresses their agitated state: '*lymphatis caeco pavore animis*' 'with minds maddened by blind panic.'[844] While the killing of the tribune was unusual, this panic demonstrates the greater hostility felt towards the centurions, Tacitus reports that the '*severissimos centurionum*' were also killed.[845]

Such relatively restrained actions towards tribunes should not be taken as an indication of a lesser degree of distrust towards the tribunes. Rather, it echoed the actions of the mutinous legions of AD 14. Tribunes were mentioned alongside centurions as agents of the soldiers' misery by the ringleader Percennius: '*interrogabat cur paucis centurionibus paucioribus tribunis in modum servorum oboedirent*'[846] 'he demanded why, in the manner of slaves, they submitted to a few centurions and even fewer tribunes.' Despite this,

[842] Tac. *Hist*. 2.26
[843] The tribune Varius Crispinus is killed at the outset of the mutiny (1.80) and another is wounded in the fighting in the palace (1.82). That the only tribunes who are violently attacked by their soldiers are praetorian tribunes may be relevant; unlike legionary tribunes, the majority of praetorian tribunes were former centurions, Rankov (2007: 45).
[844] Tac. *Hist*. 1.82 The language here is similar to the events of the AD 14 mutiny. There too, Tacitus says that the German mutineers were *lymphati* (*Ann*. 1.32.1).
[845] Tac. *Hist*. 1.80
[846] Tac. *Ann*. 1.17.1

while they mistrusted the tribunes, the mutineers did harbour the same intense enmity towards them. While the centurions in Pannonia were attacked and beaten, the tribunes and camp prefect were simply driven beyond the palisades.[847] Similarly, when Germanicus bemoaned the state of the mutineers' camp, he alluded to the differing fates of centurions and tribunes: '*hic tantum interfici centuriones, eici tribunos*...'[848] 'here only are centurions murdered, tribunes driven away.' Instead, it appears that some measure of restraint or respect moderated the violence done to tribunes in periods of mutiny or military anarchy.

Vestricius Spurinna, holding Placentia for Otho, opted not to lead is small force into battle against Vitellius' German legions. His efforts were resisted by his men in a way that would be familiar to any republican general: '*sed indomitus miles et belli ignarus correptis signis vexillisque ruere et retinenti duci tela intentare, spretis centurionibus tribunisque*...'[849] 'But the undisciplined and inexperienced soldiery seized their standards and colours, and rushed to the attack, brandishing their weapons in the face of their general when he sought to restrain them, after rejecting the centurions and tribunes...' Spurinna was forced to enter into negotiation with the mutinous soldiers in an effort to restrain them, though he is unsuccessful. It is only when facing the prospect of entrenching on open ground that the careful counsel of the

[847] Tac. *Ann*. 1.23.3
[848] Tac. *Ann*. 1.42.4
[849] Tac. *Hist*. 2.18

tribunes and centurions was able to convince the soldiers to return to Placentia.[850]

Similarly, Annius Gallus, leading **I** to relieve the besieged Placentia, did not fancy his men's chances against the *Vitelliani* and halted at Bedriacum. Tacitus describes his difficulty in enforcing his orders: '*aegre coercitam legionem et pugnandi ardore usque ad seditionem progressam Bedriaci sistit*.'[851] 'though the legion could hardly be restrained, and in its eagerness for action, even went to the length of open mutiny, he halted at Bedriacum.' Both of these events were superficially similar to the republican mutinies described in Livy, but there was one significant difference. When republican soldiers mutinied it was because they doubt the tactical wisdom of their commander, or because the fear their commander lacked faith in their abilities. The allegiance or honesty of the republican commanders was never questioned.[852] When both Spurinna and Gallus attempted to restrain their men, however, the *Othoniani* were quick to question the loyalty of their commanders. In their initial resistance to Spurinna the Praetorians convinced themselves that their general was playing his own game: '*prodi Othonem et accitum Caecinam clamitabant*.'[853] 'they cried that Otho had been betrayed and Caecina was here by invitation.' Later Gallus' own troops came to the same conclusion:

> suspectum id Othonianis fuit, omnia ducum facta prave aestimantibus. certatim, ut quisque animo ignavus, procax ore, Annium Gallum et

[850] Tac. *Hist*. 2.19
[851] Tac. *Hist*. 2.23
[852] E.g. Livy 7.13-14
[853] Tac. *Hist*. 2.18.2, following *Bekker*.

> Suetonium Paulinum et Marium Celsum—nam eos quoque Otho praefecerat—variis criminibus incessierant.[854]
>
> This created suspicion among the Othonian troops, who put an unfavourable construction on everything their generals did. Cowardly and loud-mouthed elements among them vied with each other in assailing Annius Gallus, Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus, who had also been given command by Otho.

These reactions from the *Othoniani* were remarkable, and demonstrated a fundamental shift in the relationship between the *milites* and their commanders. The point of contention was no longer merely differing opinion on tactics, it had become an issue of loyalty. Taking actions that the soldiers do not agree with was seen as indication not that they have misjudged the quality of their army or the danger posed by the enemy, but rather that they were working to undermine the Othonian cause. As we have seen, the *Othoniani* were particularly quick to judge any actions by officers and senators as evidence of treachery. In Tacitus' narrative, the army represents Otho's only real group of determined supporters.[855] Because the only two parts of the Othonian cause – as understood by the *milites* – were the emperor himself and the soldiery, there was no room for the social hierarchy of the legion. In Tacitus' narrative there is evidence that even the physical representations of the military heirarchy had been disrupted by the *Othoniani*. We have discussed above Othos own appearance as an unshaven *miles gregarius*, but when the plot first began, Tacitus describes the arming of the soldiery:

[854] Tac. *Hist*. 2.23.4
[855] Chilver (1979: 222)

> rapta statim arma, sine more et ordine militiae, ut vix praetorianus aut legionarius insignibus suis distingueretur: miscentur auxiliaribus galeis scutisque, nullo tribunorum centurionumue adhortante.[856]
>
> Arms were immediately seized, with no care for procedure or military order – so that a praetorian could hardly be distinguished from a legionary by his gear – these were mixed with the helmets and shields of auxilliaries, with no encouragement from the tribunes or centurions.

The *Othoniani* tended towards becoming an army without hierarchy, both in appearance and in behaviour. A semblance of the social hierarchy was present – when they went to war they marched with centurions and tribunes – but if any suspicion fell on the officers this hierarchy would collapse and the soldiers would accept no man's authority over them except Otho's. Following the riot in Rome, Otho took steps to address this in his speech to the troops, where he tried to incorporate his soldiers into the hierarchy of his larger empire. The behaviour of his men in the subsequent campaigns shows that he had been unsuccessful. The Othonian cause never resestablished the hierarchy either of the state or of the camp. Otho's attempts to recruit the soldiery to his cause and the way that they took over the process had the effect of bypassing the hierarchy of the legion. The only loyalties shown by Otho's soldiers were to him.

The situation with the *Vitelliani* was a more complicated. At the outset in Germany, as in Rome, the centurions were not trusted by their mutinous men, even though, as with the *Othoniani*, the majority of the officers either supported Vitellius' rebellion or made no move to stop it. Indeed, one of the

[856] Tac. *Hist*. 2.38.3

causes of the plot was a rumour that both *milites* and centurions would suffer under the new regime: '*accessit callide vulgatum, temere creditum, decimari legiones et promptissimum quemque centurionum dimitti*.'[857] 'There was also a report, ingeniously spread and recklessly believed, to the effect that the legions were being decimated, and all the most energetic centurions dismissed.' There was, to be sure, a much stronger sense of solidarity between the ranks in the Vitellian army than in the Othonian. Despite this, the soldiers retained a deep suspicion of any officers they saw to be acting against their own interests. When the German armies declared for Vitellius, the only open resistance came from four centurions of XXII who acted to protect the portraits of Galba. These men were arrested and imprisoned, not by the Vitellian officers, but by the soldiery itself: '*impetu militum abrepti vinctique*.'[858] 'by an assault of the soldiery they were apprehended and confined.' Tacitus is clear that it is the soldiery who are the driving force in the arrests, as he generally reserves the collective singular noun *miles* for common soldiers.[859]

Similarly, when the *Vitelliani* felt that they had been held back from attacking the forces of Otho at the first battle of Cremona they mutiny, and imprisoned Julius Gratus, their *praefectus castrorum*: '*tamquam fratri apud Othonem militanti proditionem ageret*.'[860] 'on the grounds that he was concerting treachery with his brother.' Here Tacitus is not explicit that the *milites* were acting on their own, but it can be confidently suggested that they

[857] Tac. *Hist*. 1.51.5
[858] Tac. Hist. 1.56.1
[859] Woodman (2004: 364) Though it is Vitellius who orders their execution (*Hist*. 1.59.1).
[860] Tac. *Hist*. 2.26.1

were, as he frames the situation as *in castris seditio* and in Tacitus those are always driven by the common soldiery. The Vitellian cause was marked by a military hierarchy that largely remained intact, though tension did exist. Like the *Othoniani*, the *Vitelliani* are also quick to ascribe sinister motives to a decision made that appears to be counter to the interests of their emperor. The hierarchy remained intact so long as all parts of it appeared to be acting in cohesion. When the faction finally fell apart, it was the officers that deserted Vitellius and the soldiers. His men stayed loyal to the end, fighting in the streets to defend their emperor.

The *Flaviani*, on the other hand, present a remarkably stable internal hierarchy throughout most of the *Historiae*.[861] There was no trouble between the *milites* and the centurions or tribunes. This was due to the differing way they were recruited. Tacitus makes repeated reference to the fact that the factions taking part in the civil war were composed of individuals with differing temperaments and motivations. As the Othonian plotters gained momentum: '*suspensos ceterorum animos diversis artibus stimulant*...'[862] 'they worked by various devices on the wavering minds of the remainder...' Some men were won over by implying their careers were at risk, other reminded of the lack of donative. Others were frightened into allegiance with the threat of a posting to the frontier. Each man was recruited into the plot with differing motivations

[861] Ash remarks that 'Primus commands by consent from below rather than by imposition of authority from above' (1999: 161-162). But in fact the Flavian army has the most intact hierarchy in AD 69, and contains the only examples of generals controlling their soldiers with anything other than bribery.
[862] Tac. *Hist*. 1.26

and with a differing degree of commitment: '*isque habitus animorum fuit ut pessimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur.*'[863] 'Such was the temper of men's minds that, while there were few to venture on so atrocious a treason, many wished it done, and all were ready to acquiesce.' This mix of levels of commitment and varied motives also characterised the Vitellian cause, both among the officers and the German legions.[864] Tacitus records that the subversion of the Eastern armies to Vespasian's cause was also done on an individual basis '*ut cuique ingenium*'[865] 'according to each man's temperament.' But the Eastern legions were brought into the cause carefully and with appeals to men of all. Further, much more than either the Othonian or Vitellian cause, the foundation for Vespasian's proclamation was laid over a period and organised from above. As a result, the legions joining Vespasian in the east do so with their internal hierarchies intact.

The only serious trouble between the men and the command structure occurred when the Danube legions declared for Vespasian, but there too the internal hierarchy of the legions was largely preserved. Doubts were raised and threats made toward certain of the legates who were considered to be insufficiently loyal to the new regime or were already unpopular. Ampius Flavianus was under threat for his life due to his relation to Vitellius and because he had alienated the men under his command.[866] Aponius Saturnius

[863] Tac. *Hist*. 1.28
[864] Tac. *hist*. 1.51-57
[865] Tac. *Hist*. 2.5
[866] Tac. *Hist*. 3.10

was likewise in danger because he was believed to have been in correspondence with Vitellius.[867] In both cases the hostility towards the legates was universal – Tacitus mentions no centurions or tribunes who offer support to the threatened commanders – and order was restored when each man retired from his position and headed east to join Vespasian as a *privatus*.

The Flavian hierarchy was the only one of the three factions to take concrete steps to reinforce or restore the social order. Hearing of demobilised praetorians operating as armed gangs in Liguria, the procurator Valerius Paulinus was dispatched to recruit them to Vespanian's cause and use them to capture Forum Julii in his name. Significantly, it was Paulinus' personal connexion to the troops that allows him to reincorporate them into the structure of the Flavian forces: '*eo gravior auctor, quod Paulino patria Forum Iulii et honos apud praetorianos, quorum quondam tribunus fuerat*' '.[868]

The most telling evidence that the Flavian army retained its internal heirarchy is demonstrated by the fact that the primary cause of tension between the soldiery and the officers was due to a perceived lack of aggressiveness by command. Just as the early republican commanders of Livy's narrative were in danger of having their hand forced by enthusiastic legionaries, so too did Vespasian's generals risk losing control of their men if they hesitated to give battle when the soldiers thought it the most prudent option. The situation was most explicit in the aftermath of Cremona when

[867] Tac*. Hist*. 3.11

[868] Tac. *Hist*. 3.43.1 He is described as '*honos apud praetorianos' '*he was held in honor by the praetorians*'*.

Tacitus describes the difficult tactical situation and the dilemma faced by the Flavian officers:

> quae super cuncta terrebat ipsorum miles periculi quam morae patientior: quippe ingrata quae tuta, ex temeritate spes; omnisque caedes et vulnera et sanguis aviditate praedae pensabantur.[869]
>
> But above and beyond all these factors, they were frightened of their own troops, who preferred risk to waiting. Playing safe was dull, taking a chance offered possibilities. Whatever the cost in death and wounds and bloodshed, it counted for nothing when weighed against their appetite for spoil.

This mentality was shared among the factions of the civil war. Throughout Tacitus' narrative of civil war the driving force remained the soldiery, and their initiative was responsible for much of the tactical or strategic decisions. Generals only occasionally and only with difficulty were able to convince – or force – their men to take actions the soldiers disagreed with. Yet this was hardly a new factor in Roman warfare, Livy's narrative contains several examples of generals and *milites* at odds over strategic or tactical decisions. In the Flavian army the situation was the same.

Amongst the Othonians and Vitellians, the fractured nature of the military hierarchy effected their interpretation of such disagreements. As each of their armies was comprised of men with differing levels of commitment and differing interests, any disagreement was seen as reflecting the personal motivations or loyalty of the commanders and their commitment to the emperor. To the soldiers, a general refusing to give battle to a superior force was not a tactical decision, it was an indication that their commander's loyalty

[869] Tac. *Hist*. 3.26

was suspect. Any attempt to hold men back from attacking a city was not done out of concerns for its inhabitants, but because they had come to a prior arrangement. Any decisions made by commanders were interpreted through not through the tactical circumstances of the day but in a context where each man was either a supporter of the emperor or an enemy.

When Antonius attempted to camp the Flavian army at the Milvian bridge before entering Rome, he too was countermanded by his soldiers. '*sed omnem prolationem ut inimicam victoriae suspectabant*...'[870] 'But they were suspicious of any postponement, thinking it would prejudice victory.' Here again differing strategies were met not only with argument but with suspicion. But here the suspicion was not that Antonius was working to undermine the cause, but rather that his tactics might have led to defeat. This places the actions of the Flavians in an entirely different context, and one common to Roman commanders in foreign as well as civil wars. This was, in fact, a function of the military hierarchy. Since the early republic, Roman soldiers felt they had the right to question the actions of their generals if those actions threatened their chances for victory. The mirror here is not Othonian or Vitellian troops challenging their officers as traitors, but Sextus Tullius debating the strategy of Samnite war with his general, or Caesar's men urging him to cross a river and attack.

Flavian soldiers were also more open about their interests in other moments when their commanders are unable to restrain them. Before the sack

[870] Tac. *Hist*. 3.82

of Cremona, the men are careful to frame their adamant demands that they attack the city in terms of strategic considerations: '*quasi debellatum foret, pergere Cremonam et victos in deditionem accipere aut expugnare deposcunt*'[871] 'they thought that the fighting was over and clamoured to press on towards Cremona to receive, or take by force, the surrender of a beaten enemy.' Of course, Tacitus is quick to inform his reader that any strategic considerations are secondary to the soldier's desire to ensure that the loot from the captured Cremona go to them rather than their commander.[872] This jealous approach to the spoils of Italy is a recurring motivation to the *Flaviani*. Their enthusiasm to press on to Rome was also driven not only by their desire to sack Rome but also their determination that they not share the spoils with any reinforcements on their way to Italy: '*aegre id pati miles et victoriam malle quam pacem; ne suas quidem legiones opperiebantur, ut praedae quam periculorum socias*.'[873] 'This was hardly to be tolerated by the soldiery, who preferred victory to peace. Nor would they wait for their legions, considering them partners in profit rather than danger.' Here too, however, no one doubts the loyalty or commitment of their officers and here too we are reminded of republican soldiers concerned with the division of spoils during a campaign.

Superficially, the mood of the *Flaviani* outside Cremona was clearly similar to that of the *Othoniani* at Placentia, as evidenced by the similarity of Tacitus' language: The *Othoniani* act '*spretis centurionibus tribunisque*' 'after

[871] Tac. *Hist*. 3.19
[872] Tac. *Hist*. 3.19
[873] Tac. *Hist*. 3.60

rejecting the centurions and tribunes'; during the Flavian clamour to attack Cremona '*spernuntur centuriones tribunique*' 'the centurions and tribunes were rejected.' In both cases the disorder went hand in hand with a temporary rejection of the military hierarchy. However, we should be careful not to read a similar level of violence in this action as in the events of AD 14 or the Othonian panic in Rome. In whatever way Otho's troops rejected the centurions and tribunes outside of Placentia, it clearly did them no harm, as they were on hand to restore order a short time later.[874] But, there is a fundamental difference. Only among the *Othoniani* are the officers suspected of treasonous planning. The *Flaviani* see their officers' actions as being motivated by personal greed, not out of a desire to weaken Vespasian's move for the throne.

Tacitus *Historiae* is an account of three simultaneous Roman emperors. The armies of each of the claimants had internal hierarchies that mirrored the social structure of their empire. As each *miles* in these armies engages with his military – and social – hierarchy as an individual, the *Othoniani, Vitelliani,* and *Flaviani* operated not as armies within a single state, but as three competing states. The fortunes of the three factions of the civil war revolved around the degree to which the internal military hierarchy of the army is retained in the chaos of civil war. The social structure of Otho's army is broken, not despite the soldiery's intense loyalty towards their *commilito*, but because that loyalty provided no place for the ranks that were supposed to fit between the emperor

[874] Tac. *Hist*. 2.19

and the *milites gregarii*. Vitellius' army mostly preserves the social structure of an imperial Roman army, though there remained some tension. However, it is this hierarchy that weakens the army, as the soldiers began to reflect their *princeps*. Due to the nature of the Flavian conspiracy, the army of Vespasian largely retains its hierarchy, and any disruptions to it are founded in the Roman tradition of questioning the decisions of command, not because the soldiers doubt the loyalty or commitment of their generals. While these three emperors moved their army across the empire as separate states, there was a fourth state, currently without an emperor or an army, the people of the empire and of Italy. The final section will examine how each of the factions interacted with the civilian sphere.

## The Soldier and the Civilian

The civil war of AD 69 did not just involve violence committed against other Roman armies. It was also the context of widespread violence against the civilian population. Each of the factions – the *Othoniani*, the *Vitelliani*, and the *Flaviani* – were responsible for violence against the people of Italy during the civil war. Vitellius' army also subjected provincial populations to pillage during their march on Italy. Importantly, these moments of violence were not a symptom of the breakdown of the internal hierarchy of the armies, as troops turned against civilians both in periods of serious disorder and also in moments when the social order of the legions was intact. Indeed, Tacitus reserves the

most graphic and extended accounts of pillage for the Flavians, the army he presents as the most consistently disciplined of the three factions.

This section will examine the violence committed by each of the factions and the status of the military hierarchy to demonstrate that the depredations of the armies of AD 69 were not the result of the breakdown of the military social order. Rather, the status of the internal discipline was largely irrelevant to a Roman army's capacity for violence. Roman armies capacity for violence was related to the degree to which the armies had become quasi-states themselves, and as a result showed little sign of common feeling not only with other Roman armies, but with the larger Roman state itself. Alongside an erosion of common feeling, the three factions interacted with the cities of Italy and the provinces through the lens of the larger struggle for supremacy. In each interaction, soldiers judged the inhabitants of an area either to be supporters to or enemies of the emperor and his soldiers.

Otho's men showed the first indications that they were willing to use their weapons on Roman civilians. At the time of Galba's death Tacitus makes it clear that Otho's soldiers were keen to turn on the urban population and it was only with difficulty that he was able to keep them from their designs. The new emperor is described '*avidum et minacem militum animum voce voltuque temperans*.'[875] 'restraining the greedy and threatening temperament of the soldiery.' The minds of the soldiers are further described: '*caedis et praedarum*

[875] Tac. *Hist*. 1.45.1

*initium et optimo cuique perniciem quaeri apparebat*.'[876] 'It was apparent that the beginning of murder and looting and the destruction of the best men was desired.' With a mix of concessions and firmness, Otho was able to forestall any open violence between his men and the Roman population.

The relationship between the soldiery and the civilian population of Rome was a tense one.[877] Otho was prompted to order the assassination of Galba after '*armari plebem nuntiabatur.*'[878] 'he was informed that the plebs were being armed.' He considered the possibility that the plebs be armed as a serious enough threat that it led him to begin the coup. Certainly, up to his death the urban plebs were full throated in their opposition to Otho: '*Universa iam plebs Palatium implebat, mixtis servitiis et dissono clamore caedem Othonis et coniuratorum exitium poscentium ut si in circo aut theatro ludicrum aliquod postularent*'[879] 'Then the entirety of the plebs, mingled with slaves, were filling the Palatine with discordant cries for the death of Otho and the destruction of the conspirators as if they were requesting some variety of games in the circus or theatre.'

Tacitus warns the reader not to see the demands of the urban populace as sincere, but more important is the reaction of the soldiers themselves. From

[876] Tac. *Hist*. 1.45.2

[877] Sailor has written convincingly about how Tacitus perceived of the degree to which the principate undermined Rome's position as the focus and centre of the empire (2008: 188-191). What is remarkable is that the first soldiers to see Rome as hostile territory are not the provincial armies of Vespasian or Vitellius, but the men of the praetorian guard, composed of Italians and permanently stationed in the vicinity of the city and the newly formed members of the fleet, also quartered in central Italy.

[878] Tac. *Hist*. 1.40.1

[879] Tac. *Hist*. 1.32.1

the beginning of Otho's reign they saw the urban populace as hostile to them and their emperor. Tacitus presents *Othoniani* as men with long memories and prone to grievance. It was grievance against Galba that motivates the *legio classica* to join Otho's cause.[880] Hostility towards Vitellius following Otho's death led many of them to switch sides and join Vespasian's cause.[881] The discharged Praetorians, in particular, were so hostile to Vitellius and his followers that they launched a private war against the Vitellian Maturus in Liguria until Antonius was able to recruit them to Vespasian's side.[882] The Othonian hostility towards the urban populace was similarly founded in the grievance that the city had supported Galba and opposed Otho until Galba's death.

While violence against Rome itself was stopped by Otho, the actions of his soldiers in Liguria were not simply the result of the unrestrained greed of his men, but rather part of his military strategy. With the Vitellians making rapid advances into northern Italy, he deployed forces to Liguria as a diversionary move.[883] Even there, however, the characteristic disorder of the *Othoniani* undermined the official plans and the hierarchy of the army was disrupted. Though Otho gave command to three men – two *primipili* and a tribune, one of the centurions proved to be ineffective and the tribune somehow provoked the distrust of the men and '*per licentiam militum*

[880] Tac. *Hist*. 1.31.2
[881] Tac. *Hist*. 2.82.3
[882] Tac. *Hist*. 3.43.1
[883] Murrison (1993: 81-82)

*vinctus.*'[884] 'through the disorder of the soldiery he was imprisoned.' Command then passed to the ambitious *primipilus* Suedius Clemens. The depredations in Liguria are presented by Tacitus as being desired both by the soldiery and their commander. Clemens is '*proeliorum avidus.*'[885] 'greedy for battles.' The intense violence of the campaign against the population of Liguria is described graphically by Tacitus: '*non Italia adiri nec loca sedesque patriae videbantur: tamquam externa litora et urbes hostium urere vastare, eo atrocius, quod nihil usquam provisum adversum metus*.'[886] 'It did not seem to be either Italy or the seat of the empire that was attacked. It was as if they torched, devastated, and pillaged foreign shores, even more atrociously because no provisions had been made against the threat.'

The passage is worth careful consideration for two reasons, firstly, it is the first indication of a fact that becomes common in the *Historiae*, that Roman soldiers were perfectly capable of regarding the inhabitants of Italy as enemies and thus have no qualms about attacking them as such. Second, the level of the violence is emphasised, with the string of historical infinitives establishing that the actions of Clemens' forces were brutal and methodical.[887] The methodical way the pillaging progresses suggests that, at this point, the actions of the Othonian forces were still being directed by Clemens and some semblance of the military hierarchy remained. However, once the local

[884] Tac. *Hist*. 2.12.1
[885] Tac. *Hist*. 2.12.1
[886] Tac. *Hist*. 2.12.2
[887] Ash (2007: 111)

population attempted to resist Clemens vanishes from the narrative and it appears that the soldiers were acting on their own initiative: '*Inritatus eo proelio Othonis miles vertit iras in municipium Albintimilium... calamitatibus insontium expleta avaritia*.'[888] 'Provoked by this, the soldiery of Otho directed their anger against the city of Albintimilium...their avarice was sated by the ruin of the guiltless.' This passage also illustrates another important aspect of the hostile attitude that Roman soldiers show towards civilians in the *Historiae*, that the *milites* regarded the local populations not simply as bystanders who were ripe for plunder, but as enemies.

Once the locals had been organised by the local procurator – a known Vitellian – and fought back, the soldiers seized the initiative. While Clemens was in command the devastation of Liguria was directed by military concerns. Once the inhabitants had fought back under the direction of a Vitellian, the soldiery saw them as hostile forces. Further, the men acted out of both *avaritia* and *ira*. This combination of greed for the possessions of the civilian populace and hostility to them as perceived enemies of the emperor played a part in much of the violence of AD 69.

Such violence toward the civilian population is not restricted to the Othonian forces, where the military hierarchy has broken down. Valens devastated the lands of the Helvetii as he approaches. There is no indication of any disorder within his army, indeed, Tacitus explicitly paints the legate as the

[888] Tac. *Hist*. 1.13.1

director of the pillaging, keen to respond to provocation from the Helvetii with devastation – *belli avidus*, as Tacitus puts it.[889] At first the actions were conducted under the orders of the commander. There is little evidence of serious disorder in army, and indeed Tacitus presents the brief conflict with the local forces as an example of a Roman army acting as it should, with an overall strategy directed by the general and various legionary and auxillia forces acting in ordered cooperation.[890]

When the Helvetii appealed to the Roman forces, they faced the hostility of a unified hierarchy. This hostility, too, was provoked by an attempt as resistance by the Helvetii.[891] Caecina's keenness for war has already been noted, and Tacitus reports that the emperor and the soldiery were equally matched in their disinterest in mercy. The vehemence of the soldiers is particularly stark: '*ciuitatis excidium poscunt, tela ac manus in ora legatorum intentant.*'[892] 'They demanded the extermination of the citizens, and waved their weapons or fists in the faces of the delegates.' Yet, when a particularly well-spoken Helvetian defended his people, it was the soldiers who broke with the rest of the army and demanded that they be spared. '*effusis lacrimis et meliora constantius postulando impunitatem salutemque ciuitate impetrauere.*'[893] 'with flowing tears and requests for better treatment they secured the safety and health of the citizens.' Here a temporary breakdown of

[889] Tac. *Hist*. 1.67.2
[890] Tac. *Hist*. 1.68
[891] Tac. *Hist*. 1.69
[892] Tac. *Hist*. 1.69
[893] Tac. *Hist*. 1.69

the military hierarchy did not result in violence against the citizenry, but instead the soldiers were the ones to press for restraint.

The last minute deliverance of Vienna from the *Vitelliani* has already been discussed. In that situation the people of Lugdunum convinced the soldiers to attack Vienna by presenting it as a hostile city: '*cuncta illic externa et hostilia*.'[894] 'all in that place was foreign and hostile.' By framing the people of Vienna as enemies of the *Vitelliani*, the efforts of Lugdunum to convince them to attack Vienna were so successful: '*ut ne legati quidem ac duces partium restingui posse iracundiam exercitus arbitrarentur.*'[895] 'that, indeed, no legates or commanders of the faction judged it possible to restrain the wrath of the army.' It was only when the people of Vienna have made individual and personal supplications to the soldiers that they have calmed enough that Valens is able to placate them with a donative.[896] Thus while it was the state of disorder that prompts the soldiers to consider attacking Vienna, it was that same disorder that makes them available to the personal entreaties of the Viennenses, and prompted them to abandon the plan. In the cases of Rome, Liguria, the Helvetii, and Vienna the factor that drove the desires of the soldiers to attack was not the status of the military hierarchy, it was the fact that the soldiers had come to regard the civilian population as hostile.

[894] Tac. *Hist*. 1.65. This framing was successful despite the fact that both Vienne and Ludgunum were *coloniae*. Chilver (1979: 126)
[895] Tac. *Hist*. 1.66.1
[896] Tac. *Hist*. 1.66.1

It is in his account of the sack of Cremona that Tacitus goes to the greatest length to demonstrate that the soldiers had come to see the civilians as their enemy. Even as Antonius Primus tried to calm his men, Tacitus provides the reader with a list of grievances that the *Flaviani* held towards the inhabitants:

> exercitus praeter insitam praedandi cupidinem vetere odio ad excidium Cremonensium incubuit. iuvisse partis Vitellianas Othonis quoque bello credebantur; mox tertiadecimanos ad extruendum amphitheatrum relictos, ut sunt procacia urbanae plebis ingenia, petulantibus iurgiis inluserant. auxit invidiam editum illic a Caecina gladiatorum spectaculum eademque rursus belli sedes et praebiti in acie Vitellianis cibi...[897]
>
> Quite apart from its natural taste for plunder, the army had old scores to settle, and was bent on wiping out the Cremonese. It was held that they had once before supported the Vitellian side, in the war against Otho; and later the men of the Thirteenth, left there to build an amphitheatre, had been the target of their mockery and insults, this behaviour being typical of the impudent attitude of city mobs. The feeling against them was aggravated by a gladiatorial show Caecina had given at Cremona, its renewed employment as a base, and the way in which they offered the Vitellians food in the fighting line...

These grievances all frame Cremona firmly as Vitellian in the eyes of the soldiery.[898] And the prominence that Tacitus gives them suggest that they played as much a part in the motivations for sacking the city as the soldiers' desire for the loot within the walls. Later in the campaign, the Flavian army's desire to attack another Italian city, Carsulae, sparked another dispute between Primus and his men. The circumstances are very similar, Primus and

[897] Tac. *Hist*. 3.32

[898] This long list of grievances is not supported by Tacitus' narrative, he has given no indication that Cremona was an enthusiastic the Vitellian stronghold that the *Flaviani* and particularly the old Othonians among them – XIII Gemina had supported Otho before his death – seemed to regard it as. Wellesley (1972: 121)

his officers hope to negotiate the city's peaceful submission while the *milites* preferred to attack it quickly.[899] Here, unlike Cremona, Primus was successful, and the soldiers were convinced to wait in peace. The differing results from such similar situations are at first a puzzle. Ash argues that Primus' failure to protect Cremona and his success at Carsulae represent the anarchic state of civil war, in such circumstances the ability of a general to control his men cannot be predicted.[900] However, the determination of the soldiers of AD 69 to see everyone as either a supporter or an enemy of their emperor suggest a different interpretation. Cremona was too firmly established as a hostile, Vitellian city in the minds of the soldiery for Primus to divert their ire. Carsulae is never presented as offering either resistance to the Flavians or support for Vitellius, as a result Primus is able to persuade his men to restraint.

The soldiers of AD 69 approach the civilian populations with the same suspicion and hostility that they show towards their commanders and their officers. In the major outbreaks of violence in the *Historiae* the discipline of the men or the status of the armies' internal hierarchies play less of a rôle than the soldiers' perception of their victims as partisans of the other factions. Civilian populations were judged in the same way as the officers of the various armies, as loyal supporters or as hostile traitors. This new dynamic of power was as much a part of the willingness of the soldiers of AD 69 to do violence in Italy as the 'provincialisation' of the frontier armies.[901] The readiness of the largely

[899] Tac. *Hist*. 3.60
[900] Ash (1999:160-162)
[901] On the *Flaviani* and *Vitelliani* as foreigners see Master (2016:65-73); and Ash (1999:69), who argues that in Tacitus' narrative the Vitellians reflect the 4th century Gauls and the Flavians the Carthaginians.

Italian *Othoniani* to turn their swords on the population of Italy demonstrates that there was more to their violence than simple cultural difference.

## Conclusion

In the *Historiae* more than either his other works or the works of other historians Tacitus portrays the Roman army as a collection of individuals with their own motivations, loyalties, and temperaments. He gives the reader insight into their psyches and provides some of them with names. As a result the defining drive of the Tacitean soldier was not his identity as a fellow soldier to his peers nor was it his status as a member of a citizens' militia. Rather it was his personal relationship with his emperor, cultivated by appeals to his loyalty and his interests.

At first blush, this appears similar to the situation presented by both sources and scholars of the late republic. Then, too, the standard view has it, Rome had been split between armies whose loyalty was more strongly felt for their commanders than for the Roman government.[902] Yet the situation in AD 69 was different, and if anything, more dangerous. The soldiers of the civil wars allied with the prominent generals out of a hope for advancement but they did not have the same slavish loyalty demonstrated by, for example, the *Othoniani*.[903] Nor did loyalty to their general override the social structure of the army, in Caesar's commentaries, when tribunes and centurions consider

[902] On the civil wars as essentially feuds between personal armies, see De Blois (1987), Crawford (1992: 170-186); De Blois: 'we cannot speak of *the* Roman Army, but only of the armies of Sulla, Pompey, Caesar and so on' (1987: 6).
[903] De Blois (2007: 176).

defecting, they bring *milites* with them.[904] In comparison, as we have seen, in AD 69 even a hint of disloyalty could cost officers their lives at the hands of distrustful soldiers. Further, even during the civil wars, Roman soldiers were never fully separated from the Roman state.[905]

The soldiers of AD 69 interacted with the Roman state in a very different way. Their loyalty to the emperor overrode any other connexions. Tribunes and centurions were judged by their perceived loyalty to the soldiers' chosen candidate for emperor. The soldiers of other armies were regarded as enemies to such a degree that Otho's soldiers continued to fight the *Vitelliani* even after their own candidate had committed suicide. The civilian populations of Rome, Italy, and the provinces were judged to have earned the ire of a Roman army, not because of any feeling of foreignness, but because their real or perceived resistance cast them as enemy partisans and thus subject to the fury of the soldiers.

This tendency towards anarchy and violence was the dark secret of the new imperial system. A good emperor would take steps to secure the intermediate hierarchies, and thus restrain the imperial Roman soldier's tendency towards anarchic violence, but the tensions remained. Galba never understood this new context, and failed to secure the loyalty of his soldiers. Flavian success in the civil war was due to the care that Vespasian and his generals took to secure and maintain the internal social and military hierarchy

[904] E.g. Caes. *BCiv.* 1.74, 2.28, 2.44.
[905] Gruen (1974: 374-378).

of their faction, but even their troops turned violent when faced with the supporters of another emperor. Otho realised the dangers of circumventing the hierarchy of the Roman state following the riot of the praetorians, and, in his speech in the camp, tried to convince his men to see themselves not only as his soldiers, but as soldiers of the republic and the senate.

The difference between the soldiers of AD 69 and the soldiers of the republic can be illustrated by comparing the musings of Livy and Tacitus on two periods of severe military disorder. Reflecting on the mutiny of 342 BC, Livy describes the climactic meeting between the mutinous army and the soldiers gathered at Rome to meet them:

> ubi primum in conspectum uentum est et arma signaque agnouere, extemplo omnibus memoria patriae iras permulsit. nondum erant tam fortes ad sanguinem ciuilem nec praeter externa nouerant bella, ultimaque rabies secessio ab suis habebatur; itaque iam duces, iam milites utrimque congressus quaerere ac conloquia.[906]
>
> As soon as they came within sight of one another and recognized one another's arms and ensigns, all were at once reminded of their fatherland, and their anger cooled. Men were not yet so hardy in shedding the blood of countrymen; they knew no wars but those with outside nations, and thought that frenzy could go no further than secession from their people. And so on either side both the leaders and their men began to seek for ways to meet and confer together.

The Roman soldiers presented in Livy's history remain fundamentally Roman and incapable of making war upon each other. When the two armies come into contact, they immediately revert to Roman citizens, politicking and negotiating to find a resolution to the issue that prompted the mutiny. It remains the politically engaged and republican force that it is throughout Livy's account.

[906] Livy 7.40.1-2

There is a similar moment in Tacitus' *Historiae* when the Flavian soldiers enter Rome in pursuit of the remaining Vitellians:

> Id facinus post conditam urbem luctuosissimum foedissimumque rei publicae populi Romani accidit, nullo externo hoste, propitiis, si per mores nostros liceret, deis, sedem Iovis Optimi Maximi auspicato a maioribus pignus imperii conditam, quam non Porsenna dedita urbe neque Galli capta temerare potuissent, furore principum excindi.[907]
>
> This was the most deplorable and disgraceful event that had happened to the Commonwealth of Rome since the foundation of the city; for now, assailed by no foreign enemy, with Heaven ready to be propitious, had our vices only allowed, the seat of Jupiter Supremely Good and Great, founded by our ancestors with solemn auspices to be the pledge of Empire, the seat, which neither Porsenna, when the city was surrendered, nor the Gauls, when it was captured, had been able to violate, was destroyed by the madness of our Emperors.

By the time the Flavian soldiers entered Rome in the fourth book of the *Historiae*, a Roman army had reached the stage where it was capable causing the destruction of the Capitoline temple. This change was caused not by the fact that Roman legions had become essentially foreign, but because military service now involved a loyalty to the emperor that superseded any other allegiances. The cause of the destruction of the capital – as well as the sack of Cremona – was indeed the *furor principum*, as a war between emperors placed a soldier in a situation where his status as a citizen was subordinate to his status as a loyal subject of his emperor

The Roman army had become separated from the larger Roman state through its periods of service and the distances required in garrisoning the empire. The soldier's primary hierarchy was not the social structure of the Roman state, but rather a quasi-state that reflected Rome formed by his legion. He represented the general populace while his officers provided the social

[907] Tac. *Hist*. 3.72.1

strata above him. At the top of his hierarchy was the emperor. In times of peace, this system was sustainable, as soldiers of different armies shared the same emperor, even if the rest of their social structures were distinct. A soldier on the Rhine and a soldier in Syria had different *commilitiones* and officers but their emperor, the fundamental figure through which they related to the Roman state, was the same.

Alongside the account of the Pannonian mutiny, this chapter firmly pushes back against the longstanding and pervasive misunderstanding of Tacitus' representation of the common Roman soldier. In this the *Historiae* has been better served than the *Annales*, with two recent works examining Tacitus' portrayal of the Roman soldier in the work.[908] Both of these, I argue, are undermined by the fact that they remain to a degree in thrall to the traditional interpretation of the Tacitean soldier as irrational, disorganised, and foreign. In Ash's interpretation, the soldiers of the civil wars are largely extensions and reflections of their commanders. Missing from her account is any engagement with the fact that relationship between each of the factions and its soldiers is a relationship formed by negotiation and self interest, and the behaviour of the soldiers is influenced more by the nature of this relationship than by the personality of the generals. Master's work is also too quick to present the legionaries of the civil war as foreign, rather than Roman forces. This is not how Tacitus portrays the soldiers, the danger comes not from the men as somehow

[908] Ash (1999) and Master (2016).

foreign, but rather that each of the factions represents a competing form of the *res publica*, personified by its respective emperor.

The outbreak of civil war put stress on imperial system of military service. Each of the three quasi-states, the *Flaviani*, the *Othoniani*, and the *Vitelliani* had formed in different circumstances and as a result their relationship with their emperor was different. How they interacted with the other parts of the Roman state – the social structure, the civilians, the provincials – was filtered through that relationship. While military service had previously been a communal activity that built social structures – either the republic or the plebeian order – now it had become a personal activity that revolved around the dynamic between two people: the individual *miles gregarius* and the *princeps.*

# CONCLUSION

It now falls to me to restate my conclusions. I will begin by restating the conclusions of each of the chapters, then I will present the narrative of change that is formed by comparing the three ideologies of military service. Then I will demonstrate the value of this thesis as a study of the representation of soldiers and military service by my chosen historians. I will deal first with the individual specifics of this representation and then expand the context to the larger implications of the way that soldiers and military service are presented by Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. This provide new contributions to our understanding of each historian's writing of the past.

In the first chapter I examined how, to Sallust, the Roman people developed a *habitus* that was responsible for Rome's rise to greatness through military service that strengthened *concordia*, not undermined it. This *habitus* was shared throughout the Roman state by all citizens regardless of social class and was marked by a desire for *gloria*, a disdain for hardship, and a frugal home. This showed that Sallust's conception early Rome had a much larger place for the whole Roman citizenry than has often been understood. Once the Roman people had become fractured, driven by greed and ambition the *habitus* was no longer sustainable. Without the old *habitus* to channel the drives and inclinations of the Roman people, the republic soon became corrupt. However, given the fundamental nature of military service in the Sallust's early Rome, by conducting war in the traditional way later generals could cultivate within his army a reflection of the *virtutes* of the *maiores*. The

reforming nature of military command conducted according to the *mos maiorum* is demonstrated by examinations of the campaigns of Metellus and Marius in the Numidian war, Sulla in the east, Catiline in Italy. Military service in Sallust's conception of the republic is not, then, an obligation that citizens had to discharge. Rather, it is an activity fundamental to being Roman and one that performed correctly reforms and strengthens the entire Roman people.

The second chapter demonstrated that, in Livy's narrative, military service is presented as the foundation of a distinctly plebeian military identity which provided the social capital and status that plebeians used to legitimise themselves. This military identity was distinct from, and often at odds with élite Romans. As the primary focus for plebeian self-identity, the Roman army was the primary engine of organised resistance to the *patres*. In Rome's later foreign wars, the Roman army continued to be a politically engaged and continued to agitate for its interests and rights when on campaign. Throughout Livy's narrative, military service is presented as the primary way that plebeian citizens engaged with the Roman state as citizens, and the mechanism by which they secured their *libertas* and ensured that they benefited from the actions of the state.

Chapter Three examined how Tacitus engaged with the earlier models of military service in his portrayal of the mutinies of AD 14. There, the historian represented the mutinies not an imperial revolts, but rather as a final representation of kind of mutiny common during the republic. In AD 14 the soldiers revolted over practical concerns about their conditions, not to appoint

a new emperor. This was the traditional republican method of resistance by dissatisfied soldiers of the republic. Tacitus used the suppression of the mutiny to show that under the principate mutiny now presented a much greater danger to the state than it had before and that imperial soldiers no longer had access to mutiny as a way to address grievances. Imperial military service now had as its chief pillar not the connexion between the soldier and the state, but the connexion between the soldier and the emperor. The tension and violence in the narrative is caused by the soldiers misunderstanding of the new dynamic of imperial soldiering.

The final chapter considered how, in his account of the events of AD 69, Tacitus continues to represent the fundamental relationship of the individual Roman soldier was his loyalty to the emperor not his connexion to with the state or to his fellow citizen. This was the only way in which a Roman soldier engaged with the Roman state. As a result, in a context where there were multiple emperors, soldiers regarded both other soldiers and citizens as either supporters or enemies of their chosen emperor. This made the armies, in effect, separate states at war not just with each other but with the larger Roman world. Military service now no longer forged and strengthened a soldier's identity as a Roman citizen, but rather it cultivated a new identity as a loyal soldier of the emperor.

To Sallust, military service as a communal and reforming process by which a citizen takes engages with his state and his fellow citizens. For Livy it was the means by which the plebeian citizenry asserted and protected its

status through communal action and negotiation with the élites. Finally, service under the eagles took place in a context where the Roman soldier's only significant connexion to the Roman state was through his personal loyalty to the emperor. In the works of each historian, the behaviour and attitude of the soldier is presented as a reflection of the place that their military service plays in the Roman state.

This thesis has used close readings to elucidate the rôle of military service in the Roman state as understood by Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. It has established that each saw Roman soldiers as an important and influential part of the *res publica* and how to each of them, but in different ways, the soldiers represented the part of the Roman people capable of wielding political power in opposition to the élite. The historians' understanding of the political rôle of soldiers is fundamentally linked to issues of the citizenship and *libertas* of the Roman people, as in each of their accounts, soldiers represent the largest number of representations of non-élite citizens. Understanding the ideology of military service for each of the historians provides insight into their understanding of the place of Roman citizens in the *res publica*.

The representation of the *miles gregarius* in the works of Roman historians is an issue that has seen relatively few detailed surveys. This is particularly striking compared to the wealth of scholarship on the experience of Roman soldiers serving in her armies, both under the republic and the

principate.[909] Carrié, in what remains the closest thing to a general survey, noted this in 1993.[910] Since then there has been some movement, but it has tended towards examining how their representation has figured into larger cultural discourse, for example Roman conceptions of manliness.[911] Other surveys have lumped the soldier with other related but distinct groups.[912] To a greater or lesser degree, however, much of these surveys remain influenced by the traditional idea, articulated by scholars like Carrié, Campbell, and Phang, that because the Roman soldier was poor, the élite authors disdained him and did not give his presentation much thought.

The chapters of this thesis have challenged that perception of the individual historians, whether driven by Livy's disinterest or Tacitus disdain. Yet this thesis only begins the work of complicating the our understanding of a generally negative and dismissive attitude towards Roman soldiers. If this perception cannot be said to apply to three such prominent Latin historians as Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, then surely it cannot be confidently projected across Roman literature – or at least the remaining Roman historians.

This thesis proceeded by carefully surveying the portrayal of soldiers and defining the ideology of military service presented in Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus. These have been shown to be far more complicated that the simple

[909] E.g. Le Bohec (1989: 36-67); Rosenstein (2004); Lendon (2005); Phang (2008); Rankov (2017). A more detailed survey of this scholarship is present in the introduction.
[910] Carrié (1993: 101).
[911] On this, see McDonnell (2006) and Späth (2012)
[912] Milne (2009) does not draw a strong distinction between aristocratic *homo militaris* and the *miles gregarius*, lumping them together in her definition of 'soldier'. This has the effect of focalising the experience of military service not just with the élite authors but with the élite individuals within the historical narratives. Master (2016) closely associates the *miles gregarius* with the *auxillia*, sidestepping the thorny issue of the status of the *miles* as a citizen.

repeating of commonplaces or aping of their sources. Rather, they reflect each historian's individual understanding of the part that military service played in the Roman state and the way that Roman citizens, as soldiers, engaged with their community. This contributes something new both to our understanding of the how each of the chosen authors reconstructed the past, and to the larger dialogues of military service present in the ancient sources. It also provides insight into how Roman authors conceived of the crisis and reformation of the *res publica* as Rome transitioned from a republic to an empire. As the sources themselves demonstrate, that process involved the transition of Roman soldiers from citizens to subjects.

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